SUMMARY
Since gaining independence from British Colonial rule in 1960 and becoming a republic in 1963, Nigeria has been plagued by organized violence. Prior to entrenching democratic governance, Nigeria witnessed several military regimes characterized by authoritarian leadership and multiple threats of insecurity. In 2009, Nigeria returned to democratic governance under the leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Despite a turn to civilian rule, Nigeria continues to confront rising rates of insecurity with repeated cycles of violence recorded in all regions predominantly the North, West, East and Niger-delta regions.
Since 1989, Nigeria has experienced the inter-state, intrastate, non-state and one-sided categories of organized violence, as defined by UCDP.
2025
The total level of organized violence remained high in Nigeria in 2025 and was spread across the country. Compared with 2024, violence increased, although it remained at levels similar to those recorded in recent years and well below the peak reached in 2024.
The state-based category was the deadliest, causing the highest number of fatalities in 2025. The Nigerian government remained challenged by two main Islamist groups fighting in two separate state-based conflicts; IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighting in a conflict over territory referred to as the Islamic State; and the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) fighting in a conflict over government. The territorial conflict between the Nigerian government and the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP) which commenced in March 2015 has progressed over the years. Compared to 2024, an increase in violence was recorded in 2025. The fighting was mainly concentrated in Borno State, in northeastern Nigeria, but the group continued to spread into Yobe State during 2025. Throughout the year, the Government of Nigeria relied heavily on airstrikes when targeting the group, specifically in the Lake Chad area, which resulted in scores of IS fighters being killed. The Islamic State’s West African Province targeted army bases and also relied on Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs), which were often planted on roads to target Nigerian army patrols but frequently resulted in civilian fatalities when detonated by civilian vehicles.
The state-based conflict against ISWAP is in a sense a continuation of the conflict fought between the Nigerian government and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), with the latter group fighting for puritanical Islamic rule throughout Nigeria. Even though they are notably weaker than during their peak in the mid-2010s, JAS continued to fight the Government. The fighting remained concentrated in the northeast of the country, more specifically in Borno State, close to the Cameroonian border, as well as in the Diffa region in Niger and at the shores of Lake Chad in Chad. A few events attributed to JAS were also recorded in North Central Nigeria, specifically in Niger State, close to the Shiroro reservoir. Compared to 2024, the level of state-based violence between the Nigerian government and JAS decreased, although the group’s one-sided attacks against civilians increased.
During 2025, the Nigerian government continued to fight against IPOB, a militia group pushing for secession from the state of Nigeria. The intensity of the territorial conflict decreased notably in 2025 compared to previous years but remained concentrated within the South East of Nigeria. IPOB continued with its tactic of targeting police stations and checkpoints. The group also clashed with government forces when they imposed their weekly sit-at-home order. Additionally, the Nigerian government conducted several raids targeting IPOB/ESN hide-outs during the year.
Non-state conflicts are prevalent in Nigeria and the violence is spread across the country and includes several different types of actors. The conflict between ISWAP and JAS – which has been the primary driver of non-state violence during the past years - decreased compared to 2024. Yet, deadly clashes between the two jihadist groups erupted in the second half of the year, reportedly wakening some JAS factions and shifting territorial control in Borno state.
Another prominent non-state actor is the Fulani. Although not a formally organized militia, the group embodies loosely organized formations that carry out violence against other ethnic groups across Nigeria. Similar to previous year, a prevalent conflict is the one between Fulani herders and Tiv farmers, stemming from opposing interests between the groups with Tiv factions alleging the destruction of agricultural crops by grazing cattle. However, the origin of the Fulani-Tiv conflict is rooted in deep-seated contentions resulting from changing power dynamics in urbanization and boundary lines. The violence, characterized by tit-for-tat attacks, increased notably, resulting in 388 fatalities and was thus the deadliest non-state conflict in Nigeria during 2025. Contributing to the major spike of fatalities was the deadly June attack on Yerewata village in Benue state, resulting in over a hundred residents killed. The Fulani also frequently clashed with the Birom and Irigwe ethnic groups, resulting also in 118 respectively 78 fatalities.
The deadly cult violence, characterized by supremacy battles, escalating reprisal attacks and clashes over territorial control, continued to ravage Nigeria in 2025. Black Axe remained as a prevalent non-state actor in UCDP data that frequently clashed with other cult groups, especially in the southern parts of the country. Violence involving Black Axe resulted in 111 fatalities in 2025, fighting other cult groups such as Eyie and SVC.
Meanwhile, the level of one-sided violence in Nigeria notably increased compared to previous years. ISWAP and JAS remained the main driving actors of one-sided violence, mainly centered in northeastern Nigeria, specifically in the Lake Chad region. Notably, JAS increased its level of one-sided violence compared to 2024 and was responsible for some of the deadliest one-sided attacks in Nigeria during 2025. The group targeted fishing villages in Borno state and also farmers in Gwoza LGA, close to the Cameroonian border. On 15 May, JAS attacked Mallam Karamti and Kwatandawashi villages, in the Lake Chad area, killing 57 civilians and kidnapping over 70. The group also used suicide bombs—once a common tactic during its 2015 peak—as it targeted public places in Borno state, resulting in civilian deaths. Lastly, also contributing to the increase of one-sided violence are deadly attacks by bandit groups that frequently target rural villages in northwestern Nigeria. The bandit group led by Bello Turji, mainly operating in Sokoto and Zamfara states, carried out raids against villages which resulted in over 70 civilian fatalities. Meanwhile, in Katsina state, Forces of Barbaru was responsible for a deadly attack against a mosque in Gidan Mantau village.
REPEATED CYCLES OF VIOLENCE
Nigeria has encountered repeated cycles of violence propelled by ethnic, political, economic and religious contentions, which have become interconnected over time, with several notable actors transcending state boundaries and alliances of groups pitting against each other along different dividing lines.
There were four clear peaks in organized violence in Nigeria within the 1989-2021 period. While these peaks were driven by different types of violence, at least some of them were closely interlinked and part of the same overarching context.
Early- and mid-1990s: non-state conflicts cause bloodshed
The first peak, in the early and mid-1990s, was tied to a number of non-state conflicts between different ethnic communities, one of which was between the Adoni and Ogoni ethnic groups, played out in the Niger-delta region. The Adoni-Ogoni conflict contributed to one of the highest fatalities recorded in non-state conflict within the 1990s. The Niger-delta region is home to most oil wells that generate Nigeria’s major source of revenue. Given multifarious ethnic groups domiciled within the region, a number of groups have forged alliances along ethnic lines to pursue several interests. This polarization has led to the contestation of land ownership of oil-rich areas, conflicts over taxation of land, employees at oil facilities, etc. The oil-rich lands in the Niger-Delta usually border the Ogoni ethnic communes. Despite its oil wealth, the region has been plagued with underdevelopment, pollution and high poverty levels. MOSOP, an umbrella organization representing the Ogoni population in the Niger Delta has noted that the reluctance by the Ogoni ethnic clan to allow for exploitation and/or the building of pipelines on their land is the basis for being targeted by the international oil companies and the Nigerian government through the Adoni people. This conflict has also been closely linked to the Ogoni-Okrika (Ijaw) and Ndoki-Ogoni clashes, which arose in the wake of 1992 as a result of boundary disputes and land settlement contestations resulting in over 100 fatalities. Non-state inter-ethnic communal clashes between the Atyab and Hausa ethnic communities also contributed to rising fatality rates in the early to mid-1990s. The actual conflict, which began as ethnic contentions, soon evolved into widespread religious violence between the mainly Muslim Hausa, and Christian Atyap ethnic groups in Kaduna State. Religious conflicts have been predominantly common within the North given the equal distribution of the Christian and Moslem population within the region with the fear of domination motivating conflicts on the basis of mistrust and suspicion.
Late 1990s-early 2000s: Prevalence of inter-ethnic tensions characterized by incidences of one-sided Violence and Non-State Conflicts
The second peak of violence occurred within late 1990s to early 2000s. This period was mainly characterized by incidences of one-sided violence and non-state conflicts. The highest fatalities were tied to the Odi Massacre – an attack by the Government of Nigeria on civilians in the predominantly Ijaw town of Odi in Bayelsa State. This attack came in the context of the clamourings within the Niger-Delta region over resource control and the need for the federal government to address environmental pollution and land degradation fostered by oil mining. On 20th November 1999, military personnel acting on the orders of the Nigerian government invaded Odi town in search of armed militia groups demolishing every single building in sight killing thousands of unarmed civilians. Over the next ten days, the destruction continued guided by a reconnaissance aircraft that flew over on a daily basis for ten days or more resulting in the death of 2,478 civilians. This event formed the bedrock for the emergence of more armed groups within the region that continued clamourings for resource control and secession. As civilian rule returned in 1999, ushering in political liberalization, inter-ethnic tensions also heightened in Nigeria and a vast number of non-state armed conflicts erupted in the 2000s. Particularly of note is the tensions between Christians and Moslems, which accounted for over 1,800 fatalities. The fact that Christianity and Islam are the prominent religions in Nigeria and that the religions are represented in different parts of the country has on several occasions led to mobilization along religious lines. In late 1999, Islamic clerics sought to impose Sharia law as a norm within the northern region, leading to widespread contestations and tensions resulting in rioting, with repeated arson attacks directed towards religious buildings, i.e. churches and mosques. Since the violence was religious at its core, the display, and practicing of, traditional religious rites became targets of attacks by groups of Muslims or Christians. The issue of imposing sharia legislation in the northern areas of Nigeria would cause even more fatalities in the years following 2000. Other bouts of non-state conflicts recorded within this period were inter-ethnic conflicts between the Hausa-Igbo, Yoruba; Ife - Modakeke and Jukun - Tiv which has its roots in the broader spectrum of the ethnic and religious non-state conflicts that have ravaged Nigeria in the past and intensified with the end of military rule, from 1999 and onwards.
Mid-2000s to 2015: Emergence of conflict actors along tribal lines and escalation of organized violence
While the period 1989-2009 saw bouts of violence, they paled in comparison to developments starting in 2010 to 2015. Trends show organized violence rising steadily in 2009 to 2010 escalating dramatically and peaking in 2014-2015. While trends reveal a de-escalation of violence from 2015, conflict levels remaining on a plateau and way above the levels seen prior to 2014-2015.
The first escalation of organized violence in 2010-2012, prior to the main peak in 2014-15, was mainly driven by developments in non-state conflict. The Fulani emerged as a major actor within this period, engaging in organized violence within various states. The Birom-Fulani conflict formed a part of the larger patterns of ethnic and religious tensions between communities in Plateau State and accounted for the highest fatality rates in 2010 to 2012. The Birom ethnic group are an indigenous Christian community in Plateau state, while the Fulani are traditionally cattle herders, and mainly Muslims. Small-scale conflicts between the communities over grazing rights and cattle raids have existed for a long time, however, with the Fulani herders migrating to Plateau State in search of grazing land and settling within some parts of the community, tensions and contestations began over land ownership and subsequently political and economic power. The introduction of Sharia law in most northern states triggered conflicts with religious undertones in many areas, causing an influx of migrants, particularly the Hausas to Jos, Plateau State fueling tensions along religious lines. This formed the bedrock for the Birom-Fulani, Hausa conflict, with the Hausas joining forces with the Fulani ethnic clan to contest land ownership and political power. Muslim communities within Plateau State also wanted religious dominance of Islam. This period further witnessed an escalation in tensions between Christians and Muslims in various parts of the Northern region particularly the North-central and North-Eastern states. It is important to note that ethnic and religious conflicts that occurred within this period must be placed within the wider spectrum of conflicts that have plagued Nigeria in the past and intensified with the end of military rule, from 1999 and onwards.
During the years that followed, activity in state-based conflicts escalated to high proportions incurring dire fatality rates. Particularly from 2013, organized violence began steadily increasing, reaching an all-time high in 2014. A number of factors contributed to this escalation in organized violence such as the repeated attacks by JAS and later, the Islamic State (IS). JAS was formed in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno state, Northern Nigeria and became active in dyads against the Government of Nigeria with a stated goal to challenge western education, topple the government and establish puritanical Islamic rule in Nigeria. In late 2010, the group intensified its attacks and broadened its scope to other Northern States thereby gaining control over an increased territory in Maiduguri, Borno State, Yobe State and some other states in the North-Central region.
The conflict between the Nigerian government and the Islamic State's West African Province (ISWAP) is also in a sense a continuation of the conflict fought between the Nigerian government and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad commonly called Boko Haram or JAS, but over a different incompatibility. In March 2015, the Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) - a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – and a few days later, the latter accepted the pledge. With that, what had previously been Boko Haram was integrated into IS, and renamed Wilayat (province) West Africa. The group subsequently switched its goal to the more wide-reaching one stated by IS: the creation of a global Islamic State. However, there were leadership tussles within the group with the merger and the end of 2016 witnessed a split with Boko Haram exiting IS and regrouping. It retained its main base in Sambisa forest and surrounding areas. IS, for its part, initially withdrew to the Nigeria-Niger-Chad-Cameroon border region, in the northern and northeastern-most part of Borno state. While the Nigerian military was occupied with its ongoing offensive against Boko Haram in Sambisa forest, fighters of IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP) got the welcome opportunity to re-group, build up its capabilities and increase its numbers relatively undisturbed in the periphery. Over time, IS was able to extend its area of operation, and by late 2017- early 2018, the group was also active in the central areas of Borno, and neighboring Yobe states.
It is important to note that one-sided violence perpetuated by the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad and IS was the main driver of organized violence and accounted for the highest rates of fatalities in 2014 and 2015, causing a peak in casualty figures as was ever reported in Nigeria. In 2014, the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad killed over 5000 civilians with fatality rates higher than state-based conflicts. The year 2015 also saw extreme levels of one-sided violence by JAS. As its modus operandi, the group began targeted killings of civilians i.e. traditional and religious leaders, including moderate Islamic clerics, politicians and residents of divergent communities as a means to propagate its mandate. The group also recruited suicide bombers as well as led the bombings of churches, markets, and public places with the use of homemade bombs/explosive devices. The militia group also made international headlines with the abduction of 246 school girls from a community in Chibok, Borno State torching down houses and killing other civilians in the process.
Post 2015 to 2025: A peak in non-state conflicts and subsequently all categories of organized violence
While the levels of violence de-escalated in both the state-based conflicts and in one-sided violence after the main peak in 2014-15, non-state conflicts picked up. Some of these conflicts were linked as part of the same context as the ongoing state-based conflicts, such as the one pitting JAS against a local vigilante outfit called Yan Gora (also known as CJTF). The Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad - Yan Gora conflict emanated as a result of clashes between armed youths within a village in Borno State and JAS. A pattern of retaliatory attacks also occurred within this period especially in state-based conflicts between the Nigerian government who in a bid to reclaim territories staged various military operations capturing and killing suspected members of JAS and IS groups. In return, both groups intensified its attacks on military forces and communities within states to draw the attention of the government and lay claims to territory as a means to ward off the opposition.
While trends depict a minimal reduction in organized violence in 2018, the following years reveal a steady rise in all three categories of organized violence particularly state-based and non-state conflicts. In the state-based category, the most violent conflict was the one fought between the government and IS’ West Africa Wing. The latter broadened its target areas, encroaching into Southern States and the conflict incurred around 800 fatalities in 2017-18, and then escalated, causing 1600 deaths in 2021. The Nigerian Government was a notable actor within this period in several clashes including with the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a militia group within the South East of Nigeria pushing for secession from the state of Nigeria. The secessionist agenda was fueled by the massacre of the Igbos living in Northern Nigeria between 1953–1966, the Biafra civil war and divergent claims of marginalization which was evident from the 1970s.
The non-state category of organized violence accounted for the second highest number of fatalities in 2021, exceeding fatalities in one-sided violence. Trends show a significant increase from almost 500 in 2020 to over 900 casualties in 2021. The IS - JAS conflict was notable as the most violent non-state conflict with over 300 fatalities. Both actors have predominantly been involved in clashes at the national, state and communal level in Nigeria and other border countries. Conflict erupted after IS kidnapped a dozen women linked to JAS, which responded by attacking IS positions, allegedly killing several militants and freeing the kidnapped women. Since IS broke off from the Shekau-led JAS in 2016, a bitter war of attrition, a battle for supremacy and violent confrontations between both factions have been recurrent. This escalated rapidly and evolved to become one of the most deadly non-state conflicts in Nigeria. This period also witnessed recurrent incidences of farmer-herder conflicts with the Fulani as a major actor in several non-state conflicts such as the Birom-Fulani, Fulani-Tiv which dominated the scene in 2018; the Jukun-Tiv conflict in 2019; the Atyap-Fulani conflict in 2020 and a resurfacing of the Fulani-Tiv conflict in 2021, all spanning the Northern and Southern states. Several underlying causes propelled a peak in non-state conflicts within this period including structural/governance issues, electoral violence, and marginalization claims by certain ethnic groups like the Tiv, Igbos leading to organization along ethnic lines as a reactionary measure to the aforementioned issues.
Organized violence perpetrated by bandit groups emerged in northwestern Nigeria during the 2010s. Initially loosely organized along ethnic and communal lines and engaging in small-scale cattle rustling, the bandit groups became increasingly militarized over time and violence escalated. By the 2020s, banditry had evolved into one of Nigeria’s most pressing security threats. Bandit groups raided villages, extorted farmers and miners, kidnapped residents for ransom, and communities had to pay levies or – if unable to pay – risked facing deadly attacks or mass abductions. Due to movement and infighting, the groups often shifted in size and leadership, and were thus difficult to map. Moreover, bandit groups frequently clashed with Nigerian security forces and engaged in deadly small-scale village raids. In response, the government responded with military operations, including airstrikes that occasionally resulted in civilian deaths. However, the state-based violence between the Nigerian Government and formally organized bandit groups is not portrayed in the final UCDP data, as the bandit groups do not have a clearly stated incompatibility with the government. Thus, the violence is not applicable to the UCDP definitions of state-based armed conflict. Non-state and one-sided violence involving bandit groups, on the other hand, is applicable. Several non-state conflicts have been recorded, such as the clash between Forces of Dan Chaki and Forces of Gwaska Dankarami. The one-sided violence is mainly characterized by attacks on rural communities in northwestern Nigeria, sometimes in combination with mass abductions of residents. In August 2025, Forces of Barbaru attacked a mosque in Gidan Mantau village and neighbouring communities in Zamfara state, killing over 50 civilians and abducting dozens.
PRE-1989 CONFLICTS
UCDP has also recorded intra-state conflicts from 1960 to 1989. Following Nigeria’s independence from British colonial rule in 1960, the northern section of British Cameroon was incorporated into the newly independent state that adopted the name Federal Republic of Nigeria. The history of independent Nigeria came to be marked by divisions between the Muslim North and the Christian and Animist South as well as inter-ethnic tensions. In January 1966, an Igbo Military faction (forces of Patrick Nzeogwu) staged a coup d’état that soon prompted a countercoup by members of the military, who feared Igbo domination. The intrastate armed conflict terminated civilian rule with the installation of General Yakubu Gowon as president. In the late 1970s, President Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo initiated the return to civilian rule and was succeeded by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the winner of the 1979 elections. The Second Republic lasted only from 1979 to 1983. After another 15 years of military government, civilian rule returned with the presidential elections of 1999.
In 1967, another intrastate conflict broke out when the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra, formed by the three states of the Eastern region, declared its secession. After a massive government offensive, the militarily inferior rebel forces formally surrendered to the government in early 1970. Despite the end of the Biafra civil war, there were allegations of marginalization and discrimination by the Igbos setting the stage for secessionist agitations. These agitations intensified with inter-ethnic clashes and the farmer-herder conflicts as well as the agenda championed by IS and Boko Haram for an Islamic state.
