This dyad belongs to the conflict Nigeria: Government
Summary of conflict Nigeria: Government
In 1966 Nigerian army officers carried out a coup d’état. This constituted the onset of the Nigerian conflict over government power. In July 2009, a second phase of the conflict started as violent clashes broke out in northern Nigeria between security forces and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) resurfaced in late 2010 and intense fighting continued on a high level.
In 2025, even though notably weaker than during their peak in the mid-2010s, JAS continued to fight the Nigerian government. Compared to previous years, the intensity of the conflict decreased. The majority of the violence remained concentrated in northeastern Nigeria, although a few events were also recorded in north-central Nigeria. Clashes took place on Nigerian, Nigerien, and Chadian territory, and resulted in major losses for the rebel group partly due to the government’s use of airstrikes.
1966 coup d’état
Ethnically, linguistically and religiously mixed Nigeria saw the eruption of violence in the wake of the first post-independence parliamentary- and legislative elections, held in 1964-65. On 15 January 1966, a coup d’état was carried out by Nigerian army officers including Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. In parallel attacks on different locations, the putschists killed a number of persons, including the Federal Prime Minister. According to estimates the toll from this day rose to the level of at least 25 battle-related deaths.
Later the same day Major Nzeogwu, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces in a radio broadcast, proclaimed the suspension of the constitution. He also stated that the Revolutionary Council employed military force to achieve the aim of “establish[ing] a strong united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife.” Following the coup, Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi gained power and established a provisional government, with militaries in high-ranking positions.
Most putschists belonged to the Igbo group, and there were fears that the coup was a way of establishing Igbo rule in the country. Moreover, after Ironsi seized power he faced accusations of Igbo partiality. Later in the year, anti-Igbo violence erupted. During July Ironsi among others was killed in a countercoup, following which Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon became the new government leader.
The January putsch constitutes the start of the Nigerian conflict over governmental power, however, subsequent to 1966 the conflict was not coded as active until 2009 and the advent of Islamist Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad’s (JAS) clashes with Nigerian forces.
Origins of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad and the 2009 armed conflict
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and is a heterogeneous state comprising numerous ethnicities, languages, and religious groups. Since independence, Nigeria has on several occasions experienced different forms of conflict related to divisions between Muslims and Christians. The Muslim population is mainly concentrated in the north, and since 1999 a number of northern states have adopted sharia law. On several occasions, communal violence has broken out between Muslim and Christian groups, and in 2004 an armed conflict broke out as an Islamic group sought to establish an independent Muslim state in northern Nigeria. However, as many analysts have pointed out, conflicts along ethnic lines have usually been motivated by economic and political grievances rather than by religion itself.
The 2009 conflict between the Government of Nigeria and the Islamic sect Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) (by the time commonly known as Boko Haram) appears to have similar origins as the group Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa which was involved in the 2004 territorial conflict. Some analysts claim that the groups originated in the same locations, in Maiduguri of Borno state and Kanamma of Yobe state. Furthermore, there appears to be some overlap between the two groups in terms of leadership. However, the top leader of JAS until 2009, Mohammed Yussuf, does not have any apparent connections to Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa, and while that group fought for the independence of a part of northern Nigeria, JAS stated the goal to topple the government and set up puritanical Islamic rule.
JAS, was formed in 2002 or 2003 in Maiduguri of Borno state in northern Nigeria. The founders of the group were reportedly inspired by the Talibans of Afghanistan and the group has stated the goal to topple the government and set up puritanical Islamic rule. There have been allegations that local politicians were involved in the establishment of the group, with the purpose of orchestrating violence to secure political power, but such claims have not been verified. Followers of the group, drawn from various ethnic groups and social backgrounds, reportedly prayed in separate mosques and could be distinguished by their long beards and black or red headscarves. According to their belief, all who did not follow their strictly puritanical interpretation of Islam should be considered infidels. “Boko Haram” has in most reports been translated roughly as meaning "Western education is a sin" in the Hausa language spoken by many in northern Nigeria. However, the group itself has rejected this interpretation and stated that their name should rather be understood as meaning "Western civilization is forbidden". In 2010, the group announced that rather than the commonly used “Boko Haram”, their official name was Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which means “Group Committed to Propagating the Prophets Teachings and Jihad”. (It should be noted by the 2020s, the name “Boko Haram” came to encompass all terrorist and armed groups in Nigeria, referring both to JAS and IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP). Thus, the name “Boko Haram” is no longer a clear synonym for JAS.
Until 2009, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad was relatively unknown, but in late July that year, it launched an attack against a police station, marking the beginning of an armed conflict with the government. The violence that year culminated as the security forces lay siege to the group’s base in Maiduguri, and the rebel leader Mohammed Yussuf was captured and killed. While the government reported that most of the group’s members had been killed or captured, some managed to escape and later made threats of renewed violence. After the death of Mohammed Yussuf, the leadership and cohesion of the group became unclear. On 14 August 2009, a statement signed by a purported acting leader, Mallam Sanni Umaru, stated that the armed struggle would continue and warned that attacks would soon be launched all over Nigeria. Statements have since been issued by several different people claiming to represent the group, fuelling speculations that the group had split into several factions; somewhat contradictory responses to government offers of dialogue have further strengthened such suspicions. Many believe the main faction of the group has since Yussuf’s death been led by Abubakar Shekau, who was Yussuf’s deputy leader and was initially believed to also have been killed in the 2009 violence.
The fighting resumes and intensifies
After a year of low activity, featuring only minor attacks that did not reach the threshold of armed conflict, JAS intensified its attacks on state targets in 2011. In the first half of the year, attacks mainly followed the earlier pattern with small-scale attacks on police and other security targets, mainly in Maiduguri; however, as the year evolved, the group’s attacks became more sophisticated and spread to a larger geographic area. In June, they attacked the police headquarters in Abuja in an apparent suicide bombing using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VIBED), representing a major leap in technological sophistication; similar attacks followed, many of them outside the traditional operating area of the group. These changes in tactics prompted widespread concern that the group was receiving training and support from groups such as the al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or Somalia’s Al-Shabaab.
The government’s response to the escalating violence comprised a strengthened security force presence in Maiduguri and surrounding areas, while simultaneously offering talks and an amnesty to militants prepared to lay down arms. Negotiation offers were however met with high demands from JAS, and no talks appear to have taken place during 2011. Meanwhile, in late December President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in parts of northern Nigeria bordering Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
The following year saw a continued escalation of the conflict, both in terms of the number of people killed and in its geographical scope.
The year got off to a dramatic start, with the large-scale attacks on the northern town of Kano in January. On 20 January JAS carried out a highly complex attack when they targeted security forces at eight different locations throughout Kano and subsequently exchanged gunfire with the police and military for several hours. In total at least 186 people died. After the attack, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in 15 Local Government Areas (LGAs) across four states in the north.
Geography-wise, JAS expanded its area of operations from Borno state, in the extreme northeast of the country, all the way to Sokoto state in the northwest, thus covering the full breadth of the country. In August, the group announced that it would also spread its struggle south, stating that their “Islamic revolution” was not limited to the northern states. While the threat was not realized during the rest of the year, there were growing indications that JAS had managed to infiltrate Kogi State in the country’s North-Central Zone, which is much further south than previously recorded. Many analysts agree that by establishing such a presence, the Islamists could use the state as a staging point for operations in southern Nigeria.
During the year Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad carried out frequent attacks on the police and the military, engaging especially the latter’s elite Joint Task Force in bitter street battles. The group also targeted local government officials and customs officers, as well as stepped up its attacks on unarmed civilians. A new tactic adopted by the group was the systematic destruction of hundreds of telecom towers, whereby the security forces were unable to track down the group’s members. The security forces, for its part, carried out a number of offensives, especially during the last four months of the year, and were able to inflict serious losses on the rebels. Furthermore, more than ten commanders were either captured or killed during this period.
Another notable development during 2012 was the emergence of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad splinter group Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina fi Biladi Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; commonly called Ansaru). Details about the group remain murky, but it seems clear that the reason behind its break from JAS was the latter’s attacks on civilians.
As the year 2013 started, JAS’ operations once again came to focus mainly on its home area in Borno state, as well as neighboring Adamawa and Yobe. The group was able to establish control and authority over some areas of Borno, destroying the national flag and instead raising their own black one. During this period, they launched a number of bloody attacks on border towns, and state officials were forced to flee ten LGAs of the state.
This took place amid rumors of ceasefire deals and the launching of a negotiations commission by the government. Neither of these attempts bore fruit, however, and violence continued to escalate on the ground. Subsequently, on 14 May, President Goodluck Jonathan imposed a state of emergency in the three northeastern states, declaring that the level of violence called for "extraordinary measures". In addition, a large-scale military offensive was launched, with thousands of troops participating, supported by fighter jets. All telecommunications were suspended, which cut the area off from the rest of the country and made for difficulties in reporting. During the offensive, a militia emerged in Borno, sometimes called Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and sometimes Yan Gora. It consisted of local youths, armed with bows, arrows, and axes but no guns. They were recognized by the military and given training and ID cards and were then used as a proxy militia. Furthermore, mass arrests were carried out as the army pushed the rebels out of towns and cities.
The offensive was initially deemed a success; as the Islamists were forced to retreat into semi-arid land on the northern border with Niger, and to the Mandara Mountains along the border with Cameroon, and violence declined. However, JAS proved resilient and attacks and killings soon intensified again. Aside from its usual targets, the group also declared all-out war against Yan Gora (see JAS – Yan Gora), which meant that the civilian population came to suffer even more. The group also stepped up attacks against schools. With violence surging, the state of emergency was extended in November.
Establishment of an Islamic caliphate, a joint West African offensive and Shekau’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State
The year 2014 saw a change in JAS’ strategy, in that it more than before sought to control and defend conquered territory. Amidst denials by the government, the group made large territorial gains. By the end of the year, JAS controlled an area roughly the size of Belgium, in which Shekau declared the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Aside from consolidating its territorial gains in northeastern Nigeria, the group increased its presence in Cameroon, which saw both attacks on the civilian population and military targets.
In January 2015, JAS carried out an attack on the town of Baga and its surrounding that was described as its most brutal one that far into the conflict. While initially targeting Doron Baga and the base of the so-called Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the bulk of the violence was directed at the civilian population. Fatality estimates of the attack vary between a few hundred and 2000. After the massacre, JAS released a video in which Shekau took responsibility for the mass killing and taunted the leaders of neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger, as well as Nigeria. Efforts by the regional leaders at carrying out a unified attack against the group intensified and in late January, a major offensive was launched, with warplanes and ground troops from Chad and Nigeria. A few days later also Niger joined in. Over the next few weeks, the loose coalition succeeded in forcing the Islamists from about a dozen towns and villages, with JAS responding by carrying out retaliatory raids on the civilian population. While the offensive was originally planned to be completed before the 14 February elections in Nigeria, it was announced on 7 February that the polls would have to be postponed for six weeks due to unsafe voting conditions in the northeast.
Amidst continued setbacks, JAS leader Abubakar Shekau on 7 March pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) and its leader al-Baghdadi. A few days later, on 12 March, the pledge was accepted. The group subsequently changed its name to Wilayat West Africa or IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) and became part of the Islamic State. With that, the conflict over government power in Nigeria was temporarily terminated, and a new one commenced; a territorial conflict over the so-called Islamic State.
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad re-appears
Having fought under the banner of IS for a year, cracks started to show in the organization. There were intermittent reports of problems within the group already during the first months of 2016, but it was not until 3 August that something concrete materialized. On that day, IS central announced that Habib Yusuf – also known as Abu Musab al-Barnawi – son of the founder of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad – was the new emir of its West Africa province, in effect dethroning Abubakar Shekau. This led to a battle of words between Shekau and Barnawi, with the former responding to the news by lashing out in a video, claiming that Barnawi and his followers – which control the line of communication with IS central – had manipulated the latter by preventing Shekau from sending messages. He then went on to accuse Barnawi of apostasy. Barnawi, in turn, denounced Shekau as a hypocrite and coward, criticizing him for the indiscriminate and excessive killing of Muslim civilians. Ostensibly, IS' West Africa wing under the new leadership of al-Barnawi attempted to shift the behavior of the group away from the killing of Muslim civilians, to focus more exclusively on Christians as well as on military targets.
After the split, IS' main area of operation was the Nigeria-Niger-Chad-Cameroon border region, in the northern and northeastern-most part of Borno state, but over time this has grown to also include parts of Yobe state as well as other areas of Borno (see Nigeria: Islamic State). The re-founded JAS, for its part, retained its main base in the Sambisa forest and was primarily present there and in the local government areas surrounding it. Furthermore, it retained a presence in the Mandara mountains on the border with Cameroon, and in the northern part of Adamawa state. While the government has made repeated claims of outright victory over the group over the years, JAS has proved resilient and able to continue launching attacks in its area of operation. The group has mainly targeted the civilian population, carrying out frequent suicide attacks, oftentimes deploying female and child bombers. However, JAS also remained a threat to the Nigerian military, as it has at times also engaged security forces. An emerging pattern from JAS after the split was that of roadside IEDs in the areas under JAS control. There have also been a number of instances of attacks on military convoys in the past years. The government forces, for their part, have struggled to effectively seize and hold territory and are largely resigned to conducting aerial bombardments on JAS positions in and around Sambisa forest.
Expanding beyond Sambisa forest
Since 2019, Shekau has sought to expand from his entrenched position in the Sambisa forest by connecting with local affiliates in areas of Nigeria. In late 2019, a faction of IS’ West Africa Province operating in Lake Chad defected to JAS, the so-called Bakura faction. Since then they began carrying out attacks in neighboring Niger and Chad. In June 2020, JAS released a video where they extended greetings to fighters in the northwestern Zamfara and Niger states. These were reciprocated by an armed group in Niger state, which sent greetings to Shekau and their "brothers" in Zamfara, Lake Chad, and the Sambisa forest. While the bond between Shekau and the Bakura faction appears strong, the strength of ties between Sambisa forest and the northwestern states is dubious. In December 2020, hundreds of schoolchildren were abducted from Kankara in the northwestern Katsina state. JAS claimed responsibility for this attack, which was their first in the region, allegedly recruiting local bandit groups to carry it out. However, the abducted boys were released within a week of the kidnapping, contrary to typical JAS modus operandi and the infamous Chibok kidnapping in 2014. This indicates that while the northwestern affiliates may have followed Shekau's directive, his influence over them has been limited. It remains unclear how strongly tied the northwestern bandit groups have been to the leader in the Sambisa forest.
The death of Shekau
Following a period of escalating violence between ISWAP and JAS, the former moved against Shekau, reportedly following orders from IS central. On 19 May 2021, ISWAP thus entered Shekau’s stronghold in the Sambisa Forest after several of his commanders reportedly had been convinced to switch sides. Clashes erupted, however, when ISWAP fighters cornered Shekau, whom refused to surrender, he detonated his suicide vest, and ISWAP conquered JAS’ Sambisa territory.
Following Shekau’s death, JAS fighters took different routes. Many of Shekau’s commanders initially joined ISWAP after the group had explained that they shared the same goal and, as long as the previous JAS fighters obeyed IS’ rules, they could fight together. Other fighters choose to give up the fight entirely and surrendered to the Cameroonian or Nigerian authorities. The JAS faction of Bakura, active in northern Lake Chad, and Ali Ngulde, operating from Gwoza Hills, did not join ISWAP. Moreover, when JAS fighters were to be integrated into ISWAP and had to experience the ban on plunder and turn in their weapons, a new group of previous JAS fighters choose to go different ways. While some joined Bakura or Ngulde, others gathered in the Bama area of Borno state, centered around previous commanders of Shekau, establishing the Dar al Gazuwa sub-group.
New leadership of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad
Following Shekau’s death, JAS experienced a period of internal division. In June 2021, Bakura Sahalaba, the religious leader of the JAS faction operating in northern Lake Chad and also reportedly the designated successor after Shekau, publicly declared that the group would continue its fight. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed imam of JAS. The military commander of the Lake Chad faction, Bakura Doro, was reportedly considered unsuitable for the position because he lacked religious knowledge. However, tensions between the two persisted and, in March 2022, Bakura Doro had Bakura Sahalaba executed and replaced him as imam of JAS. According to Bakura Doro, Sahalaba had been promoting negotiations and advocated for an agreement with ISWAP. The initial reactions to Bakura Doro as imam of JAS was mixed. Some argued he lacked religious expertise, specifically the Dar al Gazuwa faction was reportedly hesitant of Bakura Doro as the new leader of JAS. Yet, Bakura remained as leader, one reason perhaps being that he was able to supply the subgroups with weapons as he reportedly had sent weapons to the Gazuwa group when he tried to conciliate.
During the 2020s, a JAS faction located in northwestern Nigeria, around the Shiroro reservoir in Niger state, emerged. The faction was reportedly led by a JAS commander known as Sadiku. This faction integrated with the local communities, offering protection from bandit groups in the area in exchange for their cooperation and support. Yet, the group is responsible for several deadly attacks against villages in the Shiroro area, including usage of IEDs along major roads causing civilian fatalities. Moreover, the Sadiku faction also set up arrangements and formed alliances with local bandit groups, such as Forces of Dogo Gide and Forces of Gwaska Dankarami. However, the status of the relationship with the bandit group led by Dogo Gide was unstable and culminated in a deadly clash between the two groups in early 2025, resulting in Sadiku’s fighters reportedly having to relocate within and outside Niger state.
