This dyad belongs to the conflict Cameroon: Islamic State

Summary of conflict Cameroon: Islamic State

The territorial conflict between the Government of Cameroon and the Islamic State (IS), which commenced in March 2015, is in a sense a continuation of the conflict fought between the Government and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), but over a different incompatibility. In March 2015, JAS pledged allegiance to IS - a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – and a few days later, the latter accepted the pledge. With that, what had previously been JAS became IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP). The conflict between IS and the Cameroonian government subsequently focused on IS’ aim of integrating Cameroon into its Islamic State.

In 2025, the level of violence in the conflict between the Cameroonian government and IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP) intensified and became active again. Throughout the year, ISWAP escalated its attacks against Cameroonian military posts in the Logone-et-Chari department in the Far North region and made frequent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

Emergence of Islamic State's West Africa Province (Wilayat West Africa)

The territorial conflict between the Government of Cameroon and the Islamic State – and more specifically the Islamic State’s West Africa wing (ISWAP) – is in a sense a continuation of the conflict over government power (Cameroon: Government), where the Cameroonian government fought the initially Nigerian Islamist group Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad. After fighting the Nigerian government in a conflict over government power for six years, JAS in January 2015 also challenged Cameroon’s government in a video called “Message to President Biya of Cameroon”. In the video, the group demanded that Cameroon scrap its constitution and embrace Islam, or else the country would “taste what had befallen Nigeria” With this, a new phase of the conflict over governmental power in Cameroon commenced. This conflict was short-lived, however. In March 2015, the group’s leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to IS - a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – and a few days later, the latter accepted the pledge. With that, what had previously been JAS was integrated into IS, and renamed Wilayat West Africa. The group subsequently switched its goal to the more wide-reaching one stated by IS: the creation of a global Islamic State. Thus, while the actual fighters on the ground remain the same, they have announced a new name for themselves and are now fighting for a different goal.

Aside from the clear connection to the earlier JAS phase, the conflict is also closely tied to conflicts in neighboring Nigeria, Niger, and Chad. The governments in these three countries have all been challenged by the IS West African wing, and are involved in territorial conflicts against the latter. Realizing their shared interests, they cooperate more or less closely against their common enemy. In the case of Cameroon, Chad was actively involved in 2015, sending troops already in January, in order to support the Yaondé government against IS’ predecessor JAS. By the end of the year, Chad withdrew its troops and there was no external involvement on Cameroonian soil in 2016. However, Cameroon did launch cross-border attacks into Nigeria – oftentimes in coordination with Nigerian forces – and was thus registered as a secondary warring party in the Nigeria conflict against IS.

While the bulk of IS’ West Africa wing’s activities occurred within the context of its conflict with Nigeria (Nigeria: Islamic State, also northern Cameroon suffered under its attacks. Especially the region bordering northeastern Nigeria saw assaults on villages and military bases, with the Islamists melting back into Nigeria afterward. The group’s behavior changed over time, going from mainly conventional warfare to almost exclusively guerilla-style attacks. During the first half of 2015, IS launched large-scale attacks involving hundreds – sometimes even thousands of fighters – and temporarily occupied villages and towns. The Islamists suffered substantial setbacks, however, and adapted by turning more and more to the use of guerilla warfare, carrying out ambushes, small-scale attacks, and using suicide bombers and IEDs. This led to a decrease in the number of battle-related deaths, which became increasingly clear during 2016-2017.

Leadership struggle

There were intermittent reports of problems within the group during the first months of 2016, but it was not until 3 August that something concrete materialized. On that day, IS central announced that Habib Yusuf – also known as Abu Musab al-Barnawi – son of the founder of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, was the new emir of its West Africa province, in effect dethroning Abubakar Shekau. This led to a battle of words between Shekau and Barnawi, with the former responding to the news by lashing out in a video, claiming that Barnawi and his followers – who control the line of communication with IS central – had manipulated the latter by preventing Shekau from sending messages. He then went on to accuse Barnawi of apostasy. Barnawi, in turn, denounced Shekau as a hypocrite and coward, criticizing him for the indiscriminate and excessive killing of Muslim civilians. IS' West Africa wing under the new leadership of al-Barnawi has been careful to shift the behavior of the group away from the indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians, to focus more exclusively on Christians as well as on military targets. The group thus split in two, with one faction under Barnawi remaining under the banner of IS, and the other, under Shekau, re-forming Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).

Analysts agree that in the Cameroonian context, IS mainly operates in the Logone-et-Chari department in Cameroon’s Far North region and on Lake Chad islands. While there have been a continuation of attacks on military targets and intermittent clashes between ISWAP and the military in the Logone-et-Chari department, the conflict has seen changing levels of intensity, repeatedly switching between active years and years in which the number of fatalities fell below the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. In 2019, the conflict escalated as IS fighters targeted military positions on Darak island in the Lake Chad area and clashed with the Cameroonian military, reportedly resulting in the deaths of 16 soldiers and 8 civilians. Another notable incident occurred in 2021, also a year marked by escalation of violence, when IS fighters in vehicles stormed a military camp in Sagmé, in the Fotokol area close to the Nigerian border, and killed 8 soldiers.