SUMMARY
The territorial conflict between the Nigerian government and the Islamic State (IS), which commenced in March 2015, is in a sense a continuation of the conflict fought between the government and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), but over a different incompatibility. In March 2015, JAS pledged allegiance to IS, and when the pledge was accepted, what had previously been JAS was integrated into IS. The conflict between IS and the Nigerian government subsequently focused on IS’ aim of integrating Nigeria into its global Islamic State.
In 2025, the Nigerian government continued to fight IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP), mainly concentrated in Borno State. The group was also active in Adamawa and Yobe states where it conducted several attacks against soldiers and civilians. ISWAP continued its usage of IEDs and also returned to SVBIEDs. During the first half of the year, ISWAP announced its “Burn the Camps” offensive, including a series of attacks heavily targeting Nigerian military positions in northeastern Nigeria. Throughout the year, the Government of Nigeria relied heavily on airstrikes when targeting ISWAP, which resulted in scores of IS fighters being killed.
IN DEPTH
Background to the conflict
The conflict between the Nigerian government and the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP) is in a sense a continuation of the conflict fought between the government and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) but over a different incompatibility. JAS had since 2009 sought to topple the government and set up puritanical Islamic rule throughout Nigeria. In March 2015, the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) - a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – and a few days later the latter accepted the pledge. With that, what had previously been JAS was integrated into IS, and renamed Wilayat (province) West Africa. The group subsequently switched its goal to the more wide-reaching one stated by IS: the creation of a global Islamic State. Thus, while the actual fighters on the ground remain the same, they have announced a new name for themselves and are now fighting for a different goal: the integration of Nigeria into a global caliphate.
Prelude to the transformation from Boko Haram to IS
The months leading up to JAS leader Abubakar Shekau’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State were characterized by an escalation of violence. In 2014 JAS changed its strategy, in that it more than before sought to control and defend conquered territory. Amidst denials by the government, the group gained control of large swathes of territory. By the end of the year, JAS controlled an area roughly the size of Belgium, in which Shekau declared the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. In January 2015, JAS carried out an attack on the town of Baga and its surrounding that was described as its most brutal one to date. While initially targeting Doron Baga and the base of the so-called Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the bulk of the violence was directed at the civilian population. Fatality estimates of the attack vary between a few hundred and 2000. After the massacre, JAS released a video in which Shekau took responsibility for the mass killing and taunted the leaders of neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger, as well as Nigeria. Efforts by the regional leaders at carrying out a unified attack against the group intensified and in late January, a major offensive with warplanes and ground troops from Chad and Nigeria was launched. A few days later also Niger joined in. Over the next few weeks, the loose coalition succeeded in forcing the Islamists from about a dozen towns and villages, with JAS responding by carrying out retaliatory raids on the civilian population. It was amidst these continued setbacks that Shekau pledged his allegiance to IS-leader al-Baghdadi on 7 March, thus, temporarily, ending the conflict over government power in Nigeria.
Islamic State's West Africa Province (Wilayat West Africa, ISWAP)
At the time when JAS became IS’ West Africa Province, the group was thus in the midst of being pushed from the vast territory it had controlled in northeastern Nigeria. A loose coalition of Chadian, Nigerien, and Nigerian troops was on the offensive, and by mid-year, IS was reverting to guerrilla tactics. In May, the newly elected president Muhammadu Buhari declared that the rebels would soon be forced to its knees. However, IS quickly demonstrated that it was far from defeated, launching a wave of suicide attacks, bombings, and massacres through the northeast.
A central point for the government’s attacks was the Sambisa forest, one of the last known bastions of IS in Nigeria. There were numerous reports of government offensives in the area, with both sides suffering losses. While the government troops fell victim to landmines, planted by the Islamists, they managed to overrun several IS bases, rescuing hundreds of children and women.
Leadership struggle
There were intermittent reports of problems within the group during the first months of 2016, but it was not until 3 August that something concrete materialized. On that day, IS central announced that Habib Yusuf – also known as Abu Musab al-Barnawi – son of the founder of JAS, was the new emir of its West Africa province, in effect dethroning Abubakar Shekau. This led to a battle of words between Shekau and Barnawi, with the former responding to the news by lashing out in a video, claiming that Barnawi and his followers – which controlled the line of communication with IS central – had manipulated the latter by preventing Shekau from sending messages. He then went on to accuse Barnawi of apostasy. Barnawi, in turn, denounced Shekau as a hypocrite and coward, criticizing him for the indiscriminate and excessive killing of Muslim civilians. IS’ West Africa wing under the new leadership of al-Barnawi thus appeared to attempt to shift the behavior of the group away from the killing of Muslim civilians, to focus more exclusively on Christians as well as on military targets. The group’s former head, Abubakar Shekau responded by announcing that he was once more the leader of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and the two factions subsequently continued fighting the government as separate entities.
ISWAP grows stronger
With the split in the movement, Shekau went on the re-form JAS, and this faction retained its main base in the Sambisa forest and surrounding areas. IS, for its part, initially withdrew to the Nigeria-Niger-Chad-Cameroon border region, in the northern and northeasternmost part of Borno state. As the Nigerian military was occupied with its ongoing offensive against JAS in Sambisa forest, fighters of IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP) got the welcome opportunity to re-group, build up its capabilities and increase its numbers relatively undisturbed in the periphery. Over time, ISWAP was able to extend its area of operation, and by late 2017- early 2018, the group was also active in the central areas of Borno, and neighboring Yobe states. This expansion continued during 2018 and into 2019, with IS also making inroads into territory that had earlier been very much associated with Shekau’s JAS, such as the northern part of Adamawa state. Aside from an increasing number of ambushes on military convoys, the group carried out a number of successful large-scale attacks on army positions in northern Borno, inflicting heavy casualties on the army and seizing uniforms and arms, thus expanding its already considerable arsenal. Furthermore, on 23 February 2019, the group carried out an attack on Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. This was the first time IS had targeted the town since the rift in the movement in August 2016; since then Maiduguri had been solely attacked by JAS.
Aside from expanding geographically, IS also gained strength in terms of military capabilities, economic capabilities as well as manpower. The increase in military capabilities is to some extent connected to the type of targets preferred by IS; in line with the logic behind the 2016 split, the group has largely refrained from targeting the civilian population, instead focusing on the Nigerian military. Aside from an increasing number of ambushes on military convoys, the group carried out a number of successful large-scale attacks on army positions in northern Borno, inflicting heavy casualties on the army and seizing uniforms and arms, thus continuously expanding its arsenal. The reasons behind the growing economic capabilities of the group as well as its success with regards to recruitment were both tied to its conduct towards the civilian population. Apart from actively refraining from targeting civilians, the group also provides them with a number of services typically associated with a state: some basic health care, policing of cattle-rustling, and a general sense of security. The latter is enforced through IS’ brand of “Islamic justice”, which is brutal, but predictable. All this has meant that the group has been able to garner the support of at least sections of the population in areas under its influence, who have thus been willing to be taxed, thereby increasing IS’ economic capabilities. It was also this support that made it possible for the group to recruit more fighters, and by early 2019 it was estimated to have some 3500-5000 men under arms.
From 2019 and onwards, several new offensives have been launched against ISWAP by the government and its allies. In February, the MNJTF launched the Yancin Tafki operation with Chad contributing a significant number of troops. Lasting until early 2020, the operation was reported to have put significant pressure on ISWAP. But long-term it had little effect, as areas cleared by the MNJTF were quickly recaptured by IS when the operation was concluded. In March 2020, Chad launched a unilateral offensive called Wrath of Bohoma against both IS and JAS in the Lake Chad area, supported by elements of the MNJTF. At the same time, Nigeria launched its own offensive in the Alagarno forest area of southwestern Borno. Both these operations were hailed as successes that dealt significant blows to ISWAP, but in reality, the effect they had on the operational capacity of ISWAP was limited. The group continued to launch raids on military bases and conducted frequent ambushes on army patrols throughout 2020. Having abandoned the strategy of capturing and holding territory that JAS had employed in 2014, ISWAP instead focused on raiding larger towns and nearby army bases. After a successful raid, they would typically loot supplies and weapons, set fire to government buildings and then retreat before the military launched a counterattack. Part of ISWAP's successes since 2019 has been attributed to the Nigerian government's strategy of so-called "super camps"; abandoning smaller outposts in favor of highly fortified bases near larger towns. With the retreat of the Nigerian military to these defensible towns, ISWAP has been able to strengthen its position in the vacuum between them.
New leadership struggles
While not evident at first, those that took over leadership of the group in 2016 were joined more in opposition to Shekau, than in agreement on how to proceed with the armed struggle. Over time it became apparent, however, that some were in favor of pursuing a negotiated settlement with the Nigerian authorities, while others were staunchly opposed to this idea. In 2018, this rift was torn wide open. Mamman Nur was one of the top leaders of the group. He had been active in the movement from when it was born as JAS, at that time a top lieutenant of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf. When Shekau took over after Yusuf’s death, Nur was a rival of the former, but the two eventually reconciled. However, tensions between the two remained, and Nur was clearly on the side of al-Barnawi when the group split in 2016. After the split, it became increasingly clear that Nur was pro-talks with the government and by 2018 it was evident that he was pursuing this option actively. In August of that year, he was executed by members of ISWAP and while the reasons behind this were never explained, most analysts believe that it was due to his willingness to talk to the government. Nur’s killing was the springboard for a chain of changes in ISWAP’s top rank, which became increasingly dominated by hardline militants, and in March 2019, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was deposed and replaced by Abu Abdullah ibn Umar al-Barnawi, more commonly known as Ba Idrisa. As with Nur’s execution, no explanation was given for this, but two things commonly pointed to was his closeness to Nur, and his record of neutrality regarding the IS – al-Qaida rivalry. The latter may have become a liability as ISWAP grew closer to another IS sub-group, ISGS, which was active in a region with ongoing IS – al-Qaida tensions. Regardless of the reason for Abu Musab’s demotion, this, together with Nur’s killing showed the cracks in the movement, and tensions remained during the rest of the year.
