SUMMARY
High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate is an Afghan rebel group which split from the Taleban movement due to a leadership conflict in August 2015. It emerged as a faction led by Mullah Mohammad Rasool Akhund and Mullah Mansoor Dadullah which disputed the election of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor as the new leader of the Taleban movement after the announcement of Mullah Omar's death on 30 July 2015. Initially, the opposition against Mullah Mansour was supported by Mullah Omar's family.
Mohammad Rasool was a senior commander in the Taleban movement and had earlier served as governor of Nimroz province, and shadow governor of Farah province. Following the announcement of Mullah Omar's death, and the realization that the central leadership of the Taleban had kept his death a secret for two years, several commanders started to oppose the newly elected Mullah Mansour as the leader of the Taleban, refusing to pledge allegiance to him.
In early October 2015, the opposing forces held a meeting in Farah province. They changed their name to the High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate and formally appointed Mohammad Rasool as its leader and Mansoor Dadullah as his deputy.
Mansoor Dadullah was killed in clashes against the Mullah Mansour-led Taleban in Zabul in November 2015, which the group did not acknowledge until in August 2016. His nephew Mullah Emdadullah Mansoor was appointed as his replacement, and swore that he would take revenge from the Taleban for killing his uncle.
The High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate has been involved in the intrastate and the non-state categories of UCDP organized violence.
IS (Islamic State, or al-Dawla al-Islamiya) was an armed extremist Islamist umbrella group which originated in Iraq. The group was also known under the names ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), or Daesh. The group has also undergone several reorganizations and name changes (described below) that has reflected the group’s evolving objectives. In April 2004, the group (then called Jamaat al-Tawhid waal-Jihad, or JTJ) stated that its goal was to overthrow the Government of Iraq, expel the multinational coalition forces from Iraq, and establish a Sunni Islamic State ruled by Islamic law (sharia). By 2014, IS’ primary goal had evolved into establishing and expanding a global “caliphate”, a form of theocratic state ruled according to the group’s extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam. On 29 June 2014 IS released a statement entitled “This is the Promise of Allah” in the posting , the group made clear its far-reaching territorial claims by stating that the “arrival” of its fighters on any given territory made all previous allegiances and political units “null”. As such, all state-based conflicts outside Iraq involving IS in the UCDP data have been coded as territorial, as the “arrival” of IS in a country has been seen as a claim of that territory as part of the caliphate. Ideologically, IS was commonly described as adherents to the Salafist branch of Sunnism, meaning that the group favored an ultraconservative religious practice, and strict implementation of sharia law. The group was also characterized by a strong jihadist orientation, and thus favored the fulfillment of its politico-religious agenda by the use of force. It is also worth noting that the group was labeled a terrorist organization by a plethora of governmental and international actors. However, as the UCDP does not treat terrorism as a separate form of organized violence, IS was treated in the UCDP data as any other formally organized non-state group.
While IS was primarily known as a “global jihadi movement” - a repute it procured during the mid and late 2010s - it first emerged as a local militant outfit in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi created IS’ precursor Jamaat al-Tawhid waal-Jihad (JTJ, or “The Monotheism and Jihad Group”) at some point during the early 2000s, most likely in 2002 or 2003. The first confirmed statement from the group appeared on 24 April 2004, but al-Zarqawi had issued earlier threats against both the Government of Iraq and against the international coalition that had invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003. Al-Zarqawi had previously joined and eventually led a Jordanian organization called Tawheed (Unity, later called Bayat al-Imam) during the 1990s. In 1999-2001, al-Zarqawi established another organization called Jund Al-Sham (Army of the Sham region - Syria, Lebanon, Palestine) while exiled near Herat in Afghanistan. By the end of 2002, it was believed that al-Zarqawi was in northern Iraq in the territories controlled by the Ansar al-Islam. It was also believed that al-Zarqawi had been in contact with al-Qaida, at the time one of the world’s most prominent Islamist extremist groups, and its leader Osama bin Laden. In October 2004, JTJ formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaida, and subsequently changed its name to TQJBR (Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or Organization of Jihads Base in the Country of the Two Rivers). Bin Laden acknowledged the group in a statement and declared al-Zarqawi as his representative in Iraq, even though it remained clear that al-Qaida had limited, if any, authority over the activity of the Iraqi organization. At the time, TQJBR was sometimes referred to as “al-Qaida in Iraq”, or AQI.
In January 2006, TQJBR entered into a coalition with several other armed outfits, including Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansura (Army of the Victorious Sect), Army of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (Minority Saviour Sect), Jaish al-Fatihin (Army of the Conquerors), and Jund al-Sahaba (Army of the Prophets Companions). The coalition, which was dominated by TQJBR, was initially named Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), but was renamed the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in October 2006. In 2013, ISI – which up until then had primarily been active in Iraq - strengthened its presence in Syria, which at the time was hard-hit by an ongoing intrastate conflict. On 9 April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – who had become the leader of ISI in 2010 – announced that ISI had merged with Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham (al-Nusra for short), another al-Qaida-affiliated group active in Syria. Al-Baghdadi said “it’s now time to declare in front of the people of the Levant and (the) world that the al-Nusra Front [...] is but an extension of the Islamic State of Iraq and part of it”. Following this, the group changed its name to ISIS, an abbreviation of Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, alternatively Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The group was also frequently referred to as “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant”, or ISIL. In essence, these names – ISIS and ISIL - carried the same meaning, and reflected the group’s expanding territorial scope. The word “al-Sham” refers both to the country of Syria, as well as to the capital Damascus. However, it also refers to the larger Levant-region. While there has been several definitions of the “Levant”, it could generally be described as an area by the eastern Mediterranean Sea; common to all definitions, however, has been that Syria is a part of this region.
However, the day after al-Baghdadi’s announcement al-Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Golani denied the merger. Al-Golani said that the announcement was al-Baghdadi’s own initiative, and that al-Nusra had not been consulted before. Rather than uniting the groups, al-Golani said that al-Nusra’s primary loyalties were with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaida. In June 2013, al-Zawahiri wrote to both leaders and told them that al-Baghdadi’s actions were wrong, and that his authority was within Iraq only. This was not accepted by al-Baghdadi, who stated ISIS would remain in existence. Defying al-Zawahiri, he also said that he acted on God’s command, rather than that of the al-Qaidaleader. In early February 2014, al-Qaida stated that ISIS was no longer a part of the al-Qaida organization. In late June 2014, the group underwent the transformation that turned it into the Islamic State (IS). It was at this time that the group declared that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syrian and Iraq. Furthermore, it demanded the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, and declared that it would continue to seize land to expand its territory across the globe. When the caliphate was proclaimed, IS stated: “the legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas”. It was at this point that IS gradually grew to great international repute, positioning itself as one of the most well-known militant groups in the world. In effect, the declaration of the caliphate drew much attention to IS, which was able to expand its influence and operational reach. Most evidence seems to suggest that IS was at the peak of its power, and by 2017, the group appeared to be in a state of decline.
One of IS’ primary characteristic was its focus on territorial control and geographic expansion; as a result, IS had been involved in more than 20 state-based conflicts according to UCDP definitions. At the height of its power in 2015 and 2016, the IS “core group” controlled territories in Iraq and Syria that roughly equaled the size of Portugal. Aside from its “capital” al-Raqqa in Syria, IS controlled several major towns in both Iraq and Syria, including Mosul, Fallujah, Albu Kamal/al-Bokmal, Mayadin, al-Tabqa, and Palmyra. The group also managed to occupy vital oil infrastructure, which allowed it to procure significant economic resources. Within its areas of control, IS also established its own governance structures, guided by Islamic law and traditional governance practices. IS’ rule was characterized by ultraconservative religious practices, and in many instances resulted in severe repression and atrocities against the civilian population. However, following parallel military operations (see for example Government of Syria – IS, Government of Iraq – IS, and IS – SDF) IS had lost most of its territory and all major towns in Iraq and Syria by late 2017.
Aside from its “core group” in Iraq and Syria, IS’ global ambitions meant that it also established “provinces” (or wilayah) in several places around the world; in practice, this meant that IS largely functioned as an “umbrella organization” that incorporated a multitude of existing and emergent outfits. The establishment of a wilayah was done via a formal statement by IS’ central leadership. By the end of 2017, IS had created provinces in Libya (Wilayahs al-Fizan, al-Barqah, and al-Tarablus), Egypt (Wilayah Sina, based in the Sinai Peninsula), Yemen (Wilayah al-Yaman), Afghanistan/Pakistan (Wilayah Khorasan), Algeria (Wilayah al-Jazā’er), Wilayah West Africa (based in Nigeria), Wilayah Central Africa (based in Mozambique and DR Congo), and Russia (Wilayah al-Qawqaz, based in the northern Caucasus region); in December 2017, an official IS propaganda video also seemingly acknowledged the existence of a Somalia province (Wilayah al-Somal). The establishing of a province often included a “merger” of local militant outfits into the IS umbrella structure; this was usually done via a formal accepting of an “oath of allegiance” (or bay’ah) by IS’ central leadership from an existing outfit in the area of expansion. For example, IS received – and accepted – bay’ah from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Egypt, 2014), Jund al-Khilafah fi Ard al-Jazair (Algeria, 2014), Abnaa ul-Calipha (Somalia, 2017), Islamic Youth Shura Council/Battar Brigade (Libya, 2014), ADF (DR Congo, 2019) and Ansar al-Sunnah (Mozambique, 2019). In these cases, the group (if it had been active in prior years) pledging allegiance ceased to exist as separate actors in the UCDP data, and all its activities was coded as IS. In some instances, IS accepted bay’ah from parts of existing outfits, such as Forces of the Caucasus Emirate (Russia, 2015), Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (“Boko Haram”) (Nigeria and Cameroon, 2015), and TTP (Afghanistan/Pakistan, 2015). In these cases, the original group (if active) continued to exist in the UCDP data parallel to IS, and only activities involving the specific IS affiliates were coded as such.
However, IS also expanded to new regions without formally declaring new provinces, for example by naming local commanders and by recognizing local affiliates in less formalized manners. Examples of this included IS expansion to Bangladesh in 2016 when it recognized pledges from remnants of the defunct JMB, the Philippines in 2016 when it endorsed the activities of the Maute group, and the recognition of “IS in the Greater Sahara” in Mali in 2017. In these cases, IS named and/or endorsed local commanders or groups, but never declared an official wilayah. In some instances, IS also spread its activities via the diffusion of existing provinces or affiliates. Examples of this included incursions from Iraq/Syria into Jordan, Lebanon, and Iran, as well as from Nigeria/Cameroon into Chad and Niger. Furthermore, IS attacks against civilians were carried out in a large number of countries, including ones where it was not engaged in any state-based violence, such as France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Belgium.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi led the group until his death in a United States airstrike in June 2006. He was replaced by Abu Hamza al-Mujahir (or Abu Ayyub al-Masri) in October 2006. While the exact date was not known, al-Masri was then replaced by Abdullahi Rashid al-Baghdani (or Abu Omar al-Baghdani). The exact power relationship between al-Masri and al-Baghdani was unclear, as some sources claimed that al-Masri may have remained the head of the group, with al-Baghdani serving only as a “front figure”. Following the proclamation of ISI in 2006, the umbrella organization was led by a "Cabinet" in which al-Masri was listed as war minister. The cabinet, formally headed by Abu Abdulrahman al-Falahi, included representatives from several groups, but the overall leadership still appears to have rested with al-Masri. Following the deaths of both al-Masri and al-Baghdani in Unites States strikes in April 2010, ISI came under the leadership Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; it was under his leadership that the group began its transformation into IS, which culminated in the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014. From June 2014, al-Baghdadi took the title of 'Caliph'. Al-Baghdadi was killed in a joint US-SDF operation against his compound in Idlib, Syria, in October 2019. Less than a week later Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was appointed the new 'Caliph' of IS. After Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi blew himself up during a US operation in February 2022, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi became the group's third 'Caliph'. Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was killed in Daraa province in Syria in mid-October 2022, and was replaced by the group's fourth 'Caliph', Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi. In February 2023, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi was killed in clashes with the HTS, supported by Turkey, in Idlib province, Syria. In August 2023, IS announced that Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Quraishi became the group's fifth 'Caliph'. IS was known for having a relatively sophisticated command structure, at least after the establishment of the caliphate in 2014. The group maintained a more or less centralized command structure, with the central leadership appointing local military commanders (“emirs”) and governors; IS also maintained shura councils (a traditional form of consultative governance bodies) in order to ensure that its appointed officials acted in accordance with sharia law.
According to intelligence sources in January 2005, the group consisted of a total of 1500 troops divided into smaller subdivisions of between 50-500 men in Baghdad, Falluja, al-Qaim, Diala, and Samarra in Iraq. However, by 2015, the number of IS fighters had grown exponentially, but the estimates of the troop size varied considerably. Russia estimated the group at a total of 80 000 in Syria and Iraq of which 50 000 were deployed in Syria in mid-2015. Some US estimates reported that the group had 19 000 - 25 000 fighters, while they in other statements continued to report the range 20 000 - 32 000 and showed that the group continued to recruit at the same speed as they lost fighters on the battlefield. By late 2017, IS had suffered considerable losses in Iraq and Syria, with some estimates putting the group’s total strength at just a few thousand. It should also be noted that a reliable estimate for the total number of IS-affiliated fighters in all its areas of operation was not possible to find. It is also worth noting that IS managed to procure the support from a multitude of smaller groups, splinter factions, and individual fighters in most of its areas of operations. While a large share of the IS fighters were recruited in its areas of operation, the group was also known for attracting large numbers of foreign fighters. Particularly after the declaration of the caliphate in 2014, IS received fighters from many different countries, including ones in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
At least during the period 2004-2010, the group received support from al-Qaida, which aside from “moral” support possibly supplied training and financing. Furthermore, it was possible manpower was sent by al-Qaida, as many Saudis joined the ranks of TQJBR/ISI. As mentioned above, the ties between al-Qaida and IS (then called ISIS) were formally severed in early 2014. While it on occasion has engaged in tactical cooperation with other groups since 2014, IS have had strained relations with other rebel-groups, particularly in Syria. IS was known for attacking other groups, and for committing abuses directed against civilians supporting other outfits. As such, the group has been involved in non-state conflicts in Syria, as well as in other countries, such Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Yemen.
