SUMMARY
The non-state conflict between the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (organizationally the Greater Sahara faction of IS' West Africa Province until March 2022) and JNIM erupted in full in 2020 and subsequently played out across two countries – Burkina Faso and Mali – where the two groups simultaneously challenged both governments in state-based conflicts.
The conflict is multi-layered. On the one hand, it can be seen as a manifestation of the global competition between the two transnational jihadist organizations al-Qaida (of which JNIM is an affiliate) and IS, which is played out in numerous countries across the globe, such as e.g. Afghanistan Syria, Libya and Somalia. However, the conflict is also very much local in character, since the two regional affiliates of the global organizations also have local roots. IS’s Sahel province and JNIM’s internal relationship up until just before the outbreak of the conflict was atypical for that of IS and al-Qaida affiliated groups, and was known as the “Sahelian exception”, or the “Sahelian anomaly”. Generally, this meant that the two groups co-existed relatively peacefully, managing to avoid the bloody jihadi-on-jihadi violence that tended to plague their mother organizations. This was to a large extent because of the common origin of the two groups, and the fluidity of the jihadi landscape in the region.
The IS wing active in Burkina Faso and Mali had its roots in an AQIM offshoot, called MUJAO, and its successor al-Murabitun, which fought together with AQIM and Ansar Dine's in Mali during 2012-2014. While AQIM, Ansar Dine's and FLM went on to join forces and set up the al-Qaida-affiliated JNIM alliance in 2017, the MUJAO section of al-Murabitun split off and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (for more details on this, see the various actor descriptions). JNIM’s and ISGS’s shared history meant that many of both the leadership and the fighters on the ground had fought together for years and maintained interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, a network of ethnic and tribal affiliation in the region seemed to, at least for a while, transcend loyalty to different jihadist outfits, and some fighters shifted their loyalties, moving in and out of the two groups.
Despite this joint background and interpersonal ties, the relationship between the two groups began to sour in 2019, as the rivalry between them increased. The shift seems to have been triggered by two developments. For one, IS had started to push into the fringes of what had previously been JNIM’s area of influence. Whether this was caused by an increase in attacks by the French-led counter-terrorism operation Barkhane on IS’s bases in Menaka region, or if it was simply an attempt by the latter to increase its influence is unclear. Regardless, it upped the rivalry between the two, and resulted in the first clashes in the conflict, in northern Burkina Faso’s Soum province in July and in north-eastern Mali’s Gao region in September 2019. Simultaneously, internal disaffection within one of JNIM’s constituent parts, FLM, meant that a faction of fighters in central Mali defected and chose to join the ranks of ISGS. With that, the latter had access to fighters in an area previously under complete control of JNIM, far away from ISGS’s reach. Thus, in January 2020, intermittent fighting was reported in Mali’s Inland Niger Delta area, mainly around Mopti, with clashes picking up and increasing in ferocity over the following months.
By April or May 2020, JNIM had gained an upper hand in the fighting; with IS’s fighters fleeing towards either the Mauritanian or the Burkinabe border, it was apparent that the group had failed to establish a lasting presence in central Mali. Furthermore, JNIM was able to push its rivals further east, taking over areas previously under its control. There was also intense fighting in Burkina Faso’s Soum province, where JNIM succeeded in chasing IS from some of its previous strongholds.
In August the same year, IS launched a counter-offensive and the rest of the year saw intermittent fighting primarily in an area spanning from Soum and Oudalan in Burkina Faso, northeast into Mali’s Gourma-Rharous cercle, and further east, to Ansongo and Gao cercles. While it is generally held that by the end of the year, it was JNIM that had come out on top, information on individual clashes were either biased or vague, and often hard to verify. Nevertheless, it is evident that the fighting during 2020 was extremely bloody, and it affected especially IS’ ability to keep up attacks on government targets in Mali during the year. Thus, as even conservative fatality numbers soared to almost 400 in the conflict between IS and JNIM, activity dropped substantially the conflict between the Malian government and IS.
By 2021, the conflict had de-escalated, but remained active, causing a little over 120 fatalities. A majority of the armed confrontations occurred in Burkina Faso, where the fighting remained confined to Soum and Oudalan. It became increasingly clear that IS had been substantially weakened the year before, as it found itself pushed back from many of its previous areas of operation, more or less confined to the eastern part of Oudalan province and to Seno, further south. In Mali, there were scattered clashes in Mopti and Gourma-Rharous, but a majority of the battles were played out in Ansongo cercle.
The start of the following year saw IS remain on the back foot, continuing to lose ground to JNIM. Having successfully mobilized new fighters in central Mali and Burkina Faso, the al-Qaida outfit won a string of battles in the Malian Gourma in February, and by the end of the month had reinforced its position as the predominant jihadist force in the region. However, soon after this, developments external to IS started to work in the group’s favor. In August 2020, the Malian military had seized power in a coup, and then again in May 2021. In the context of the junta’s unwillingness to hand over power, many western countries became increasingly skeptical about their involvement in Mali. This skepticism was even more enhanced as the military leadership inched closer to Russia and the Wagner group during the latter half of the year. In June 2021, President Macron announced that France would soon begin to phase out its troops in the country and amidst increasing hostility from Bamako, the withdrawal began in February and was completed in mid-August. As the Malian army has a very limited presence in Menaka region, the French withdrawal meant that a window of opportunity opened up for IS and the month of March saw the resurgence of IS activities in the eastern-most part of Menaka region. While this at the time did not put the group on a collision course with JNIM (but rather the militias MSA and GATIA, it signaled the start of a shift in the power balance in the area, as IS increasingly gained ground.
In May 2022, some Islamic State units signed a ceasefire with some JNIM units in the Gourma, but it did not last long. Rather, IS received reinforcements and continued its push east of Menaka, still fighting mainly MSA and GATIA, and by June, the army. Continuing to make headway, by August, IS’ geographical reach was unprecedented. The rest of the year became a turf war over mainly Menaka region, but also Gao region’s Ansongo district, as JNIM attempted to push back IS’ advance. In this effort, the al-Qaida outfit even cooperated with the GATIA and MSA militias, which it had previously fought intermittently (albeit never causing 25 fatalities in a year, making the conflicts active in UCDP data).
Battles from October 2022, and through 2023, were heavy and caused the conflict to escalate markedly, reaching a level of intensity not seen before. Fighting became even more clearly concentrated to Mali’s Ansongo cercle, which saw large-scale battles especially during July 2023, when JNIM managed to push IS from some previously held areas. In response, IS launched an operation into Boulikessi, Mopti region, attacking JNIM positions. Fighting was fierce and caused numerous fatalities before they withdrew. Burkina Faso also saw some big battles, notably one in Est region by the end of 2023, when IS made an incursion into JNIM territory and fighting caused at least 40 fatalities.
Compared to 2022 and 2023, violence in the conflict de-escalated markedly in 2024. There were no battles on the scale of those the year prior, but rather intermittent encounters of less violent intensity. IS was clearly contained to specific areas of Mali (Menaka region and Ansongo cercle) and Burkina Faso (Oudalan and Seno), and the group made fewer incursions into JNIM territory, whereby fighting lessened.
The non-state conflict between IS and JNIM is first included in UCDP data in 2020. In March of that year, clashes around Dialoblé in central Mopti region caused the conflict to cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold for the first time.
