SUMMARY
Since becoming an autonomous republic in 1958 and then gaining independence from French Colonial rule in 1960, Niger has been tormented by organized violence. Several military cops have followed each other and a halting democratization process in the 1990s gave rise to armed separatist rebellions in the norther and eastern parts of the country respectively (see Niger: Eastern Niger and Niger: Aïr and Azawad). Despite a shift to democratic rule in 2011, Niger is still plagued by a deep distrust to the government and violence is still prevalent across the whole country. Especially the rise of various armed Islamic groups in the Sahel region in the mid-2010s has increased insecurity in Niger.
Since 1989, Niger has experienced the intrastate, non-state and one-sided categories of organized violence, as defined by UCDP.
2025
In 2025, Niger’s security situation continued to deteriorate, with overall high levels of organized violence compared to previous years. Following the 2023 coup d’etat, jihadi groups have continued to take advantage of the instability that followed.
The high level of organized violence was primarily driven by state-based violence which continued to be the most lethal category of organized violence. The Nigerien government remained challenged by a range of Islamist groups fighting in two distinct state-based conflicts. The IS’ Sahel Province (ISSP), operating mainly in the western Tillabéri region, and the IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), active in the eastern Diffa region, fought the government in a territorial conflict. Meanwhile, the al-Qaida-affiliated Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) continued its insurgency in the southwest of the country, also predominately in the Tillabéri region, in a conflict over government power.
In 2025, IS conducted several large-scale attacks against the Government, targeting military posts and convoys, often using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The violence intensified in the territorial conflict between IS and the Government, reaching peak levels of violence observed in UCDP data. A particularly deadly attack occurred on 25 May, when IS fighters attacked military camps in Eknewane in the Tahoua region, which resulted in 58 soldiers killed. In contrast, the conflict over government between JNIM and the Nigerien government decreased in intensity compared to previous year when there was a sharp increase of violence. Yet, JNIM continued to challenge the Government, mainly in the heavily affected Tillabéri region, targeting army camps and patrols, also making use of IEDs. As a response to the violence carried out by the Islamist groups, the Nigerien government continued with airstrikes, mainly in the heavily-affected Tillabéri region. However, although the army stated that the Islamist groups were the intended targets, the airstrikes occasionally caused civilian fatalities.
The trend of increasing levels of one-sided violence continued as the number of one-sided attacks sharply increased in 2025, however, it remained below the peak recorded in 2021. IS remained the largest perpetrator of one-sided violence, conducting several attacks against civilian targets, including villages and convoys transporting goods and fuel, mainly in the Tillabéri region. The deadliest one-sided attack took place in Manda village, Tera department, on 20 June. ISSP fighters attacked residents around the local mosque, resulting in at least 71 fatalities. Additionally, JNIM continued to target civilians during 2025, though at lower levels than ISSP and ISWAP.
Armed rebellions during the 1990s and early 2000s
Niger became independent in 1960 and was headed a single-party civilian regime under its first fourteen years of sovereignty and subsequently by a military junta until the end of the 1980s. A democratization process was instigated in Niger in the early 1990s, as a result of demands from student movements and trade unions to introduce multi-party democracy in the country. A transitional government was put in place and the first multi-party elections were held in 1993. However, the democratization process was not without faults. A military coup in 1996 was followed by a second coup in 1999. While the political space opened up during this democratization process, the country also saw the rise of several rebel groups and armed violence erupted in several parts of the country.
The levels of violence were relatively low during the 1990s even though three state-based conflicts were ongoing during this decade. The first peak of violence in 1989-1990 were largely driven by the perception of ethnic marginalization. Two state-based conflicts during the 1990s concerned the status of two regions of the vast country, the northern region of Aïr and Azawad and eastern Niger. Both conflicts had their roots in the perception of marginalization. In the north, the Tuareg, feeling politically, economically and socially marginalized, fought government forces for autonomy over two regions called Air and Azawad. The conflict in eastern Niger also had an ethic dimension and members of the marginalized and impoverished Toubou minority took up arms to fight for autonomy of eastern Niger. Agreements were signed with Tuareg and Toubou insurgents in 1995 and 1997 respectively and fighters from both groups were integrated into FAN (Forces Armées Nigériennes, Niger Armed Forces).
The third state-based conflict involved several Tuareg rebel groups who were involved in a conflict over government that lasted from 1991 until 2008 and in 2009, a peace agreement was signed. It was in this context that the Government of Niger perpetrated violence against civilians. In early May 1990, members of the Nigerien Armed Forces massacred probably several hundreds of civilians belonging to the Tuareg in the northern town of Tchin Tarabadene. The violence was carried out in retaliation for a preceding attack by Tuareg rebels against a police post in the area.
A two folded Tuareg uprising
Niger’s population is made up of various ethnic groups. Coupled with underdevelopment, poverty and political and social marginalization, the ethnic dimension has contributed to the conflicts that surfaced since the democratization period. The major ethnic group is the Hausa ethnicity, which makes up about 53% of roughly 16 million inhabitants. Together with members of the Djerma (21%) and Beri Beri/Kanouri (6%) groups, they populate the southern, arable part of Niger, which also comprises the capital and economic hub Niamey. The remainder of the Nigerien people, including the Tuareg (11%), Fulani (7%) and Toubou (less than 2%), live as nomads or semi-nomads in the arid northern and eastern regions of Niger.
During the 1990s, Niger went through several conflicts over both its political system and the status of minority groups. In northern Niger (specifically in Aïr and Azawad regions), armed Tuareg-dominated groups took to arms - seeking greater decentralization of political power in the whole country or autonomy for the north-western part of the country.
In 1991, the first armed Tuareg group to emerge was the FLAA (Front de libération de l'Aïr et l'Azaouad, Aïr and Azawad Liberation Front) that fought for a federal system in Niger. The conflict ended in 1993 when the FLAA signed a peace agreement, but the Tuareg rebels fractionalized with the result of a new umbrella rebel organization, the CRA (Coordination de la résistance armée, Coordination of the Armed Resistance), instigating an armed conflict over territory in 1994 striving for autonomy for northern Niger. The CRA and its successor ORA (Organisation de la résistance armée, Organization of the Armed Resistance) signed two peace agreements (in 1994 and 1995) that ended the state-based conflict. After yet another fractionalization in the wake of a peace accord, the UFRA (Union des forces de la résistance armée, Union of Forces of Armed Resistance) formed and restarted the conflict over government in 1997. A ceasefire agreement in the same year ended this conflict episode.
However, after ten years of relative stability, in 2007 the newly-created MNJ (Mouvement Nigérien pour la Justice, Niger Justice Movement) continued the struggle over an effective decentralization of political power as laid down in the 1994-1995 peace agreements. MNJ conducted numerous attacks against military targets and uranium mines in northern Niger and against the airport in Agadèz town. MNJ argued that the promises in the previous signed peace agreements had not been held and that the northern part of the country still was marginalized. Many uranium mines are located in the north – MNJ demanded that 30% of the profits from these (Niger’s largest export) would go to the inhabitants in the region. Violence increased in 2008, however, the conflict ended in 2009, when the Government of Niger and MNJ entered a peace agreement.
Ethnic rebellion in eastern Niger
In eastern Niger, where the minority ethnic group Toubou resides, two separate Toubou armed movements emerged during the 1990s, both demanding autonomy for ethnic Toubous in eastern Niger (from Djado to Zinder). First in 1994, the FDR (Front démocratique du renouveau, Democratic Front for Renewal) was formed and their armed struggle reached the level of a minor intrastate conflict in 1995. It ended in August 1998 when the FDR signed a ceasefire agreement. In 1997, the second rebel group, FARS (Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara, Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara) was established and started fighting the government of Niger. The conflict was terminated by the signing of a ceasefire agreement in November 1997 (for information of this conflict, see Niger: Eastern Niger.
In the context of this intrastate conflict the Government of Niger resorted to one-sided violence. In 1995, 29 civilians were shot by the army when they were suspected to hide FDR fighters in their village. In 1998, a mass grave containing the corpses of almost 150 bodies was discovered in the eastern Diffa region. The victims were identified as civilians belonging to the Toubou minority. The massacre reportedly occurred after a joint operation of armed forces from Niger, Nigeria and Chad in the Lake Chad area, during which over 900 Toubou refugees were returned from northern Nigeria to Niger. The grave was found in an area controlled by the Nigerien army and the corpses displayed clear signs of a massacre with deadly injuries yielding from gunshot wounds and torture.
The rise of Sahelian jihadism in mid-2010s
In the years after 2009, Niger experienced some years of relative calm. However, that period ended in 2015, when JAS in neighboring Nigeria pledged allegiance to IS and expanded their goals significantly. Soon after JAS’s transformation into IS, the group’s attacks on Niger greatly intensified. Late March and April saw the most large-scale attacks in 2015. The rest of the year saw a string of cross-border attacks on villages scattered along the Niger-Nigerian border. Furthermore, the group carried out numerous suicide bombings, targeting both military and civilian targets. JAS broke out from IS in August 2016 and are since then considered their own group in UCDP data. It should be noted that the Government of Niger and JAS are not considered to be in a state-based conflict against each other. Rather, Niger has provided secondary warring support to Nigeria in its conflict over government power against JAS. The state-based violence continued at a high level during 2016. The Nigerian connection was still noticeable in that most attacks were carried out close to the Nigerian border.
While violence deescalated overall in 2017, this year also saw another branch of IS, called IS Greater Sahara (ISGS) entering Niger from Mali. ISGS pledged allegiance to IS in 2015, yet the pledge was properly accepted by IS in October 2016. With that, what had previously been ISGS became integrated into IS, and increased their attacks on the Malian government (read more about the conflict Mali: Islamic state. A few months later, the group entered into Niger. This opened up a new front in the conflict and violence spread to previously spared regions in Niger’s southwest. Despite this, violence decreased again overall in 2018.
Further, in 2019, ISGS was incorporated in IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP) which focused its actions on north-eastern Nigeria, south-eastern Niger, northern Cameroon and the Lake Chad area of Chad. The merging of the two groups likely meant more communication between the two sections of IS. However, the two groups continued to operate in different parts of the country. The de-escalation of violence that took place in 2017 and 2018 proved only temporary, as violence escalated in 2019. In 2020, violence increased even further to previously unseen levels, as the Greater Saharan section of IS stepped up their attacks in the regions bordering Mali and Burkina Faso. In March 2022, the Greater Sahara section of ISWAP declared its own province, thus becoming IS - Sahel Province (ISSP).
With the rise of ISWAP, organized violence in Niger has become largely centered in the south-east of the country - bordering Nigeria and Chad in the Lake Chad region; and in the southwest – bordering Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria. Additionally, with the rise of ISWAP, JAS moved their base closer to the Nigerien border and have conducted cross-border attacks into Niger, mainly the Diffa region. As seen with the rise of JAS in Nigeria, the spill-over effect of regional conflicts has largely affected Niger. Note that Niger works together with Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria (a coalition named Multi Joint National Task Force (MJNTF)) to combat the rise of terrorism in the region.
Since 2017, Niger has also seen the presence of JNIM, a coalition of several jihadist groups that emerged in Mali the same year. However, it was first in 2021 that the conflict over government in Niger became active, as fighting between the Nigerien government and JNIM reached 25 battle-related deaths. The aim of JNIM is to expel foreign forces from the region and impose Islamic law. The group is affiliated with al-Qaida. The geographical scope of the group operations have been limited to a single commune in Niger, namely the Torodi commune. Most attacks were fairly small in scope, aside from a JNIM ambush on Nigerien troops on a supply mission to Boni outpost in Torodi in July 2021. As government forces tried to evacuate wounded personnel they hit an improvised explosive device, resulting in at least 15 soldiers killed. In 2024, the Government of Niger’s conflict with JNIM reached all-time high levels with a total of 440 fatalities recorded in the dyad. The violence remains concentrated in the Tillabéri region, mostly located in the Say department and the Tera department.
Niger has provided secondary warring support to Kuwait in 1991 in the Iraq-Kuwait-interstate conflict and similarly to the government of Algeria in 2004 in the Algerian intrastate conflict involving GSPC (Group Salafite pour la prédication et le combat, Salafiste Group of Call and Combat).
