SUMMARY
From a German protectorate to a French and British colony - Cameroon became independent in 1960 and became a republic the following year. Electoral fraud, corruption, a one-man-rule has since then characterized the Cameroonian political landscape. Separatist struggles in the country’s English-speaking regions, and overall tensions between the English and the French speaking population has deepened over the decades. In the mid-2010s, both Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and IS started carrying out violent offensives in the north of the country, attacking both government troops and civilians.
Since 1989, Cameroon has experienced the interstate, intrastate, non-state and one-sided categories of organized violence, as defined by UCDP.
2025
In 2025, the overall level of organized armed violence in Cameroon decreased compared to 2024. In fact, since 2018, the overall level of organized armed violence in Cameroon has been on a slight downward trend. The state-based violence continued to be dominated by three main armed groups, each with their own incompatibility against the government; the Ambazonian insurgents, IS’ West Africa Province, and JAS.
The level of state-based violence continued to decrease in 2025. As in previous years, the most violent state-based conflict was the conflict between the Government and the Ambazonian insurgents. The conflict has been ongoing since 2017 but has since then decreased in intensity. In more recent years, the Ambazonian insurgents have made frequent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) when targeting army convoys. Another notable armed actor that decreased their use of violence during 2025 was JAS, which fought a conflict over governmental power against the Cameroonian government. The group carried out attacks in villages in the Far North region against military posts, along the Cameroon-Nigeria border, but also a few attacks inwards the country. In contrast to 2024, the territorial conflict between the Government and IS intensified once more in 2025 and became active again. During the year, IS escalated its attacks against Cameroonian army posts and made frequent use of IEDs. The majority of violence occurred in the Logone-et-Chari department, in the Lake Chad area, a known stronghold for IS’ West Africa Province.
The level of non-state violence notably decreased in Cameroon in 2025 as only two fatalities were recorded in the non-state dyad between a local vigilante group (Comités locaux de vigilance) and JAS in the Far North region.
The level of one-sided violence in 2025 remained on roughly the same level as previous year. One-sided attacks by the Ambazonia insurgents, operating mainly in the North-West region, increased compared to 2024. Meanwhile, JAS continued to be the most prominent actor in the one-sided category in 2025, although the number of fatalities recorded decreased compared to previous years. The armed group continued their violent attacks largely centered in the Far North region, characterized by small-scale raids against villages in the Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga departments. The level of one-sided violence perpetrated by IS in 2025 increased compared to 2024 as the group attacked villages and ambushed travelers along roads in mainly the Logone-et-Chari department. The downward trend of one-sided violence by the Government as seen in recent years continued in 2024, resulting in some of the lowest levels of one-sided violence by the Government since 2016. However, on several occasions, civilians were reportedly shot at road checkpoints.
A turbulent history of violence
In the late 19th century the territory that constitutes present-day Cameroon became a German colony. Following the end of the First World War and the allied victory over Germany, the territory was divided between France and the UK as specified by a League of Nations mandate. France took over around four-fifths of the country, and the British took the remaining one-fifth that was bordering Nigeria (current day South-west and North-west regions). After the Second World War, demands for independence increased and several armed uprisings took place but were suppressed by the government. The French part of present-day Cameroon became independent in 1960, with the British territories acceding to the newly created state in 1961. On 1 October 1961, the Republic of Cameroon was created.
Ahmadou Ahidjo was selected president over the newly created republic and his roughly 20 years in power was characterized by a centralization of power, a turning away from the federal rule, and overall instability and discontent. The centralized authoritarian tendencies created underground opposition groups which started protest Ahidjo’s rule in the late 1970s. The English-speaking region of the country started to feel more and more discontent with the French dominance within the government and demanded change. In 1982, Ahidjo voluntarily handed over power to then prime minister Biya, and it was under the latter’s rule that the inner tensions within the country really started to grow. Biya largely built his government with people from the French speaking regions in the middle and south of Cameroon. This marginalized both people in the North and in the English-speaking region. Discontent grew in society and with that systematic repression of political opposition became more prevalent.
After fierce demands from the population, multi-party elections took place for the first time in Cameroon in 1992. However, the elections have often times since then been boycotted by the opposition parties due to lack of transparency and the high prevalence of corruption. In 2022, Biya is still the president of Cameroon and is the second-longest-ruling president in Africa, after the president of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.
Violent trends
The majority of the organized violence during the 1990s was driven by non-state violence, more specifically by violence between various ethnic groups across the country. The majority of violence was within the Choa Arab – Kotoko dyad in the Far north province. Additionally, the 1990s was also characterized by one state-based conflict, namely the interstate conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria regarding the Bakassi peninsula. The conflict had its origins in the late 17th century and early 18th century, and flared up again during the mid-1990s. Cameroon and Nigeria fought between 1994 and 1996, resulting in a recorded 69 fatalities. Additionally, it was during this time-period that the Cameroonian army carried out the so-called Karena massacre. In February 1994, the government troops entered Karena village, on the shores of Lake Chad, and in the name of avenging the death of a soldier the day before by some highway robbers killed 55 civilians.
After the 1990s followed a period of relative calm in Cameroon and the period between 2000-2013 contained only low-scale sporadic one-sided violence by the Government of Cameroon, and JAS respectively, resulting in a total of three recorded civilian deaths. However, the calm trend was intensely abrupted in 2015 when JAS, originally a Nigerian Islamist group, resealed a video in which they demanded that Cameroon should scrap its constitution and embrace Islam. Thus, the Cameroon: Government conflict became active again. It should be noted that the Cameroonian government already had fought JAS for over a year, though this fighting had been on the context of neighboring Nigeria’s conflict with JAS. A few months into 2015, JAS pledged allegiance to IS and the previous governmental conflict now became a territorial conflict over the so-called Islamic State. These two state-based conflicts resulted in all-time highly levels of organized violence in Cameroon in 2015.
Another peak in organized violence, especially state-based violence, can be discerned in 2018 when the conflict over the Anglophone region of Cameroon escalated. The conflict between the Government of Cameroon and the Ambazonia insurgents had started in the previous year, yet it escalated during 2018 when the government focused on heavy crack down of the group in the area, which resulted in increased small separatist counter-attacks on police and military checkpoints. Throughout 2018, civilians were frequently targeted by the Cameroonian government in reprisal attacks on communities suspected of supporting the separatists.
The Bakassi Peninsula
Cameroon has been involved in an interstate conflict with Nigeria, centering around a border dispute concerning the Bakassi peninsula – an area rich in both oil and natural gas. With both countries having claimed sovereignty over the area there has been occasional border clashes since the 1960s. The dispute is based on disparate views of treaties signed by the colonial powers Great Britain and Germany. Nigeria refers to a document signed in 1884, placing Bakassi in Nigeria, whereas Cameroon regards a treaty from 1913, placing Bakassi in Cameroon, to be the sole legitimate document.
The most recent crisis regarding the Bakassi peninsula dates back to the 1990s when the tensions escalated. In June 1991, Nigeria accused Cameroon of annexing nine Nigerian fishing settlements on the Bakassi Peninsula and following repeated claims of incursions by the Cameroon army, Nigeria sent some 500-1000 troops to the area in December 1993, in view to defend its citizens. The situation grew more and more tense and in January 1994, Cameroonian security forces killed a number of Nigerian civilians, and the following month the two armies clashed on the peninsula. The conflict continued at a low intensity until 1996, when it grew more intense for one year, with the most violent clashes taking place in April and May. A total of 56 fatalities were recorded this year. After 1996, the conflict de-escalated, but there were occasional reports of fighting the late 1990s and early 2000s.
In 1994 the case of Bakassi was brought to the International Court of Justice who in 2002 granted sovereignty over Bakassi to Cameroon. After extensive mediation efforts, the two states managed to come to peace agreement on the 12 June 2006 that regulated the conflict. For more information on this interstate conflict, see the Cameroon – Nigeria conflict page.
Rise of Sahelian jihadism
In 2009, the Islamic sect Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) took up arms against the Nigerian government with the stated goals to topple the government and set up puritanical Islamic rule. Until that year, the group had been relatively unknown in Nigeria, but in July the group launched an attack against a police station which marked the start of the conflict. However, violence culminated the same year as the JAS leader, Muhammed Yusuf, was captured and killed by security forces. This resulted in a leadership vacuum within the group and the cohesion of the group became unclear. Many members fled to neighboring countries, including Cameroon, and were able to set up rear bases and obtain supplies which they transferred back into Nigeria. JAS formally entered Cameroonian territory in 2013, mostly carrying out kidnappings of foreigners. The Cameroonian government became militarily involved with JAS in 2014 through the so-called Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF). This task force was made up of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, with the aim of fighting transnational terrorism in the Lake Chad region. Cameroon’s military involvement in the fight against JAS resulted in JAS carrying out attacks on Cameroonian soil, targeting both government troops and civilians.
It was first in 2015 that JAS started to directly fight the Cameroonian government – aiming to implement an Islamic ruling of the country. The first three months saw large-scale battles between the warring sides, with Chad providing secondary warring support to the Cameroonian government. JAS used both guerrilla tactics on the battle field as well as a conventional army, deploying hundreds – at times even thousands – of fighters. However, in March 2015, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of JAS, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). The pledge was accepted and JAS became the Islamic State’s West Africa wing (ISWAP). Thus, the conflict incompatibility shifted from a governmental to a territorial. ISWAP expanded across Cameron, and became the dominating rebel group on Cameroonian soil.
The conflict context changed again in August 2016 when the central leadership of IS deposed Abubakar Shekau as emir of IS’ West Africa wing. This resulted in a leadership tussle and members of IS broke out of the group, leading to the re-founding of JAS with Shekau as its leader. Throughout the rest of 2016, and in 2017, JAS carried out several attacks against the Cameroonian government, mainly in the Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga departments, in the northern parts of the country. The conflict saw few large-scale battles like in 2015. Rather, JAS focused on planting IEDs and making use of suicide bombers in towns and villages. Violence by JAS decreased further during 2018 and 2019, even falling below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold, thus not recorded as active in UCDP data. The conflict became active again in 2020, but with Shekau killed in an engagement with ISWAP fighter in May 2021 – the group drew back and the conflict did not reach the 25-battle related deaths threshold that year. Simultaneously, as the Nigerian government increase their pressure on JAS, especially in the Sambisa forest, many fighters fled across the border into northern Cameroon. In 2022, JAS remained weakened and its conflict with the [Cameroonian government(/#/actor/83) resulted in 31 battle-related deaths. No large-scale attacks were conducted and the violence kept concentrated in the Mayo-Sava and the Mayo-Tsanaga departments.
Separatist violence in the Anglophone region
The armed conflict in Cameroon’s Anglophone region has its roots in the unification of the Francophone and Anglophone regions of modern-day Cameroon upon independence from colonial rule. On 1 January 1960, the Francophone territory gained independence from France and became the Republic of Cameroon. On 11 February 1961, a referendum was held in the Anglophone territory, and as a result Southern Cameroons elected to join the Republic of Cameroon (while the Northern Cameroons elected to join Nigeria). It was believed that reunification with Francophone Cameroon would allow Southern Cameroons to maintain a large degree of autonomy. However, this was not the case and the constitution drafted by Francophone Cameroon offered the Anglophone region very limited autonomy. Throughout the following decade, the supposed federal state become more centralized and constitutional rights of Anglophones were amended. Despite a turn to multi-party system in the 1990s the country remained deeply divided, and political relations between Anglophones and Francophones remained tense.
Protests and strikes began to spread around the Anglophone region in October 2016. They originally centered around the perceived infringement on Anglophone judicial and educational systems, with some protesters calling for greater autonomy of the Anglophone region. These tensions carried into 2017 as the Cameroonian government banned civil society groups and shut down internet and telecommunications in the Anglophone regions. In parallel to the suppression of the street protests, hardliner separatists embarked on the path to establish armed groups, aiming to launch an armed struggle. However, from the outset they were fraught with internal problems and instead of creating one cohesive armed group, numerous small ones emerged. Due to a lack of information regarding the specific identity of rebel groups in violent events, the myriad of armed groups in Cameroon’s Anglophone region are collectively dubbed Ambazonia insurgents in UCDP data (for more information on individual Ambazonian actors, see Cameroon: Ambazonian conflict page).
The violent struggle began in September 2017 after protests seeking increased autonomy for the Anglophone region were brutally suppressed by the country’s security forces. The first attack by the Ambazonian insurgents were recorded in UCDP on the 16 September 2017 when the group killed two police officers during an attempted bombing of the Bamenda Congress Hall. The situation reached a tipping point during large-scale protests in late September and early October, when tens of thousands went to the streets. Cameroonian security forces responded with deadly force against the non-violent protesters. At least a few dozen and possibly as many as a hundred were killed in one-sided violence by the Cameroonian government during these events. Towards the end of 2017, security forces increased military deployment and cracked down on dissenters.
Pre-1989 conflicts
UCDP has recorded one state-based conflict in Cameroon before 1989, a conflict over government power which could be explained in two stages. The first being a so-called extra-state conflict between UCP and France over the territory Cameroon. UCP was established in 1948 as a Marxist party with two overarching goals; independence, and the reunification of the divided Cameroon. After having tried to enter the political scene after the party got banned in 1995, the UCP went underground and initiated a guerrilla war against the French colonial power. In 1958 the conflict escalated as new French units were deployed to reinforce the troops fighting UPC. Soon after this, UPC split into two factions - with one faction turning to political life, and another faction continuing the armed struggle. On 1 January 1960, France left Cameroon and subsequently one of the main objectives set up by the UCP was reached: an independent Cameroon.
However, the new Cameroonian government inherited the conflict the Marxist party-turned-rebel-group UPC from former colonial power France. The conflict entered its second stage where the Government of Cameroon received secondary warring support from France. In February 1960, French troops entered Cameroon and the rest of the year saw heavy fighting with thousands of rebels killed. On 1 October 1961, independent, French-speaking Cameroon was united with its southern half, forming the present-day Cameroon and with that UPC's second goals was met. However, intermittent rebel attacks persisted despite the fact that the UPC was substantially weakened after the French intervention of 1960. The group continued to carry out sporadic attacks through the rest of the decade.
On 6 April 1984, a coup attempt was carried out under the leadership of Colonel Ibrahim Saleh, the deputy commander of the Republican Guard. The latter was an independent faction of the Cameroonian armed forces tasked with protecting the life of the President Biya. The rebels urged the people of Cameroon to reject President Biya, shelled the presidential palace with artillery fire, seized the airport, and cut the telecommunication with the outside world. The rebels also managed to detain the Army Chief of Staff in his home.
The government swiftly launched a counter-attack the same day, and during the following days several coup makers were arrested. On 12 April the government stated that 70 people had been killed during the coup attempt, including four civilians. Unofficial estimates were, however, substantially higher, putting the figure between 500 and 2000. On 12 April all known organizers of the coup had been captured, with the exception of one Junior Officer. For extensive information about the pre-9189 conflicts in Cameroon, see the Cameroon: Government conflict page.
