SUMMARY
MUJAO (Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest), or in English MUJWA (Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), was an islamists rebel group with a broad, transnational outlook, created in late 2011 through a split in the Algerian rebel group AQIM.
AQIM had since the early 2000s retreated to two strongholds, the Berber-inhabited Kabylia region in eastern Algeria and the Sahel region to the south, prompting a debate concerning the cohesion of the group. While by 2011 the Sahel-based AQIM ‘faction’ had grown to include numerous fighters from other Sahel countries than Algeria, the leadership remained largely Algerian. This caused dissent within the group, and was one of the reasons given when MUJAO was launched. Another reason given was that AQIM had purportedly lost its devotion to jihad, instead focusing on its lucrative illicit business opportunities in the ineffectively controlled Sahel region. This reason appears doubtful, however, given that another version of the history behind the split was that it came about because of quarrels about sharing out the ransoms paid for the release of Western hostages. Another often cited possible explanation behind the split was that many of the non-Algerian fighters were dissatisfied that so much focus was placed on Algeria in terms of both strategic priority and military targeting; MUJAO instead propagated jihad in West Africa.
The overall leader of MUJAO was Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (alternative spellings are Hamada Ould Khaïrou or Hamad al-Khairy), also known as Abu Qumqum, from Mauretania. Another key leader was businessman, smuggler and former AQIM member Sultan Ould Bady, who commanded MUJAO’s Salah al-Din Brigade. He however left the movement to join fellow Islamists rebel group Ansar Dine in early 2013, bringing the brigade with him. Finally, yet another important figure in MUJAO was Ahmed el-Tilemsi (also known as Ahmad Ould Aamari). Often described as a founding member, el-Tilemsi commanded the Osama bin Laden brigade and was a member of the group’s Majlis Shura, or leadership council.
As the events of 2012 unfolded in Mali (see Mali: Azawad and Mali: Government), northern Mali in general and Gao town in particular became the main base for the group. With much of the leadership being ‘foreign’, the group – which prided itself of being multi-ethnic, with no ethnic group exerting superiority over another – made a determined effort to recruit from among the local population. In the context of the separatist conflict between CMA (originally MNLA) and the Malian government, the group could play on anti-Tuareg feelings and rally support and fighters from especially the Songhai ethnic group. Furthermore, several local Songhai received leading positions in the movement, such and head of its police force. Subsequently, MUJAO came to be both a local group and a transnational, ‘foreign’ one, comprising jihadists from Sub-Saharan Africa, Mauretania, Chad, Niger and other countries. However, the multi-ethnic image of the group was challenged in late 2012 when Hisham Bilal, a Nigerien MUJAO commander, and a number of his men returned to their home country and surrendered to authorities there, complaining that the group’s Arab commanders viewed Black African jihadists as “cannon fodder” and believed “a black man is inferior to an Arab or a white”.
Despite the fact that MUJAO was created by breaking off from AQIM, the two groups cooperated militarily in northern Mali throughout 2012. Also included in the loose Islamist alliance was the mainly Tuareg Islamist group Ansar Dine. MUJAO leading figure el-Tilemsi commented on the relationship by saying that “Our relationship is good with the jihadi groups that are present with us in the field since we are joined by the fraternal association of faith and jihad and common destiny and we all aspire to achieve unity and establish an Islamic Emirate in the region.” Furthermore, the groups also cooperated with fellow AQIM offshoot, Signed-in-Blood Battalion. There were tensions in the loose coalition, however, mainly due to Ansar Dine's ever-changing attitude to MNLA, and, in turn, to its alliance with the Islamists.
In August 2013, MUJAO merged with Signed-in-Blood Battalion, creating al-Murabitun. With that, MUJAO ceased to be recorded as an independent entity in UCDP data.
