Government of Niger - JNIM

Number of Deaths

Number of Deaths

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Map data ©2026 Inst. Geogr. Nacional
Map data ©2026 Inst. Geogr. Nacional

This dyad belongs to the conflict Niger: Government



Summary of conflict Niger: Government

The conflict over government in Niger has been pursued by four rebel groups, three of which – FLAA, UFRA and MNJ – were based among the Tuareg population of northern Niger. These three groups fought the government in the 1990s and the last active group, MNH, surrendered in January 2010. The fourth rebel group – JNIM – became active in 2021 as the group fought the Government with the aim to expel foreign forces from the region and impose Islamic law.

In 2025, the conflict over government in Niger between the Nigerien government and the al-Qaida-affiliated jihadist group JNIM decreased in intensity compared to 2024. Although, the number of attacks by JNIM against the Government remained roughly the same, the number of fatalities did not reach the high level as witnessed during 2024. The group continued to rely heavily on planted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), targeting military patrols and also attacked military posts. The deadliest attack took place on 26 May in the Falmey area of the Dosso region when JNIM fighters ambushed a patrol of the Nigerien army.

Background to the conflict

Despite being one of the world’s top five producers of Uranium, Niger is still one of the poorest countries in the world. The state has seen intermittent fighting since 1991, with two different conflicts taking place; one over the country's type of political system (the one in focus here) and one over the status of the Aïr and Azawad region in the north. In both these conflicts, the rebel groups active have primarily been based among the Tuareg ethnic group, inhabiting the north. Since independence, the Tuaregs have been subordinated by successive governments, all of whom have been dominated by other ethnic groups. Furthermore, they have frequently been hit by extended droughts and the uranium and oil industry located in this part of the country provides few jobs to locals and has contaminated scarce water sources and pastures.

Against this background, in the mid-1970s and onward, large numbers of young Tuaregs from both Mali and Niger emigrated to Libya and Algeria facing particularly severe droughts. The ones who ended up in Libya received military training, as General Quaddafi incorporated some into his regular military forces and inducted others into a Libyan-sponsored "Islamic Legion". The Islamic Legion was subsequently dispatched to Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan, where numerous Tuaregs acquired considerable combat training. When the economic situation in the host countries deteriorated in the late 1980s, the Tuaregs were forced to leave and return to their home countries. The Nigerien government promised resettlement aid for returnees, but this never materialized. This, together with historical grievances, a repressive political climate, and newly received military capabilities, led to tensions between returning Tuaregs and the Nigerien armed forces.

Conflict in the 1990s; FLAA and UFRA

Following increasing tensions between Tuaregs returning from Libya and Algeria and the Nigerien armed forces, the FLAA (Front de libération de lAïr et lAzaouad: Air and Azawad Liberation Front), was created on 19 October 1991. The group launched an armed struggle against the government with the stated goal of fighting for a federal system in which all Nigerien ethnic groups would have their own administrative entity. The conflict is thus not coded as being fought over territory, but rather over government, as the issue at hand is the type of political system in the whole country.

The rebel group, inferior in equipment and numbers, used classic guerrilla warfare, relying largely on the element of surprise and their intimate knowledge of the terrain. They mainly attacked government forces, but also facilities vital to the uranium industry. The government troops, in turn, retaliated with attacks that claimed the lives of many civilians.

From the outset of FLAA’s armed struggle, negotiations were held continuously. Following secret talks between the rebels and the government in Paris in 1993, an accord was eventually signed on 10 June 1993. The Paris Accords provided for a truce agreement, demilitarization of the north, financial assistance to returning Tuareg refugees, development funds to Tuareg areas, and planning of further talks concerning the Tuareg political demands. However, already after a month the agreement became irrelevant, having caused internal tensions in the rebel camp which eventually resulted in the emergence of a splinter group, the FLT (Front de libération de Tamoust: Tamoust Liberation Front). Simultaneously, another Tuareg group, the ARLN (Armée révolutionaire de liberation du Nord-Niger: Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of North Niger) materialized. It should be noted, however, that fighting between the government and the latter two groups did not reach the required threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in a year, wherefore they are not included as active rebel groups in UCDP data.

In contrast to these tendencies of fragmentation, an umbrella organization comprising FLAA, ARLN, and FLT - CRA (Coordination de la résistance armée, Coordination of the Armed Resistance) - was created in September 1993, effectively abandoning the demand for federalism. Instead, the new coalition demanded autonomy for the Tuareg-inhabited regions. Subsequently, the incompatibility had changed to concern territory, wherefore the conflict between CRA and the government is coded as a separate conflict (see Niger: Aïr & Azawad).

In November 1996 a new rebel umbrella organization was created; UFRA (Union des forces de la résistance armée, Union of the Forces of the Resistance Army). It comprised six different Tuareg factions that had originally been organized within the CRA and its successor organizations. While the group never clearly stated its aims UFRA reaffirmed its commitment to the 24 April 1995 agreement; an accord signed by ORA, a successor organization to CRA. As this agreement provides for changes in the administration of the whole country, UFRA is coded as active in the conflict over governmental power in Niger.

As UFRA stepped up its attacks in 1997, yet another group was starting to carry out military operations against the government. FARS (Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara: Armed Revolutionary Forces of the Sahara) was a rebel group based among the Toubou population of eastern Niger, seeking autonomy for a chunk of territory along the Chadian border (see Niger: Eastern Niger). FARS played an important role in connection to UFRA, since the two groups in 1997 joined forces in a tactical alliance. They launched joint military attacks throughout that year and also held joint negotiations with the government. The talks, held in Algeria, concerned a ceasefire, an amnesty, an exchange of prisoners, and the integration of the rebel fighters into the security forces. The negotiations led to the signing of a ceasefire accord on 23 November 1997. With this accord, the UFRA ended its armed struggle.

A note on peace agreements

Two peace agreements concluded in the conflict over Aïr & Azawad are relevant to mention in the context of the conflict over government in Niger. In these two accords, concluded in 1994 and 1995, the parties committed to decentralization of political power. This was to be done by establishing local administrations in the whole country overseeing economic, social, and cultural issues. The peace agreements also focused on economic development for the northern region. Thus, the peace agreements resolved not only the conflict over territory but also the earlier conflict over the distribution of governmental power in the whole country. However, ten years later these accords had still not been fully implemented. Effective decentralized governance had proven difficult due to the slowness in electoral preparation, the delay in providing technical and financial support as well as the weakness of the financial grants. Several municipalities had been unable to establish themselves or soon ceased to function. It was against this backdrop that the MNJ launched its struggle in 2007.

MNJ enters the fray (2007-2010)

Despite negotiations and peace accords during the 1990s the conflict over governmental power had not been resolved by 2007 when the third rebel group in the conflict emerged; MNJ (Mouvement Nigérien pour la justice, Niger Justice Movement). The MNJ was led by Aghaly Alambo, a former FLAA member. While being Tuareg-led, the rebel group also included a number of disaffected members of the Toubou, Arab, Peul, Hausa, and other nomadic or semi-nomadic groups dwelling in northern Niger. In its program, published in April 2007, one of the group’s main demands was the full implementation of the peace agreement concluded in 1995. Particularly, the MNJ focused on the outstanding decentralization of the government as well as the economic and social provisions laid down in the agreement. The group underlined that it fought for the rights of all Nigeriens and not only the northern regions and their inhabitants.

2007 and 2008 saw MNJ fighters attacking security forces, but also the infrastructure and the uranium and oil industry present in northern Niger. In response to the growing rebel threat, the government announced a "mise en garde" (state of alert) in northern Niger. This gave the army and police almost unlimited powers and subsequent harsh measures against civilians suspected of collaborating with the rebels were criticized by human rights organizations.

From its inception, MNJ repeatedly announced its willingness to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. However, during the first two years (2007-08) the government refused to open talks, declaring the rebels to be common criminals. This changed in March 2009, when the government asked Libya leader Colonel Muammar Quaddafi to mediate in the conflict. He accepted, and April saw the initiation of a peace process between the Government and MNJ. It also included two groups that had been formed by splits in the original MNJ movement: FFR (Front des forces de redressement: Front of Forces for Recovery) and FPN (Front patriotique nigérien: Niger Patriotic Front). While fatalities in fighting between these groups and the government forces did not cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold – wherefore they are not included as active in UCDP data – their formation influenced the conflict between the government and MNJ in that they weakened the latter.

In early October 2009, a peace ceremony was held in Sabha in southern Libya, at which dozens of MNJ fighters officially lay down their arms and "chose peace". The ceremony, which was attended by Alambo, was initially rejected by some within MNJ, but by the end of the month, it appeared as if the whole group stood behind the decision to end the armed struggle. Subsequently, in late October an amnesty was granted to those having taken part in the conflict, and hundreds of MNJ fighters were repatriated from Libya. A couple of weeks later the "state of alert" in northern Niger was formally withdrawn by a presidential decree.

The peace process continued in January 2010, when MNJ officially surrendered its weapons during a ceremony near Arlit in northern Niger. At the ceremony, MNJ’s president Aghali Ag Alambo expressed his ‘‘willingness’’ to work for the return of total peace in northern Niger and reported that some 3000 rebels had laid down their arms. In February Nigerien president Mamadou Tandja was ousted in a coup, and replaced by the Supreme Council for Restoration of Democracy (CSRD). Even though the peace process had been initiated by the former government, it was soon evident that the new regime had no interest in reneging on what had been decided so far; at a meeting between the MNJ leadership and the new military junta leader Salou Djibo in Syrte, Libya, in March, the latter declared that the peace process was to continue.

A few weeks later the previously splintered Touarges rebels re-united for negotiations with the junta in Niamey, hoping to hammer out a road map to accelerate the peace process. Little seems to have come of the meeting, however, as a MNJ spokesman Hamed Wagaya expressed grave dissatisfaction with the junta just a month later, complaining about the failure to implement previous decisions taken in the peace process. According to Wagaya, some 4000 ex-combatants were still waiting for the promised socioeconomic reinsertion.

JNIM in Niger (2017-)

The conflict over government in Niger became active again in 2021, as fighting between the Nigerien government and JNIM reached the 25 battle-related deaths threshold in UCDP data. JNIM, a coalition of several jihadist groups in Mali, emerged in 2017. Its aim is to expel foreign forces from the region and impose Islamic law. It is affiliated with al-Qaida and so came into conflict with the local wing of the Islamic State, IS in the Greater Sahara (part of IS West Africa Province), in 2020.

While JNIM claimed its first attack in Niger already in 2017, it did not become active in UCDP data until 2021, during which it carried out several attacks on Nigerien forces. The geographical scope of JNIM operations has been limited to a single commune in Niger, Torodi. Most attacks were fairly small in scope, aside from a JNIM ambush on Nigerien troops on a supply mission to the Boni outpost in Torodi in July. As government forces tried to evacuate wounded personnel they hit an improvised explosive device, resulting in at least 15 soldiers killed. In late 2021, a joint Burkinabe-Nigerien military operation targeting jihadists along the border dismantled a suspected JNIM base in Kokoloukou, Torodi commune. The conflict reached all-time-high levels of violence in 2022, the same year that JNIM expanded across the region into neighboring countries, including Benin and Togo. 2022 was also the year when JNIM expanded its attacks in Niger, not solely focusing on the Torodi commune in the Say department any longer. Yet, all attacks took place within the Tillabéri region in western Niger.

No recorded fatalities for this entity.