SUMMARY
The non-state conflict between the Tuareg self-defense groups GATIA and MSA on the one hand, and the Greater Sahara section (ISGS) of IS on the other was fought in the context of the conflict between the latter and the Malian state, active from 2017 onward. Furthermore, this non-state conflict is also closely interlinked with the non-state conflicts GATIA-IS and IS- MSA, as well as tied to one-sided violence carried out by all these parties.
Mali has been the scene of high levels of organized violence since the early 2010s. State-based conflicts in the country were to some extent a product of a lack of state presence in different areas, and over time, the conflicts as such served to limit state presence even further. Large section of the population thus found themselves living in extremely insecure surroundings, engulfed by armed conflict as well as ethnic mobilization and violence. In this context, the responsibility to provide security many times fell on non-state actors such as GATIA and MSA. GATIA was a pro-government militia based among the Imghad sub-group of the Tuareg people, which had emerged during the territorial conflict between separatist Tuareg rebel group CMA (initially MNLA) – with a leadership mainly from the Ifoghas sub-group of the Tuareg people – and the state. MSA, for its part, was based among the Daoussak Tuaregs, and had its roots in the separatist CMA. In 2016, the Daoussak section of CMA left the mother organization, creating MSA, citing tensions among the different Tuareg sub-groups and accusing the leadership of being vested in a narrow, inaccessible circle of Ifoghas Tuaregs. Already during the months leading up to the split, there had been some rapprochement between the Daoussak Tuareg and GATIA, and when the newly formed group came to find itself faced by IS attacks, as well as embroiled in ethnic violence (more below), the two groups grew increasingly close.
When the state-based conflict between the Malian government and the Islamic State’s Greater Sahara section erupted in eastern Mali in 2017, the two Tuareg militias became important allies of the government. As the Malian state had a limited presence in the area, it came to rely on help from MSA and GATIA to stave off attacks from the jihadist group. This coalition was also joined by the French Barkhane force. When the group fought alongside the army (and France), the violence recorded by UCDP is regarded as being part of that intrastate conflict. However, in addition to fighting together with the Malian armed forces, MSA and GATIA also faced IS on their own, in a non-state conflict. Furthermore, at times the two groups also fought IS separately. These three non-state conflicts were all part of the same context, and thus closely interlinked. During long periods of time, the Barkhane force, MSA and GATIA were the main players in opposing IS in the eastern part of the country. In early 2017, just before the start of the non-state conflict, there was a war of words between the leaders of MSA and IS’ Greater Sahara section. Initially, Abubakr al-Baghdadi of MSA made several declarations about the then-leader of IS’ Greater Sahara section, Abu-Walid al-Saharaoui, on social media, stating that “the local Daoussahak tribal community does not welcome al-Saharaoui’s men in the Ménaka”. Abu-Walid al-Saharaoui subsequently responded in an audio message, where he accused MSA of being servants of France, and threatened to exterminate the Daoussak Tuaregs. This exchange points to the fact that the escalating violence in eastern Mali in general, and Menaka region in particular, was connected to – and fed into- ethnic tensions between the Tuareg and Fulani populations. The Islamic State’s Greater Sahara section – drawing most of its support from the Fulani – viewed the Tuareg as MSA and GATIA supporters, and carried out one-sided attacks against their villages, which caused the two militias to step up activities even further, both in attacking IS, but also in targeting Fulani villages in one-sided killings. As IS began to suffer military set-backs at the hands of the two militias, they often retaliated through targeted killings of important members of the organizations, as well as further one-sided attacks on Tuareg villages.
The non-state conflict between GATIA and MSA on the one hand, and the Greater Sahara section (ISGS) of IS on the other is first included in UCDP data in 2017. In mid-July of that year, fighting near Andéramboukane in the Menaka region led to numerous deaths. With that, the conflict crossed the 25 fatalities threshold for the first time.
