SUMMARY
MSA (Mouvement du Salut de l’Azawad, or Movement for the Salvation of Azawad, sometimes MSA-D) was a Touareg-dominated armed group that originated in Mali. Since the 1990s, Mali had seen intermittent fighting between the government and several groups over the Azawad region. Amid negotiation to settle the conflict, the Azawad armed groups in 2014 organized themselves in two camps: the pro-independence CMA umbrella organization, and the pro-national unity “Platform” alliance (for more detailed information, see Mali: Azawad). In 2015, the Government of Mali signed the Algiers Agreement with both CMA and Platform, effectively settling the Azawad conflict and implementing autonomy in the region. However, the security situation in Mali remained unstable as a consequence of a parallel insurgency dominated by more Islamist-leaning groups (such as Ansar Dine), an emerging Islamic State (IS) branch, and increasing communal violence; it was in this context that MSA emerged.
MSA was created in early September 2016, following discord within CMA. According to sources within the group, MSA splintered from CMA because the latter was unable to handle the increasing communal tensions in northern Mali, and because the CMA leadership was vested in a narrow, inaccessible circle. The group was comprised of members from several CMA factions, including MNLA (Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, or Azawad National Liberation Movement), HCUA (Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad, or High Council for the Unity of Azawad), and MAA (Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad, or Arab Movement of Azawad). MSA claimed that its primary goal was to protect and represent Azawad’s entire population, and it reaffirmed its commitment to the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. Ideologically, MSA was described as a secularist and Azawad nationalist group.
Moussa Ag Acharatoumane – the chief from the Daoussak Touareg residing around the town Ménaka, and a former official of MNLA – was the founder-leader of MSA. Another important leader and co-founder of MSA was Colonel Assalat Ag Habi, a Chamanamas Touareg from Ménaka. According to the group itself, it had access to almost 3000 fighters, but this number was not independently corroborated and should thus be viewed with caution. Initially, most fighters were drawn from the same two groups as its leaders, the Daoussak and Chamanamas sub-groups of the Touareg. However, after only a few months, in November 2016, the Chamanamas faction of the group broke off into MSA-Chamanamas (MSA-C), making MSA an entirely Daoussak organization. In line with this, MSA is sometimes referred to as MSA-D.
Soon after its creation, MSA aligned itself with Platform, as it was not allowed to stay within CMA. However, in October 2016 MSA opted to create its own coalition of CMA dissident factions, which included CJA (Congrès pour la justice dans l'Azawad, or Azawad Justice Congress), CPA (Coalition pour le peuple de l’Azawad, or Coalition for the People of Azawad), and CMFPR II (Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance II, or Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Fronts and Movements II). This new coalition was however not an outright merger, but rather a formalized cooperation scheme. When fighting against IS, MSA also maintained a tactical alliance with GATIA, a pro-government group that originated in northern Mali to counter the Azawad separatist groups.
GATIA (Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés: the Self-defence Group of Imghad Touareg and its Allies) was a pro-government self-defense group that emerged in the wake of the Malian army’s withdrawal from the northern town Kidal, in May 2014.
The central government had been forced from northern Mali with the outbreak of the two state-based conflicts (one over the territory Azawad and one over government power) in 2012 (see Mali: Azawad and Mali: Government). Even though the country’s armed forces had returned to northern Mali with the help of an international intervention force, its hold on the region was tenuous, at best. Furthermore, for a long time it was not allowed back into Kidal, the separatist stronghold of CMA (originally MNLA), only re-gaining access in June 2013. In May the next year, fighting erupted between the armed forces and CMA, forcing the former to withdraw south, towards the Niger River region and to barracks in the north.
With the Malian army’s withdrawal, Kidal and a number of other northern towns were once more under the control of the separatists. The northern population is divided between a number of different ethnic groups, with the Tuareg people making up a majority of the inhabitants, followed by Arabs, Fulani and Songhay. There are deep divisions between these groups (as well as within especially the Tuareg community); they do not share the same culture or traditions and they have different interests and political agendas. These divisions have been exacerbated by the Malian state’s divide-and-rule tactics in the region. One distinct question of contention between these groups concerns the establishment of a separate state in the northern part of Mali. While this is something that especially parts of the Tuareg community have been fighting for, sections of the Arab population and the Fulani and Songhay oppose the idea, fearing that it would mean living under Tuareg domination. As for the Tuareg community, it is also deeply split on the issue. Internal divisions along clan lines have long impeded Tuareg efforts of opposition to Bamako and the south; this was the case during the rebellions in the 1990s and 2007-09 (see Mali: Azawad) and this remained so in the uprising that began in 2012. MNLA was by and large led by certain sub-clans within the Kel Adagh confederation, especially the noble Ifoghas and Idnan, based in the Kidal area. While the group strived for broad-based support among the Tuareg, especially one clan (also within the Kel Adagh confederation) remained in opposition to the new organization: the vassal Imghad, who stayed loyal to the idea of a unified Mali and fought on the side of the Bamako regime.
GATIA was a mainly Imghad armed group that was founded after the events in Kidal, but was not formally announced until August 2014. At its inception it was believed to number around 1000 well-trained fighters. Made up in part by a pre-existing Imghad militia, most analysts agree that the main core consisted of breakaway Imghad and Arab soldiers from the Malian army, led by General El Hajj ag Gamou. Ag Gamou was an in important Imghad, who had been involved in the Tuareg uprising in the 1990s. After the signing of a peace deal, he joined the Malian army, where he rose in the ranks and became Deputy Chief of Staff in 2010. Since he kept his position in the army, his role in the creation of GATIA indicated the close link between the two, even though it was strongly denied by the state. The group’s Secretary General was Fahad Ag Almahoud.
The main aim of GATIA, as outlined by Ag Almahoud, was to protect its communities against CMA. He then went on to say that the members of the group “support the peace process, […] recognize the territorial integrity of Mali and […] are not asking for autonomy. We want to work with the Malian government to bring stability to the country”. It was also clear that the leaders of the group realized that only armed groups were given seats at the negotiation table, wherefore forming one was a necessity to have a say.
Aside from its links with the government, GATIA was also allied with a number of other actors in northern Mali. In 2014, two groupings of armed movements were slowly forming in the context of the ongoing peace negotiations: Bamako-loyalists and those in favor of extensive autonomy or even independence. The former united under the banner Platform, whereas the latter was called CMA. In August, GATIA joined the Platform alliance, and as such came to cooperate closely with its member groups: MAA and CM-FPR. However, despite intermittently fighting together, the groups failed to create a joint military structure, which its opponent CMA did.
GATIA has been active in the non-state category of UCDP organized violence.
