SUMMARY
Over the years, Algeria has experienced fluctuating levels of organized violence. The country has suffered from a decades-long conflict over governmental power in which violence has escalated to high levels. Today, the Islamist groups that once targeted Algeria have broadened their scope of operations to other countries in the Sahel region, partly explaining the gradually declining levels of violence in Algeria.
Since 1989, Algeria has experienced the intrastate, non-state and one-sided categories of UCDP organized violence.
2022
In 2022, the level of organized violence remained at a low level in Algeria. Even though small episodes of state-based violence between the Algerian government and AQIM appeared, the conflict over governmental power fell below the threshold of 25 fatalities for the third time since 1991; in 2021, the level of violence was at a similarly low level. There have been no official ceasefire between Algeria and AQIM, yet the level of violence has gradually continued to decline.
Peaks of violence
There were two notable peaks of organized violence in Algeria during the 1989-2021 period. Both peaks were linked to the state-based conflict, which pitted the government against a number of Islamist groups, albeit driven by different forms of violence and changing conflict dynamics. For the most part, violence in Algeria has been concentrated in the northern parts of the country, specifically around its capital Algiers.
After escalating societal tensions and growing unrest, the country’s first-ever multiparty elections were held in June 1990. The Islamist political party, FIS, quickly became the most potent opponent to the regime as it appealed the urban poor with its anti-regime stance and Islamic values. When FIS convincingly won the first round of parliamentary elections in 1991, the Algerian army staged a coup and cancelled the second round of elections. Subsequently, the country gradually descended into a large-scale intrastate conflict that continued into the 21st century. There were a myriad of armed Islamic groups active throughout the conflict, each with their own strategies and religious beliefs. After the elections were cancelled and FIS was banned, the groups who fought the regime with arms increasingly came to dominate the struggle. The FIS leadership realized that they had lost the initiative and, in response, the party set up its armed wing AIS.
The high levels of violence in the 1990s were driven mostly by state-based violence between the Algerian army and Islamist groups. In 1992, a number of small extremist groups joined forces and set up GIA, which had a more radical Islamist approach compared to FIS and AIS. The peaks of violence were caused mainly by periods of escalation in the intrastate conflict. Relatively small episodes of non-state violence also appeared in the country, however, they were often overlooked due to the ongoing intense clashes between the Algerian army and Islamist groups. In the late 1990s, there was a short-lived non-state conflict between AIS and GIA.
The Algerian army’s counter-measures became increasingly brutal and there were frequent accusations of state culpability in the one-sided violence, ascribed to GIA. However, most analysts agree that the evidence points to the armed Islamists as the principal perpetrator, a claim fortified by the fact that GIA did not make any attempt to deny the charges. Having been the main driver of the high levels of violence during the 1990s, the state-based conflict de-escalated at the end of the decade, while the one-sided violence increased, placing itself on the same level in 2002.
Regionalisation of AQIM
From 2003 onward, the main group involved in organized violence in Algeria was GSPC, which splintered from GIA in 1998, as a reaction to the latter’s radicalization and targeting of civilians. Announcing its support for al-Qaida in 2003, the group was accepted as part of the al-Qaida network three years later, and subsequently changed its name to AQIM. With that, the group also changed its strategy, relying more on high-impact attacks, such as suicide attacks. While battles between AQIM and the Algerian army persisted, causing relatively high fatality numbers through the 2007-2012 period, the name-change signalled the start of a process that would eventually lead to a clear de-escalation of violence in Algeria.
AQIM started spreading its field of operation as the group intensified its presence in the southern parts of Algeria and most notably in the border areas with Mauritania and Mali. In 2011, when protests sounded loud in neighbouring countries, Algeria did not experience unrest to the same degree. However, the unravelling anarchy in Libya indirectly affected the Algerian conflict as the amount and accessibility of weapons was significantly enhanced in the region. The influx of armaments combined with an unstable political situation led to a better-armed AQIM. At the same time, the volatile situation in Mali, which had worsened with the fall of Gaddafi, made AQIM step up operations even further in the country, targeting the Malian army in a state-based conflict . Consequently, the expansion of operations from Algeria’s north, southward to other Sahel countries shifted the group’s presence and widened its scope. Over the years, AQIM activities in Algeria have therefore declined. In 2019, the conflict was inactive for the first time since 1991, further cementing the declining trend in organized violence in Algeria.
Pre-1989 conflicts
After Algeria was integrated into France in the 19th century, an increasing number of European settlers gradually established political, economic, and social domination over the native Algerian population. Among the disadvantaged native Algerians, nationalist sentiments grew and in 1954, FLN (Front de Libération Nationale; National Liberation Front), later joined by the MNA (Mouvement National Algérien; Algerian National Movement), engaged in an extra-state conflict against France. The two rival groups also started fighting each other, with the FLN succeeding in taking the lead in the pro-independence movement. When finally France opened peace-negotiations in 1961, the OAS (Organisation de lArmée Secrète; Secret Army Organization) formed by members of the French Army violently attempted to disrupt the peace process. Despite this intrastate conflict in France, Algeria was granted independence in 1962.
One year later, in 1963, neighbouring Morocco occupied the mineral rich Algerian province of Tindouf, but was soon pushed back by Algerian troops in a short inter-state conflict. Subsequently, Morocco recognized the Algerian border in exchange for joint mineral exploitation in Tindouf.
