SUMMARY
Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (JAS) was an armed group mainly active in northeastern Nigeria. Until 2009, JAS was relatively unknown, but in late July the group launched an attack against a police station, marking the beginning of an armed conflict with the government. JAS aimed to topple the government and establish puritanical Islamic rule in Nigeria. During the mid-2010s, the group intensely challenged the Nigerian government and also became known for its brutal and indiscriminate attacks against civilians during this time. In 2015, JAS pledged allegiance to IS, thus becoming IS’ West Africa Province and a conflict over territorial control. However, following year, ISWAP, split due to internal divisions and JAS re-appeared. Although notably weaker compared to their peak period and following the split from ISWAP, JAS continued to challenge the Nigerian government and engage in indiscriminate killings of civilians.
JAS had a Salafist jihadist ideological orientation, whereby it promoted an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam, and approved the use of armed violence to implement rule based on Islamic law. In 2009, the group called for the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law, for the establishment of law and order in Nigeria, and for the removal of Western influence over Nigeria. The group also called for collective targeting against political opponents and people of other religious convictions. As the conflict progressed, the establishment of an Islamic state, change of the judicial system to Sharia law, and protection of Muslim religious rights were continuously emphasized.
There are differing accounts among scholars and analysts about the origins of JAS, such as when the group first appeared and regarding leadership. Nevertheless, most accounts trace the group’s roots to the early 2000s in northeastern Nigeria, particularly Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. Mohammed Yusuf is widely regarded as its founder and first leader. Initially associated with the radical but non-violent Izala movement and mentored by the Salafi religious leader Jafar Adam, Yusuf became increasingly radicalized and rejected the secular foundations of Nigerian society. His criticism of Izala leaders, opposition to Western education, and rejection of the Nigerian state eventually led to his exclusion from Izala mosques. Around 2003, he also severed ties with Jafar Adam over religious and ideological disagreements.
During this period, Mohammed Yusuf reportedly developed ties with Muhammed Ali, an Islamist activist who shared his criticism of the Salafi establishment and its cooperation with the Nigerian state. However, the two later split over ideological differences reportedly centered on whether Muslims could legitimately live in Nigeria and the timing of launching jihad. According to several accounts, Ali and his followers viewed Yusuf as “too soft”. While Ali argued that the time for jihad had already arrived, Yusuf argued that additional time was needed to mobilization, establishing support, and acquire weapons.
Ali and his followers subsequently established a rural commune near Kanamma in Yobe State, where they sought to create a community free from state influence. The group, known as Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa, eventually clashed with Nigerian security forces in 2004, resulting in the deaths of many members. Although Yusuf's actual role with regards to the Kanamma commune remains disputed, most accounts state Yusuf was present in Maiduguri during the time, however, the episode is widely regarded as an important precursor to JAS. Following the crackdown, many of the surviving members reportedly returned to Maiduguri and joined Yusuf's movement.
Meanwhile, Yusuf continued to expand his following across northeastern Nigeria and neighboring countries. As his movement grew, he adopted increasingly hardline positions and intensified his criticism of the Nigerian state, political elites, and Western-style education, drawing support from individuals frustrated by social, economic, and political grievances.
Up until July 2009, the group had no official name for themselves. This was also the year when tensions between the Nigerian government and the movement escalated and violent clashes with security forces erupted, which marked the start of the armed conflict. During the group’s earlier years, the group was known as ‘Boko Haram’ which translates roughly to “Western education is a sin” in the Hausa language. However, the group itself has rejected this interpretation and stated that their name should rather be understood as meaning "Western civilization is forbidden". In 2010, the group announced that rather than the commonly used Boko Haram, their official name was Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad, which means “Group Committed to Propagating the Prophets Teachings and Jihad”.
During the clashes in Maiduguri in 2009, Mohammed Yusuf, was arrested and later killed in custody. Following his death, the group’s leadership was initially ambiguous as many JAS members went underground. However, Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s deputy, eventually emerged as the new top leader of JAS (its imam). The group saw its peak under Shekau’s leadership. During this time, the group targeted state and religious elites who they deemed hostile to the group’s aims and its tactics became increasingly indiscriminate, contributing to a dramatic increase in civilian fatalities.
After Yusuf’s death in 2009, JAS received support from AQIM (Qaida al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami; al-Qaida Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb). Nigerian militants with connections to AQIM had reportedly stepped in and brought Shekau to Kano for treatment as he had been wounded in the 2009 Maiduguri clashes. Additionally, apart from being active in northern Nigeria, JAS fighters were from 2011 onwards also present in northern Mali, where Islamists groups for some months in 2012 created and ruled a de facto Islamic state. There were thus credible reports of strong links between the Nigerian organization and especially AQIM and MUJAO (Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de lOuest: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), an AQIM splinter group. JAS reportedly received training in Mali, as well as financial and technical support. Shekau later thanked AQIM which can be seen as a clear confirmation of received support.
In 2012, disaffected JAS members formed the splinter group Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina fi Biladi Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; commonly called Ansaru), citing discontent with the group's indiscriminate violence and leadership style. Led by Khalid al-Barnawi, who reportedly consulted with AQIM before the split, Ansaru remained a relatively small organization, operating mainly in Kogi and Kaduna states and parts of southwestern Nigeria. The group has never become active in UCDP data and group appears to have fragmented further in the 2020s, while leadership losses and defections to JAS and ISWAP have contributed to its decline.
Furthermore, during its peak period, JAS expanded its area of operations from Borno state, in the extreme northeast of Nigeria, all the way to Sokoto state in the northwest, thus covering the full breadth of the country. Meanwhile, the group announced that it would also spread its struggle south, stating that their “Islamic revolution” was not limited to the northern states. JAS became internationally recognized in 2014 due to their infamous large-scale kidnappings of hundreds of schoolgirls in Chibok. The year also saw a change in JAS’ strategy, in that it more than before sought to control and defend conquered territory. Amidst denials by the government, the group made large territorial gains. By the end of the year, JAS controlled an area roughly the size of Belgium, in which Shekau declared the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Aside from consolidating its territorial gains in northeastern Nigeria, the group increased its presence in Cameroon, which saw both attacks on the civilian population and military targets.
However, following year, in 2015, JAS became increasingly pressured by the Nigerian army and the military from neighboring countries and experienced setbacks. This was also the year when Shekau pledged allegiance to IS and the conflict over government thus turned into a conflict over territorial control. Following the split from ISWAP in 2016 due to internal divisions, a notably weakened JAS retained its main base in the Sambisa Forest and remained under the leadership of Shekau. The group was primarily present there and in the surrounding areas of the forest, while it also had a presence in the Mandara mountains on the border with Cameroon and in the northern part of Adamawa state. While all JAS commanders were loyal to Shekau, they were increasingly autonomous, reportedly conducting operations on their own. During this time, the group had lost much of its ability to attack state targets and reverted to plundering civilians. However, the one exception was a sub-group in the northern Lake Chad area, led by Bakura Doro and Bakura Sahalaba. The group came to develop its own taxation system, similar to that of ISWAP, which enabled procurement of weapons. Meanwhile, the sub-group carried out attacks in neighboring Niger and Chad, and occasionally engaged in deadly clashes with ISWAP over control of resources and territory.
In 2021, ISWAP invaded the JAS stronghold in the Sambisa Forest which ultimately led to Shekau detonating his suicide vest after being cornered by ISWAP. Following Shekau’s death, JAS experienced a period of internal division. In June of that year, Bakura Sahalaba, the religious leader of the JAS faction operating in northern Lake Chad, publicly declared that the group would continue its fight. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed imam of JAS. However, tensions between Sahalaba and Bakura Doro, the faction’s military commander, persisted. In March 2022, Bakura Doro reportedly had Sahalaba executed and replaced him as JAS leader. According to Bakura, Sahalaba had been promoting negotiations and advocated for an agreement with ISWAP.
The initial reactions to Bakura Doro as imam of JAS was mixed. Some argued he lacked religious expertise, specifically a JAS sub-group in the Bama area of Borno state (the Dar al Gazuwa sub-group), was reportedly hesitant of Bakura Doro as the new leader of JAS. Yet, Bakura remained as leader, one reason perhaps being that he was able to supply the subgroups with weapons as he reportedly had sent arms to the Gazuwa group when he tried to conciliate. He also had to manage ethnic dynamics within his Lake Chad stronghold. It is an area where the Buduma ethnic group resides and many fighters thus belonged to the Buduma ethnic group. Although not Buduma himself, Doro reportedly sought to maintain support by appointing Buduma members to senior positions while accommodating local leaders.
Geography-wise, ISWAP largely consolidated control over the Sambisa Forest following its offensive against JAS in 2021. Nevertheless, several JAS sub-groups, all loyal to Bakura, persisted. These included groups based in the Gwoza Hills near the Cameroonian border, led by Ngulde, and the Dar Al Gazuwa faction in the Bama area. Furthermore, a JAS cell operating under the leadership of a commander known as Sadiku also maintained a presence in northwestern Nigeria.
Estimates of the number of JAS fighters have varied considerably over time and across sources. During JAS’s peak period, in 2014, Cameroon’s Ministry of Defence claimed JAS had an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 members, while other analysts placed the figure around 9,000. Following the split with ISWAP, JAS was significantly weakened and reported to have about a thousand members. As of 2024, statements from defectors indicated that the Bakura-led group compromised several thousand fighters. Over the years, several thousand JAS fighters have also laid down their arms and surrendered to the authorities.
Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (JAS) has been involved in the state-based, non-state and one-sided categories of UCDP organized violence.
MUJAO (Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest), or in English MUJWA (Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), was an islamists rebel group with a broad, transnational outlook, created in late 2011 through a split in the Algerian rebel group AQIM.
AQIM had since the early 2000s retreated to two strongholds, the Berber-inhabited Kabylia region in eastern Algeria and the Sahel region to the south, prompting a debate concerning the cohesion of the group. While by 2011 the Sahel-based AQIM ‘faction’ had grown to include numerous fighters from other Sahel countries than Algeria, the leadership remained largely Algerian. This caused dissent within the group, and was one of the reasons given when MUJAO was launched. Another reason given was that AQIM had purportedly lost its devotion to jihad, instead focusing on its lucrative illicit business opportunities in the ineffectively controlled Sahel region. This reason appears doubtful, however, given that another version of the history behind the split was that it came about because of quarrels about sharing out the ransoms paid for the release of Western hostages. Another often cited possible explanation behind the split was that many of the non-Algerian fighters were dissatisfied that so much focus was placed on Algeria in terms of both strategic priority and military targeting; MUJAO instead propagated jihad in West Africa.
The overall leader of MUJAO was Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (alternative spellings are Hamada Ould Khaïrou or Hamad al-Khairy), also known as Abu Qumqum, from Mauretania. Another key leader was businessman, smuggler and former AQIM member Sultan Ould Bady, who commanded MUJAO’s Salah al-Din Brigade. He however left the movement to join fellow Islamists rebel group Ansar Dine in early 2013, bringing the brigade with him. Finally, yet another important figure in MUJAO was Ahmed el-Tilemsi (also known as Ahmad Ould Aamari). Often described as a founding member, el-Tilemsi commanded the Osama bin Laden brigade and was a member of the group’s Majlis Shura, or leadership council.
As the events of 2012 unfolded in Mali (see Mali: Azawad and Mali: Government), northern Mali in general and Gao town in particular became the main base for the group. With much of the leadership being ‘foreign’, the group – which prided itself of being multi-ethnic, with no ethnic group exerting superiority over another – made a determined effort to recruit from among the local population. In the context of the separatist conflict between CMA (originally MNLA) and the Malian government, the group could play on anti-Tuareg feelings and rally support and fighters from especially the Songhai ethnic group. Furthermore, several local Songhai received leading positions in the movement, such and head of its police force. Subsequently, MUJAO came to be both a local group and a transnational, ‘foreign’ one, comprising jihadists from Sub-Saharan Africa, Mauretania, Chad, Niger and other countries. However, the multi-ethnic image of the group was challenged in late 2012 when Hisham Bilal, a Nigerien MUJAO commander, and a number of his men returned to their home country and surrendered to authorities there, complaining that the group’s Arab commanders viewed Black African jihadists as “cannon fodder” and believed “a black man is inferior to an Arab or a white”.
Despite the fact that MUJAO was created by breaking off from AQIM, the two groups cooperated militarily in northern Mali throughout 2012. Also included in the loose Islamist alliance was the mainly Tuareg Islamist group Ansar Dine. MUJAO leading figure el-Tilemsi commented on the relationship by saying that “Our relationship is good with the jihadi groups that are present with us in the field since we are joined by the fraternal association of faith and jihad and common destiny and we all aspire to achieve unity and establish an Islamic Emirate in the region.” Furthermore, the groups also cooperated with fellow AQIM offshoot, Signed-in-Blood Battalion. There were tensions in the loose coalition, however, mainly due to Ansar Dine's ever-changing attitude to MNLA, and, in turn, to its alliance with the Islamists.
In August 2013, MUJAO merged with Signed-in-Blood Battalion, creating al-Murabitun. With that, MUJAO ceased to be recorded as an independent entity in UCDP data.
AQIM (Qaida al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami, al-Qaida Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb), an Algerian rebel group, was until early 2007 known as GSPC (Groupe Salafite pour la prédication et le combat, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). It emerged in 1998 as a splinter group of the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé, Armed Islamic Group), which had since 1993 fought an intra-state conflict against the Algerian government.
AQIM was founded in Algeria by former GIA member Hassan Hattab. It dissociated itself from GIA’s view that civilians were legitimate targets, reverting to the conventional takfiri belief that the state only, and not the whole society, should be regarded as “impious”. Accordingly, the group’s stated to focus on government targets and the security forces in its struggle. Despite this pledge, it made use of one-sided violence in the 2000s.
In 2003, the rebel group declared its support to the al-Qaida struggle against the USA and in 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, a senior leader of the international al-Qaida confirmed that the group had joined al-Qaida. Analysts argue that al-Qaida may have provided funding to Hassab to establish the group under the name GSPC in 1998. It is, however, unclear whether AQIM has had any operational links to the international network.
The organisation of the rebel group is decentralised with a number of local groupings. Some of them have surrendered to the Algerian government that offered them amnesty in 2006.
The founder of AQIM, Hassan Hattab, led the movement until 2003 when he was succeeded by Nabil Sahraoui. Sahraoui was killed by the Algerian army a year later and Abdelmalek Droukdel also know as Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud, took over the leadership. According to analysts, many top-commanders leading the group in the mid-2000s were trained in Afghanistan. Intense power struggles within the group have been reported.
AQIM has engaged in the intra-state conflict against the Algerian government with the goal of replacing the secular Algerian regime with an Islamic state.
AQIM has been involved in the intra-state and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
