SUMMARY
MUJAO (Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest), or in English MUJWA (Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), was an islamists rebel group with a broad, transnational outlook, created in late 2011 through a split in the Algerian rebel group AQIM.
AQIM had since the early 2000s retreated to two strongholds, the Berber-inhabited Kabylia region in eastern Algeria and the Sahel region to the south, prompting a debate concerning the cohesion of the group. While by 2011 the Sahel-based AQIM ‘faction’ had grown to include numerous fighters from other Sahel countries than Algeria, the leadership remained largely Algerian. This caused dissent within the group, and was one of the reasons given when MUJAO was launched. Another reason given was that AQIM had purportedly lost its devotion to jihad, instead focusing on its lucrative illicit business opportunities in the ineffectively controlled Sahel region. This reason appears doubtful, however, given that another version of the history behind the split was that it came about because of quarrels about sharing out the ransoms paid for the release of Western hostages. Another often cited possible explanation behind the split was that many of the non-Algerian fighters were dissatisfied that so much focus was placed on Algeria in terms of both strategic priority and military targeting; MUJAO instead propagated jihad in West Africa.
The overall leader of MUJAO was Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (alternative spellings are Hamada Ould Khaïrou or Hamad al-Khairy), also known as Abu Qumqum, from Mauretania. Another key leader was businessman, smuggler and former AQIM member Sultan Ould Bady, who commanded MUJAO’s Salah al-Din Brigade. He however left the movement to join fellow Islamists rebel group Ansar Dine in early 2013, bringing the brigade with him. Finally, yet another important figure in MUJAO was Ahmed el-Tilemsi (also known as Ahmad Ould Aamari). Often described as a founding member, el-Tilemsi commanded the Osama bin Laden brigade and was a member of the group’s Majlis Shura, or leadership council.
As the events of 2012 unfolded in Mali (see Mali: Azawad and Mali: Government), northern Mali in general and Gao town in particular became the main base for the group. With much of the leadership being ‘foreign’, the group – which prided itself of being multi-ethnic, with no ethnic group exerting superiority over another – made a determined effort to recruit from among the local population. In the context of the separatist conflict between CMA (originally MNLA) and the Malian government, the group could play on anti-Tuareg feelings and rally support and fighters from especially the Songhai ethnic group. Furthermore, several local Songhai received leading positions in the movement, such and head of its police force. Subsequently, MUJAO came to be both a local group and a transnational, ‘foreign’ one, comprising jihadists from Sub-Saharan Africa, Mauretania, Chad, Niger and other countries. However, the multi-ethnic image of the group was challenged in late 2012 when Hisham Bilal, a Nigerien MUJAO commander, and a number of his men returned to their home country and surrendered to authorities there, complaining that the group’s Arab commanders viewed Black African jihadists as “cannon fodder” and believed “a black man is inferior to an Arab or a white”.
Despite the fact that MUJAO was created by breaking off from AQIM, the two groups cooperated militarily in northern Mali throughout 2012. Also included in the loose Islamist alliance was the mainly Tuareg Islamist group Ansar Dine. MUJAO leading figure el-Tilemsi commented on the relationship by saying that “Our relationship is good with the jihadi groups that are present with us in the field since we are joined by the fraternal association of faith and jihad and common destiny and we all aspire to achieve unity and establish an Islamic Emirate in the region.” Furthermore, the groups also cooperated with fellow AQIM offshoot, Signed-in-Blood Battalion. There were tensions in the loose coalition, however, mainly due to Ansar Dine's ever-changing attitude to MNLA, and, in turn, to its alliance with the Islamists.
In August 2013, MUJAO merged with Signed-in-Blood Battalion, creating al-Murabitun. With that, MUJAO ceased to be recorded as an independent entity in UCDP data.
Signed-in-Blood Battalion (alternatively Those Who Sign with Blood or Signatories for Blood) was an Islamist rebel group active mainly in the Sahel region of southern Algeria and northern Mali. While the group was launched in early December 2012, its roots can be traced back to mid-October of that year, when Mokhtar Belmokhtar (also known as Khaled Abou El Abbas or Laaouar, and nicknamed Mr. Marlboro and The One-Eyed) announced that he had broken away with his Battalion of the Veiled from the Algerian rebel group AQIM.
A former commander in AQIM, Belmokhtar had a long history in the Algerian intrastate conflict. Having returned from training and fighting in Afghanistan, Belmokhtar joined the Islamist rebel group GIA (Groupe Islamique Armeé: Armed Islamic Group), and later chose to follow those splintering off from GIA, creating GPSC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), renamed AQIM in 2007. In 2003 then-GSPC pledged its allegiance to al-Qaida and around the same time it retreated to two strongholds, the Berber-inhabited Kabylia region in north-eastern Algeria and the Sahel region to the south, prompting questions concerning the cohesion of the group. Based in the south, Belmokhtar quickly rose in prominence and started to gain an interest in smuggling and other illicit trafficking (hence the name Mr. Marlboro), causing money to flow into the movement. When GSPC changed its name to AQIM Belmokhtar became the head of his own brigade, the Battalion of the Veiled, which operated more or less independently, primarily in southern Algeria and northern Mali, but also in Mauretania.
There was a history of rivalry and power struggle within the AQIM leadership in general and among the commanders in the Sahel region in particular. During the second half of 2012 this power struggle came to a head. Passed over for the position of Saharan emir, and at loggerheads with three AQIM leaders – AQIM's overall emir Abdelmalek Droukdel, based in Kabylia region, Yahya Abou el-Hammam, who won the power struggle and was appointed Saharan emir and Katibat Tariq Ibn Ziad commander Abou Zeid – the relationship between Belmokhtar and the leadership broke down. Reports differ as to whether Belmokhtar subsequently decided to break away from the movement, or if he was in fact suspended. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he from mid-October 2012 became a player, independent of AQIM. Bringing with him a majority of his fighters from the Battalion of the Veiled, Belmokhtar in early December launched his new movement, the Signed-in-Blood Battalion.
The objectives of the new movement were not entirely clear, with statements ranging from concerning only northern Mali, to the entire globe. In December 2012 Belmokhtar elaborated on the group’s goals, saying that it aimed to consolidate shariah in northern Mali. He also threatened to attack Algeria and France and called on Mauritanian imams to come to the aid of the “Azawad,” which is the term mainly used by Tuareg separatist for northern Mali. A close associate of Belmokhtar, Oumar Ould Hamaha, later broadened the goal, stating that Belmoktar wanted to create a pan-Saharan movement, and that AQIM was too narrowly focused on countries in the Maghreb, or North Africa. The aim of the movement was broadened yet again when France commenced their intervention in Mali in January 2013 and Oumar Ould Hamaha stated that the group’s jihad would go global.
While Signed-in-Blood Battalion broke off from AQIM, the group’s leadership was clear on the fact that it continued to be associated with al-Qaida central, stating that it was even taking orders from the latter. It is unclear how close the collaboration was, however. Belmokhtar’s group was also reported to be working alongside fellow Islamist rebel group MUJAO, especially in Gao and Khalil towns in Mali.
In August 2013, Signed-in-Blood Battalion merged with MUJAO, creating al-Murabitun. With that, Signed-in-Blood Battalion ceased to be recorded as an independent actor in UCDP data.
