This dyad belongs to the conflict Algeria: Government
Summary of conflict Algeria: Government
The armed conflict in Algeria over governmental power has been fought by a number of different Islamic groups since the beginning of the 1990s. Although the goal of establishing an Islamic state generally has been shared among the groups, the means have differed. The conflict escalated to war in 1993 with increased brutality. The intensity of the violence decreased in 2002, and some groups have laid down their weapons.
In the last ten years, the intensity of the conflict in Algeria between the Government of Algeria and the al-Qaida Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had gradually declined and in 2019, for the first time in a long period, the conflict over governmental power in the country became inactive. It had been active since 1991.
Background and onset of the conflict
Following a bloody seven-and-a-half-year war of independence, Algeria gained independence from France in 1962. Subsequently, most of the skilled workers left the country, plunging the economy into chaos. The economic situation did not improve during the following 27 years of socialist one-party rule under FLN (Front national de liberation, National Liberation Front). During the 1980s, an ever-growing gap between the youthful population, lacking job and housing, and the political elite became increasingly apparent. In the late 1980s, this gap was made clearly visible in violent strikes and riots, shaking the regime. Following the riots, a multiparty system was introduced, and the country’s first-ever multiparty elections – for communal and provincial assemblies – were held in June 1990. With the holding of elections, a clear threat to the regime emerged in the form of an Islamist political party, FIS (Front Islamique du Salut, Islamic Salvation Front). FIS quickly became the most potent opposition force in the country, as its anti-regime stance, coupled with Islamic values, appealed to the urban poor. After the first round of parliamentary elections in 1991, convincingly won by FIS, the democratic process was halted by the army, and the second round was subsequently canceled. Amidst increasing political violence, FIS was outlawed in March 1992.
There has been a myriad of armed Islamic groups active throughout the conflict, each with their own strategies and religious beliefs. During the early 1980s, following a brutal clampdown on demonstrations held for the introduction of sharia law, a number of Islamist leaders went underground. One of them, Mustapha Bouyali, set up MIA (Mouvement Islamique Armée, Armed Islamic Movement), an armed group aiming to topple the regime and introduce an Islamic state. After some years of inactivity, the group re-emerged in 1992, soon becoming the dominant armed force. In 1992, MIA was joined by Takfir wal Hijra, a radical group that, like MIA, was aiming for the installation of an Islamic state. The movement had existed since the 1970s but did not launch its armed struggle until 1990. Parallel to these armed groups, FIS was choosing to fight for the introduction of an Islamic state by participating in the democratic process. As indicated above, FIS had large support from the general public and was poised to win the 1992 elections. When the elections were canceled and FIS was banned, the groups who fought the regime with arms increasingly came to dominate the struggle, and the FIS leadership realized that they had lost the initiative. In response, the party endorsed MIA’s armed struggle in 1993, and subsequently went on to set up its armed wing, AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut, Islamic Salvation Army), largely made up of fighters from MIA.
The formation of GIA and increased armed violence
In 1992, a number of small extremist groups joined forces and set up GIA (Groupe islamique armée, Armed Islamic Group). Even though AIS and GIA shared a common goal, i.e., an Islamic state, GIA contrasted sharply with its rival on a number of issues. Whereas FIS (Front Islamique du Salut/Islamic Salvation Front) and AIS had only launched its armed struggle as a last resort, preferring to pursue their goals on the political arena, GIA rejected democracy and pluralism per se. It portrayed its struggle as Muslims fighting an apostate state and viewed their declared jihad as not only a means of reaching their goals but also as an end in itself. From 1996 and onwards, a number of GIA leaders broke away and formed their own groups in response to radical changes in GIA’s methods and targets (see “Changing conflict dynamics”). The most prominent splinter group was GSPC (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), led by Hassan Hattab, appearing in September 1998. In January 2007, the group changed its name to AQIM (al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb), thus confirming its allegiance to Usama bin Ladin's al-Qaida Organization.
The governmental side in the conflict was, until 1992, represented by a relatively reform-friendly regime, led by President Chadli Bendjedid. ANP (Algerian armed forces), traditionally the power base of the government, wielding considerable influence, had formally withdrawn from politics in 1989 but remained watchful on the sidelines. With FIS poised to win the second round of voting in 1992, the army intervened and installed a military government, which ruled by decree. During the following years, a series of un-elected army-backed regimes ruled the country. In 1994, General Lamine Zeroual was inaugurated as president. However, since he was under the influence of various powerful military factions, his freedom of maneuver was seriously restricted, and he stepped down in 1999. The same year, presidential elections were held but lost all credibility as all candidates but the army-backed Abdelaziz Bouteflika withdrew. Even though a number of senior army figures remain influential, Bouteflika has since 1999 managed to strengthen his position.
Secondary support
Over the years, various other states, as well as organizations, have been involved in the conflict, actively supporting one of the warring parties. Important political and economic backing for the regime has been provided by France, who also supplied the government with arms deliveries during the mid-1990s. Moreover, neighboring countries Tunisia and Morocco have aided the government in both cases by cooperating militarily with ANP to hunt down Islamic guerrillas in the border regions. Furthermore, the Egyptian regime, having a similar threat posed against it by domestic Islamic groups, has provided ANP with much needed military equipment. In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the Algerian government has received significant international support for its fight against Muslim extremism. Apart from important military backing from the US, this has also meant a decrease in the western government’s criticism of Algeria’s poor human rights record.
When it comes to the various rebel groups, it is more difficult to establish both sender and exact recipient of the support, as much of it has been given clandestinely. What is certain is that a number of Islamic organizations, e.g., the Islamic Relief Organization, at times have made economic contributions to AIS and that Sudan supplied GIA with arms in the late 1990s. Furthermore, it is known that al-Qaida had supported GSPC even before the two groups became officially allied in September 2006. Apart from this, a myriad of rumors, accusations, and counter-accusations flourish. Iran, for example, is often accused of delivering arms to Algerian guerrillas, but the allegations have never been substantiated.
Changing conflict dynamics
The character of the violence in Algeria has changed dramatically over the years, both in terms of who is targeted and the manner in which it is carried out. Initially, violence came in the form of armed clashes between the rebels and the security forces. However, in 1993 the armed Islamists expanded their targets to include government officials, representatives of the opposition, foreigners, and journalists. In the mid-1990s, the nature of the violence changed, and the conflict turned into carnage. GIA (Groupe islamique armée, Armed Islamic Group), issuing a fatwa that charged the whole Algerian society with apostasy, launched a new strategy, specifically targeting the civilian population. Thus, in 1996-1999, violence reached a new level of cruelty, as at least 67 large-scale massacres took place. Also, the usage of bombs became increasingly frequent, targeting both official buildings and public places.
The army’s counter-measures became increasingly brutal, resulting in gross human rights abuses. There have also been frequent accusations of state culpability in the massacres of civilians, ascribed to GIA, but most analysts agree that the evidence points to the armed Islamists as the principal perpetrator, a claim fortified by the fact that GIA has not made any attempt to deny the charges. However, as Amnesty International points out, the army was a culprit, at the very least, for its failure to intervene and stop the massacres. More and more, GIA, with its brutal methods, came to dominate the armed struggle, and in 1997 AIS declared a unilateral ceasefire in a bid to distance itself from the violence that was carried out in the name of Islam. However, by the mid-1990s, problems were arising within GIA. The radicalization had split the group, and subsequent internal opposition led to violent purges as well as the formation of new groups, GSPC being the most important one.
Partial amnesty and negotiations
In a referendum on 29 September 2005, 97.43% of the Algerians voted in favor of a government proposal for a partial amnesty for former rebels (and for the security forces). The amnesty came into effect in February 2006, named the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, but was soon rejected by GSPC (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). The deadline for the amnesty passed in late August, and up until that date, a total of 2,200 prisoners had been released, and fewer than 300 fighters had surrendered (according to government figures). Clashes nevertheless continued throughout the year.
The attitude towards negotiations has varied greatly among the armed Islamic groups. GIA (Groupe islamique armée/Armed Islamic Group) has throughout the conflict refused to talk to the government. In GIA’s view, those promoting a peaceful solution are seeking to compromise with apostates. Negotiations and reconciliation would be an indirect recognition of an apostate regime, which, in itself, is apostasy, punishable by death in Islamic law. In stark contrast, FIS/AIS (Front Islamique du Salut, Islamic Salvation Front / Armée Islamique du Salut, Islamic Salvation Army) have always favored a negotiated settlement. Between 1993 and 1995, talks between FIS imprisoned leadership and representatives of the government were held on a number of occasions, mainly centering on the release of FIS leaders, the question of amnesty, and the re-legitimization of FIS as a political party. However, no progress was made. Instead, the government opened up negotiations with AIS in 1996, excluding the FIS leadership. In 1997, the talks resulted in AIS, at the time increasingly marginalized in the face of GIA dominance, calling a unilateral ceasefire, which was to hold through the following three years. The negotiations continued until 2000 when an accord was reached. Under this accord, AIS rebels were given full amnesty and were also promised assistance in finding employment. Furthermore, families of AIS members were granted financial compensation. In exchange, AIS agreed to completely disband itself and to take part in a special military unit, specifically designed to fight the more extremist rebels groups, who refused to join the accord.
Apart from the accord struck with AIS, the government also pushed through the Law of Civil Reconciliation, which extended an amnesty to other rebels, choosing to end their armed struggle. However, the amnesty only benefited those who had not taken part in acts like killing and rape. In response to this law, 22 small factions within GIA put down their arms in 2000. Furthermore, there were reports of secret negotiations being held between the government and the GSPC in 2001, but no concrete results were produced, and the movement has continued its armed struggle.
Use of suicide attacks as a new strategy
The year 2007 saw an increase in attacks by GSPC, which in January changed its name to AQIM (al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb). A string of bombings in February turned out to be the first in a long line of bomb attacks in 2007, and analysts soon aired the suspicion that the group was about to change its strategy, relying more on high-impact attacks. This was confirmed in a video released by the group in August, where AQIM leader Abou Moussab Abdelouadoud revealed the organization's decision to resort to what he called suicide attacks as a strategic option. While this change of strategy was evident throughout 2007, there were nevertheless also battles between the two parties, especially during search operations carried out by the Algerian army.
In 2008 the conflict continued according to the pattern instigated in 2007, although the government insisted that AQIM was defeated. AQIM regularly ambushed military, paramilitary, and police, often employing remotely controlled bombs but also in suicide attacks and shootings. The military conducted search operations and raids in rebel strongholds resulting in clashes. The events occurred mainly in the north and the east of the country in provinces stretching from Tlemcen through Tizi-Ouzou to Tebessa.
The conflict saw a continuation of attacks throughout 2009, resulting in substantial casualties on both sides. Notably, however, the tactic of conducting suicide attacks was not very prominent. Indeed there were theories that this line of action was too costly in terms of popular support. Subject to plentiful attention were the kidnappings of four European tourists at the Mali-Niger border in January and the subsequent assassination of one of them. The remaining three, as well as two Canadian diplomats abducted in late 2008, were however released.
Regionalisation of AQIM
A few issues have been brought to the fore concerning AQIM, most notably the issue of kidnapping and extortion as a means of income. There were a couple of high profile cases that included kidnapping during 2010. In these instances, the issue of ransom payment was a heated one, and in some cases, the disagreement between the affected countries was quite massive. Another feature of 2010 was the spreading of AQIM’s field of operations; the group intensified its presence in the southern parts of Algeria and most notably on the border areas with Mauretania and Mali. In addition to the kidnappings, AQIM has also been involved in various kinds of criminality to fund its operation, namely extortion and smuggling.
Yet another feature of 2010 was an increased regional cooperation concerning the threat posed by AQIM to the northern African countries. The establishment of the Joint Military Staff Committee (JMC) with its headquarters in Algeria can be seen as a serious attempt at eliminating the terrorist threat in the Sahel region, besides Algeria the participating countries are Mali, Niger and Mauretania.
During 2010 the activities of AQIM have started to shift in geographical focus. In previous years, the bulk of the activity was in the northern parts of the country. During 2010 a number of events have taken place in the Sahara region on or in the proximity of the borders to Mauretania and Mali. This pattern is possibly a consequence of the increased AQIM activity in Mali and Mauretania, AQIM has become more of a transnational organization during 2010. In light of this development, the governments in the regions have increased their cooperation, and as mentioned above, initiated a Joint Military effort to curb the activities carried out by AQIM. The Al-Quaeda connection grants AQIM considerable attention. The U.S military expressed concerns regarding AQIM’s development in the Sahel region.
The developments during 2010 can be summarized as an increased regionalization of AQIM activities, this in turn prompting a regional approach by the affected countries.
During 2011 the potential split of AQIM became more obvious as the northern elements of the group became more separated from the southern cells. The northern factions of the group have remained more focused on the struggle against the Algerian government regarding the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, while the southern portion has ventured into the regional criminality that had become more rampant due to the Arab Spring in the region. The southern cells of AQIM had also been in contact with other Islamic organizations in western Africa, namely Boko Haram of Nigeria. The geographical features of Algeria and the area of operations that AQIM operated in might also be a reason for the development towards separate entities. The vast Saharan desert separating the two factions of the group made it difficult to coordinate and cooperate. How that potential split would affect the dynamics of the Algerian conflict was difficult to predict, yet the regional dynamics had already been affected by the transformation of AQIM. As AQIM was expanding its area of operations southward, the countries in the Sahel area were all at risk of having AQIM on their soil. The possible interactions between AQIM and other Islamic terrorist organizations in the area was another scenario that the countries in the area were trying to avoid. The fight against AQIM was an international effort of all the governments in which AQIM was operating (Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania). As part of this cooperation, various inter-governmental defense structures had been put in place.
Furthermore, permission to carry various actions against AQIM by one government's military on another's territory had been frequent - both Algerian and Mauritanian forces being allowed access into Mali. The United States and France support the fight against AQIM through various initiatives, such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Partnership (TSCI/TSCP).
Arab Spring in Algeria
The demonstrations in Algeria in connection to the regional movement named the Arab Spring were limited in terms of casualties and impact. Contrary to its neighbors, the demonstrations in Algeria were focused mainly on rising food prices and increasing costs of fuel. These grievances were addressed by President Bouteflika, who subsidized fuel and foodstuff in a move that calmed the protesters. Further, Bouteflika lifted the state of emergency that had been in effect since the early 1990s. After these measures were taken, the uprisings in Algeria decreased, and media attention was quickly shifted towards neighboring Tunisia where President Ben Ali stepped down from the presidency after popular revolts demanded his ouster.
Aftermath of the Arab Spring
The tumultuous events that unfolded during 2011 had a profound impact on the countries on the northern fringe of the African continent. That was also true in the Algerian case. The Algerians did not experience unrest to the same degree as the neighboring countries, neither was the Algerian leadership forced out of power. Instead, the protests were directed against higher costs of living and shortages of foodstuffs more than trying to achieve a total political overhaul. The most tangible outcome of the Arab Spring in Algeria was that President Bouteflika lifted the state of emergency that had been in place since the beginning of the Islamist uprising after the canceled elections in 1992.
The unraveling anarchy in Libya affected the Algerian conflict. The amount, and the accessibility of weapons in the region, was significantly enhanced as the Libyan regime entangled itself in a battle over governmental control with the Transitional National Council (TNC). This influx of armaments combined with the unstable political situation has led to a better-armed AQIM in Algeria. The fact that the Libyan regime fell under its own weight meant that the borders were left largely unmanned, as Libyan soldiers still loyal to the regime were occupied trying to fight the rebellion in the northern parts of Libya. The fact that AQIM became significantly better equipped, in combination with the lifting of the emergency law, led to a situation where the fatalities in Algeria had increased. That was a sharp contrast to the situation in the preceding year when violence decreased, and many analysts foresaw the end of the Islamic uprising in Algeria when the Algerian military launched large scale offensives against the remnants of AQIM during the last months of 2010. The campaign seemed to be successful, violence did decline, and at the lowest point of support, AQIM was made up of less than 100 fighters. However, the volatile situation in the region has strengthened the resolve and given AQIM a more convenient environment to carry out its operations. Subsequently, AQIM has made the headlines during late 2011 in connection with kidnappings in the Saharan desert.
The fact that AQIM extended its operations had led to an increase in cooperation between the North African countries affected by AQIM. Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Niger have developed regional cooperation to deal with the threat in the Sahel. This regional cooperation had been in place for a few years and worked alongside the Joint Military Staff Commission (JMC), and led to more effective coordination. Even though this regional cooperation had been in effect, the border-crossing activities of AQIM did not decrease, and in the security vacuum that evolved in Libya after Gaddafi fell from power, AQIM was quick to act. The amount of smuggling and weapon accumulation rose during 2011 compared to previous years.
Turmoil in the region
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, there had been a lack of stability and order in the greater Sahel region. This chaotic context was advantageous for various groups fighting to establish footholds in the region. In particular, the Islamic State (IS) established caliphates in Libya and in Algeria as well. The increased volatility in the region led to a geographical shift, as more violent events were taking place in the Sahel region, rather than in the northern coastal regions of Algeria. Moreover, the number of kidnappings and high profile attacks carried out to gain attention and notoriety had increased.
In 2018, the conflict in Algeria over a governmental between Algeria and the al-Qaida Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained active, yet decreased in intensity compared to 2017 thus continuing the downward trend. Just as in 2017, most of the violence was recorded in the North-East of the country.
In 2019, the downward trend continued and the conflict became inactive after a long period. It had been active from 1991 to 2018. There was no official ceasefire or an agreement, yet AQIM's activities had gradually withered away in Algeria.
