SUMMARY
The non-state conflict between IS’ West Africa Province and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) erupted in 2016 and has played out mainly in the Lake Chad basin – on Cameroonian, Nigerien, and Nigerian territory - where the two groups have simultaneously challenged the governments in state-based conflicts.
The conflict is multi-layered and complex as the two groups are interconnected, having once worked together under the IS banner. JAS, having intensely challenged the Nigerian government in a state-based conflict over government since 2009, pledged allegiance to IS in March 2015. This was at a time when JAS was pressured by the Nigerian army and also the military from neighboring countries. However, a major reason for the pledge of allegiance was reportedly due to internal pressure from the top leadership members toward JAS leader Abubakar Shekau. Nonetheless, IS leader al-Baghdadi accepted the pledge and thus IS’ West Africa Province (ISWAP) was created. In UCDP data, JAS thus became part of the Islamic State, with JAS leader Shekau as the appointed leader of ISWAP, and the governmental conflict between the Government of Nigeria and JAS was terminated. Instead, the group became involved in a new conflict over territory as the overarching aim of ISWAP was to integrate Nigeria into its global Islamic State.
However, having fought under the banner of IS for a year, cracks started to show in the ISWAP organization. Already during the first months of 2016, there were reports of internal divisions, which had led to mediation attempts by IS central. Shekau was faced with mounting criticism and was accused by other leaders within the group of excessive and indiscriminate killings of Muslim civilians, not following the guidance of IS, and questioning the tactics of the group, such as misappropriation of ISWAP loots. But it was not until on 3 August that something materialized. On that day, IS central announced Habib Yusuf, also known as Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of the founder of JAS, as the new emir of its West Africa province. This move effectively dethroned Abubakar Shekau as the ISWAP leader. Shekau accused Barnawi of having manipulated the communication with IS and also of apostasy. Barnawi, in turn, denounced Shekau as a hypocrite and coward, criticizing him for the indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians. The critics of Shekau remained under the IS banner, while Shekau and his followers reverted to the JAS designation. Thus, the group that previously had been JAS resurfaced and retained its main base in the Sambisa Forest of Borno state. The group also had a presence in the Mandara mountains on the border with Cameroon and in the northern parts of Adamawa state. Following the split, ISWAP emerged as the stronger faction, benefitting from its ties with the Islamic State and also grew in size due to mass defections from JAS. During this period, there were occasional reports of jihadist delegations attempting to mediate between the two groups, although with no success.
A rivalry between the two groups remained, mainly for resources and territorial control in the Lake Chad area, although rooted in ideological differences of treatment of civilians and governance. While ISWAP had applied a more bureaucratic organizational model, which might be more sustainable and efficient compared to JAS’ model, it was on the other hand more controlling in nature and thus did not allure many JAS fighters. ISWAP also limited violence against Muslim civilians while JAS was more indiscriminate in its operations, plunder and sectarianism. Thus, although the split between ISWAP and JAS was rooted in ideological differences, the subsequent conflict has been driven primarily by rivalries over territorial control and recruitment of fighters.
Between 2016 and 2021, the level of violence stayed at relatively low levels. Immediately after the split, Shekau had launched attacks against previous JAS members defecting, however, the clashes decreased quickly in intensity. During this time, ISWAP was reportedly content with fighting off JAS raids on its territory. While it is known that clashes occurred between the two groups over territorial control in the Lake Chad region, the exact number of deaths are however difficult to estimate due to limited reporting and access to those areas.
In May 2021, after weeks of escalating violence between the two groups, ISWAP invaded Shekau’s stronghold in the Sambisa Forest, reportedly following instructions from IS central. When ISWAP cornered Shekau on 19 May, he detonated a suicide vest, killing himself. Shekau’s death had several implications on the structure of JAS which, in turn, also had effects on the conflict landscape in Nigeria and its neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. Many JAS fighters in the Sambisa Forest joined ISWAP. Another group also surrendered to the Cameroonian and Nigerian authorities. However, JAS factions in the Lake Chad and Mandara Mountains remained.
In the second half of 2021, the violence between the two groups was characterized by tit-for-tat attacks. Despite JAS being clearly weakened after Shekau’s death, the rivalry between the factions persisted. JAS launched several raids on ISWAP territory and ISWAP retaliated. In the vicinity of the Sambisa Forest, clashes between the two groups also persisted. Since 2021, both groups have continuously published propaganda videos, claiming the other group has suffered severe defeats in clashes against each other. Following the death of Shekau, there are reports about ISWAP and JAS having talks on at least three occasions, with the encouragement of IS central. The successor after Shekau, Bakura Sahalaba, located in northern Lake Chad, had reportedly favoured reconciliation with ISWAP. However, JAS was plagued by internal tensions and Bakura Doro, who did not aim towards reconciliation, had Bakura Sahalaba executed and took over as imam of JAS.
During 2022 and 2023, JAS’ Bakura faction in the Lake Chad area pushed back hard against ISWAP, challenging the rival group for territorial control. The groups engaged in sporadic clashes across the Lake Chad region, on both Nigerian and Nigerien territory, resulting in scores killed. These confrontations were marked by deadly ambushes, reprisal attacks, and the execution of members from the opposing group. In late 2023 and early 2024, intense clashes erupted between the two factions. Bakura reportedly launched a series of successful assaults on ISWAP-held islands in the Lake Chad. As a result, JAS is reported to have gained control of several islands, capturing supplies and weapons, while ISWAP lost many fighters. During this time, ISWAP reportedly expelled former JAS members who had previously defected and pledged allegiance to IS, accusing them of maintaining divided loyalties.
Violence intensified throughout 2024, and was characterized by recurring cycles of attacks and retaliation. In April 2024, heavy fighting in the Lake Chad area of Borno state reportedly resulted in over 100 fatalities. The clashes led to the dislodgement of JAS from islands they had previously seized from ISWAP. JAS retaliated, attacking ISWAP strongholds, resulting in further fatalities. Fighting resumed in July and August, which again led to more than 100 deaths. As in April, the violence followed a pattern of escalating reprisals, with attacks by one group triggering retaliatory strikes by the other.
In 2025, violence remained at high levels, although it declined compared to 2024. During the first half of the year, sporadic clashes over control of territory and resources occurred in the Lake Chad region of Borno state. In the second half of the year, violence intensified and followed a similar pattern to that observed previously; an escalating cycle of retaliatory attacks. The escalation was reportedly triggered by an attack by JAS on a village located in ISWAP- controlled territory and also ISWAP killing a senior JAS tax collector. Further, the clashes altered territorial control between the two groups as JAS’ Gazuwa faction in the Bama area of Borno state was reportedly significantly weakened.
The non-state conflict between IS and JAS is first included in UCDP data in 2021. In February of that year, clashes near Korongol village in the Diffa region in Niger caused the conflict to cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold for the first time.
