SUMMARY
Libyan National Army (LNA, alternatively the Libyan Arab Army) was an armed group active in Libya. The group defined itself as “anti-Islamist”, reflecting its opposition against the Islamist political factions and militias that became increasingly powerful in the years following the ousting of long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The LNA was also motivated by a sense of deprivation among former Libyan military officers, who were disgruntled over the decision by the Government of Libya to rely on Islamist militias to maintain security in the country. The primary goal of the group was to overthrow the pro-Islamist General National Congress (GNC), which controlled the Government of Libya at the time. However, the LNA was opposed to all pro-Islamist groups and factions, regardless of whether they supported the GNC or not.
Khalifa Haftar, a former Libyan general who had served under the dictator Muammar Gaddafi, led the LNA. During Libya’s intervention in the conflict in Chad during the 1980s, Haftar had been one of the officers commanding the Libyan forces; he had also fought with the Egyptian Army in the 1973 conflict with Israel. Haftar had however been stripped of his military rank and exiled to the United States following a failed attempt at an uprising against Gaddafi in 1987. General Haftar returned to Libya in 2011, where he and his militia played a minor role in the successful ousting of Gaddafi by the National Transitional Council (NTC); Haftar’s forces were mainly active in eastern Libya in 2011. The LNA’s decision to take military action against pro-Islamist groups in Benghazi in 2014 (called “Operation Karama”, see ASL – LNA and February 17 Martyrs Brigade, Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade – LNA) should be seen in the light of Haftar’s own personal ambitions, and not just as ideologically motivated. Haftar had failed to gain the favors of the post-Gaddafi regimes, especially the GNC. For example, Haftar had attempted to secure himself the position as Libya’s Chief of Staff after the uprising, only to be overlooked in favor of Yusuf al-Mangoush, another former Gaddafi-era officer who had defected to the NTC. In the aftermath of the uprising, the Government of Libya was also unable to rely on the regular security forces, most of which were in disarray, to carry out its functions. Instead, it turned to various auxiliary and former revolutionary groups, many of which had Islamist orientation, to organize alternative security forces, such as the Libya Shield Force (LSF). This left many former military officers, including Haftar, deeply disgruntled. Furthermore, it later became clear that Haftar had far-reaching political ambitions, and that he saw himself as the potential future leader of a unified Libya. It was unclear exactly when Haftar opted to form the LNA, but in February 2014, Haftar declared that he would clear Libya of “terrorists” and urged the Islamist-dominated GNC-led Government of Libya to step down, after it attempted to postpone scheduled elections and extend its own term by one year.
While Haftar failed to score any significant military victories in May 2014, Operation Karama meant that a large number of regular Libyan army units rallied to the LNA, making it a potent military force. It was suggested that the willingness of these regular army units to join the LNA was driven by a series of assassinations and attacks against officers and soldiers, allegedly committed by the militant Islamists the LNA was fighting against. The first units to join included the elite Saiqa Special Forces Brigade - led by Wanis Bukhamada - from Benghazi, as well as air force units from the Gamal Abdul El Nasser and Benina air bases. Other regular army units that joined the LNA included Brigade No. 25 (Ahmed al-Shareef Brigade) as well as the “Husayn al-Juwayfi”, “Isa al-Wakwak”, “Al-Suqur”, and “204 Tank” battalions. Aside from regular military units, the LNA was also comprised of various tribal and regional-based armed groups such as the Army of Barqa (Cyrenaica Defense Force), armed groups from the Baraghitha tribe, and fighters from the Toubou tribe. When the LNA launched its attack against Benghazi in May 2014, it had at least 6000 fighters and advanced weapons such as tanks, military aircraft, and helicopters.
The LNA was closely allied to the Zintan Military Council, which commanded a collection of militias from the town Zintan. The Zintanis shared the LNA’s anti-Islamist orientation and pledged its full support to Haftar’s campaign to oust Libya’s Islamist factions. However, the two groups did not fight as a unified force; the LNA initially restricted its operations to eastern Libya, while the Zintan Military Council focused on Tripoli and western Libya.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt provided support to the LNA, for example by delivering weapons. While it was never officially confirmed, both UAE and Egypt most likely also provided warring support to the LNA in the form of airstrikes. However, given the lack of official acknowledgment of these strikes, it was not included as secondary warring support in the UCDP data.
When the House of Representatives – Libya’s legislative assembly that had been elected on 25 June 2014 - was forced to leave Tripoli under pressure from the pro-Islamist Libya Dawn coalition, Haftar decided to lend the LNA’s support to it. While the House of Representatives was initially unwilling to openly endorse the LNA and Haftar - who had the reputation of being a “renegade” - the goals of the two were largely concurrent, as they opposed the Islamist factions that has seized power in Tripoli. On 15 October 2014, LNA - alongside the Zintan Military Council - aligned itself with the House of Representatives, which had eventually endorsed Haftar and the LNA. After this date, the LNA became part of the Forces of House of Representatives, and thus ceased to exist as an independent actor in the UCDP data. The House of Representatives later, in March 2015, formally appointed Haftar as its top military commander. It should however be noted that the LNA has maintained its own agenda, and continued to on occasion act semi-independently from the political leadership of the House of Representatives.
