SUMMARY
The February 17 Martyrs Brigade was an Islamist militia operating in eastern and southeastern Libya. In May 2014, the group, together with the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, was engaged in a non-state conflict against the Libyan National Army (LNA). Other than the group’s Islamist orientation, it did not have any pronounced national political goals. The brigade was created based on local conditions and grievances during the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, and was one of many groups serving as vehicles for the ambitions of local strongmen.
Fawzi Bukatif led the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, which had been created by several smaller militias during the 2011 uprising to fight against Gaddafi. After the uprising ended, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade became one in a plethora of independent or semi-independent militias employed by Libya’s consecutive transitional governments as state security forces. The group belonged to the Islamist movement that gained considerable political influence in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s ouster; it also had close ties to the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamist orientation of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade was one of the primary reasons for why it was targeted by Operation Karama (“Dignity”), launched by the pronounced anti-Islamist LNA in May 2014. At the peak of its strength, the brigade could mobilize as many as 3500 fighters, making it one of the militarily strongest groups in eastern Libya. The February 17 Martyrs Brigade was otherwise most publicly known for its role in the storming of the Unites States consulate in Benghazi in September 2012. The brigade had been employed by the Americans to provide security around several United States compounds in the city, but it failed to deter a large number of unidentified assailants from attacking the consulate and killing the US ambassador Christopher Stevens.
Prior to 2014, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade was employed by the Libyan Ministry of Defense as part of the Libya Shield Force (LSF) to carry out security tasks, primarily in eastern Libya (such as Benghazi) and in the Kufrah district. The LSF was intended to serve as a transitional national security force following the ouster of Gaddafi in 2011. As such, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade received significant funding from the Libyan Ministry of Defense. However, the LSF’s constituent militias and brigades were allowed to operate with a high degree of autonomy, and most groups were never formally integrated into the regular Libyan armed forces. At the onset of violence with the LNA in 2014, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade did not maintain any observable ties to the Government of Libya. However, the group appears to have coordinated its military activities with those of the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade to a significant extent.
The February 17 Martyrs Brigade also had good relations with ASL, at the time the most prominent Islamist group active in Benghazi and several other towns. Like many other Libyan militia groups, the brigade was accused how having close relationships to al-Qaida; however, it never pledged allegiance to the global jihadi organization.
On 20 June 2014, the group merged with, among other groups, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, and the Libya Shield 1 militia to create the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council; after this date, the group ceased to exists as independent actor in the UCDP data.
Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade was an Islamist militia operating in eastern and southeastern Libya. Other than the group’s Islamist orientation, it did not have any pronounced national political goals. The brigade was created based on local conditions and grievances during the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, and was one of many groups serving as vehicles for the ambitions of local strongmen.
Ismail Muhammad al-Salabi was the founder and leader of the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, which was formed from members of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade. Al-Salabi, who played a crucial role in organizing the resistance against Qaddafi in Benghazi during the 2011 uprising, had previously been a top commander within the February 17 Martyrs Brigade before he formed his own group. Between 2012 and 2014, the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade was employed by the Libyan Ministry of Defense as part of the Libya Shield Force (LSF) – formally organized as “Libya Shield 7” - to carry out security tasks, primarily in eastern Libya (such as Benghazi) and in the Kufrah district. It should however be noted that the group – like most LSF units – was never integrated as a formal government armed unit, and it continued to operate without any significant government interference or direct command.
Aside from Al-Salabi, Mohammed al-Gharabi was one of the group’s most prominent commanders. The Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade could mobilize between 1000 and 2000 fighters, making it among the strongest militias in eastern Libya. In the first years of the brigade’s existence, al-Salabi promoted the image that it was pursuing the implementation of sharia (Islamic law) rule via a democratic process. However, the brigade had difficulties maintaining its public image in Benghazi, where the local population was aggrieved by the unlawful detentions of civilians in the brigade’s “prisons”. The popular dissatisfaction with the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade on several occasions led to large protests against it.
Even after the split, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade and the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade maintained a cordial relationship. For example, the two groups continued to coordinate their military activities. Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade also had good relations with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), at the time the most prominent Islamist group active in Benghazi and several other towns. Like many other Libyan militia groups, the brigade was accused how having close relations with al-Qaida; however, it never pledged allegiance to the global jihadi organization.
On 20 June 2014, the group merged with - among other groups - ASL, February 17 Martyrs Brigade, and the Libya Shield 1 militia to create the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council; after this date, the group ceased to exists as independent actor in the UCDP data.
