SUMMARY
In 2011, the NTC rebel organization overthrew Libya’s long-time dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and subsequently established itself as the new Government of Libya. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, the new NTC-led government failed to restore order in Libya, which led to a precarious security situation. One of the most pressing issues facing the government was the large number of revolutionary fighters (commonly referred to as “thuwwar”) that had fought for the NTC during the uprising, but now refused to disarm. In many parts of the country, the thuwwar militias established themselves as autonomous local or regional powerbrokers. Libya was also ideologically divided, with the main fault line being between two camps: an emergent Islamist movement (which was supported by a majority of the thuwwar), and the “anti-Islamists”, which included secular liberals, nationalists, and defectors from the Gaddafi regime. While the two camps were not coherent movements, they still provided a salient political division of Libya that actively exacerbated existing tribal and factional tensions.
Benghazi – Libya’s second-largest town, and considered by many the “cradle” of the 2011 uprising – harbored several powerful Islamist and thuwwar militias, such as ASL. As the few national security forces present in the town were unable or unwilling to contain these groups, Benghazi came under the control of several different non-state groups. The Benghazi-based groups consolidated their power, and even set up rudimentary, parallel governance structures. However, by early 2014, the Islamists in Benghazi became the targets of inflammatory rhetoric from Khalifa Haftar, a former general who had served the Gaddafi regime. Haftar was a Libyan military veteran who had been forced into exile after participating an attempted coup against Gaddafi in the 1980s. He had returned to Libya in 2011 and participated in the uprising by commanding his own private militia group. After being denied a formal position within the post-2011 military administration, Haftar openly challenged Libya’s Islamist factions in early 2014. Haftar – who had far-reaching personal political ambitions - went so far as demanding the dissolution of the Libyan government and parliament, which he claimed was controlled by Islamists unable to curb the turmoil in the country. In May, Haftar then announced that his militia would purge Benghazi of the “terrorist” groups present there as a first step in his anti-Islamist campaign.
By then, many ordinary citizens in Benghazi had grown dissatisfied with the parallel governance structures of the Islamist and thuwwar factions, which were perceived as arbitrary and discriminatory. Furthermore, the national security forces present in Benghazi had grown increasingly frustrated as they experienced violent attacks, mainly in the form of ambushes and targeted assassination. While most of these attacks could not be attributed to any specific group, it was suspected that Islamists were behind most of them. As a result, Haftar was able to procure support from both local tribal groups, and from security forces in Benghazi. On 17 May 2014, Haftar declared that “Operation Karma” (Operation Dignity) had been launched to capture Benghazi from the Islamist factions. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) militia – comprised of fighters from various tribal groups and elements from the national security forces that had defected to join Haftar – began attacking neighborhoods and bases belonging to ASL. Much of the fighting took the form of skirmishes and indiscriminate shelling; ASL did on at least one occasion deploy suicide bombers in an attempt to kill Haftar himself. Some of the most intense fighting between the two groups took place in early June, when ASL attempted to overrun one of LNA’s bases in Benghazi. Parallel to this, LNA also attacked positions held by the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, and Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade in other parts of Benghazi. In a display of support to Haftar’s anti-Islamist campaign in Benghazi, militias affiliated with the Zintan Military Council stormed the Libyan parliament in Tripoli on 18 May and declared it dissolved (for more information on the developments in western Libya, see Libya Dawn – Zintan Military Council and Libya: Government).
The LNA’s offensive in Benghazi – spearheaded by the Saiqa (“Thunderbolt”) Special Forces Brigade – was primarily directed at the southern parts of the town. However, most of Haftar’s forces lacked the tactical and operational skills necessary to capture Islamist-held areas. The Islamist militias also used rockets to attack LNA bases in Buatni neighborhood and at Benina airport, and the LNA responded by launching airstrikes. In June, several of Benghazi’s Islamist factions – including ASL, February 17 Martyrs Brigade, and Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade - decided to merge into the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council in order to more effectively fight against LNA. As such, more information on the developments in Benghazi after 20 June 2014 can be found in the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council – LNA conflict description.
The non-state conflict between ASL and LNA is first included in UCDP data in 2014. In early June of that year, clashes between the two groups had resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.
