SUMMARY
This conflict began on 20 June 2014 as a direct continuation of fighting that had broken out on 17 May 2014, when General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) militia launched “Operation Karma/Dignity” to capture the eastern town Benghazi from several Islamist factions. The fighting in Benghazi was a result of the political chaos and deteriorating security situation that had emerged in Libya following the ousting of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. In essence, the Benghazi conflict reflected a countrywide struggle for political and military influence between an ever-increasing number of local and regional militias and factions. Adding an ideological dimension to the tensions, most factions belonged to one of two major camps: an emergent Islamist movement, and the “anti-Islamists”. Haftar’s initial offensive on 17 May 2014 had been part of a campaign he had launched to purge Libya of “terrorists” and Islamist influence. For a more detailed description of the background to the fighting in Benghazi, as well as more details regarding the conflict events up until 19 June 2014, please consult the ASL – LNA and February 17 Martyrs Brigade, Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade – LNA conflict pages.
On 20 June 2014, several of Benghazi’s Islamist factions – including ASL, February 17 Martyrs Brigade, and Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade – merged into the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council in order to coordinate their efforts to fight the “anti-Islamist” LNA. This meant that LNA began facing a far more coordinated and capable resistance, as the Shura Council factions could more easily pool its forces. By mid-July, the fighting in Benghazi had reached a stalemate, as LNA had failed to capture the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council’s main stronghold in the Sidi Faraj neighborhood. At this time, the conflict was primarily characterized by LNA airstrikes against Sidi Faraj, and Shura Council artillery strikes against the main LNA base in the Benina suburb. In late July, Shura Council forces launched an offensive against the main base of the Saiqa (“Thunderbolt”) Special Forces Brigade – a regular military unit that had defected to LNA in May – located in the Buatni neighborhood. Despite the arrival of LNA reinforcements from the towns Beida and Tobruk, the Shura Council fighters captured the base on 29 July, and the LNA was forced to retreat to Benghazi’s suburbs.
Following the capture of the base, Muhammad al-Zahawi – the leader of both the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and its ASL sub-faction – declared that Benghazi was now an “Islamic emirate”. The Shura Council forces continued to drive back the LNA forces, and by mid-August, they controlled large parts of the town. However, the Shura Council faced increasing hostility from the Benghazi residents, who accused the Islamists of being responsible for the lawlessness and disorder that had persisted in the town since the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi. The popular dissatisfaction culminated in large protests and violent attacks against Shura Council members. Despite the popular unrest, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council was able to push LNA into a small area of the town around the latter’s main base at Benina airport; battles raged around Benina during September and early October. At this point, the LNA was hard-pressed, and the Shura Council commanders announced that victory was imminent.
When Haftar announced a new offensive in Benghazi on 14 October, LNA’s “Operation Karama” was formally endorsed as an “operation of the army” by the House of Representatives, Libya’s legislative assembly located in Tobruk. As such, information about developments in Benghazi from 15 October can thus be found on the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council – Forces of the House of Representatives conflict page.
The non-state conflict between Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and LNA is first included in UCDP data in 2014. In late July of that year, clashes between the two groups had resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.
