This dyad belongs to the conflict Lebanon: Government
Summary of conflict Lebanon: Government
Lebanon received formal independence from France in 1946. Disputes over Lebanon's power-sharing system, the National Pact, became the driving factors in the civil wars that rocked the country in 1958 and in bouts between 1975 and 1990. In general the conflict has stood between Western- and right-wing oriented Christians and pro-Syrian right-wing Moslem groups, although intra-factional fighting was also prominent. The civil war that begun in 1975 was terminated in 1990, after the pro-Syrian government defeated the last of the Christian Maronite resistance. The Taif peace plan, signed by parliamentarians in 1990, then reformed the political system somewhat. Sectarianism, however, remains as the main political divide in the country.
The conflict over government in Lebanon has not been active since the 1990s but resumed in 2014 as a consequence of the Islamic State’s advancements in the region. In August, is together with Jabhat al-Nusra, clashed with Lebanese troops in and around the border town of Arsal, following the arrest of a rebel commander. The Lebanese Army managed to retake control over the town in mid-August, but is continued to have a presence in the area.
Historical background and the 1958 civil war
Lebanon became an independent state in 1943, as it freed itself from domination by the French. Together with most of the countries in the Middle East Lebanon had fallen under the dominion of a European power following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, when the Ottomans had joined the German-led alliance which lost the war. Lebanon was, during its time as a part of the Ottoman Empire, a part of what was known as “Greater Syria”.
As France was occupied by Nazi-Germany during the Second World War Lebanon asserted its independence in 1943 and became an independent republic. French troops returned after the end of the war in 1945, but chose to evacuate the country already in 1946.
The population of Lebanon at this time was a patchwork of different religious groups, with the most important ones being the Christian Maronites, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims and the Druze (also Muslim). Christians made up roughly half of the population, with the Muslim confessional groups making up the rest of the equation. Political life in the independent republic came to be dominated by the thought that civil peace in the country could only be upheld by sharing power between these confessional groups.
The root of such power sharing was the so-called National Pact (Mithaq al-Watani in Arabic), an unwritten agreement that evolved into a political strategy to uphold civil harmony and national identity. The Pact dictated that legislative power in the assembly would be shared 6:5 in favour of the Maronites, that the President would always be a Maronite, that the Prime Minister would always be a Sunni and that the Speaker of the House would always be a Shiite. Further, there was also tacit agreement that the Maronites would accept that Lebanon was an Arab country and thus not attempt to align its policies with the West, whilst the Muslims would not attempt to unite with Syria. Disagreements over the future of this pact, and the way it was or was not adhered to in politics, has been one of the key factors in Lebanon’s internal conflicts.
The factors that led to the outbreak of the Lebanese crisis in 1958, when mainly Muslim militias attempted to topple the regime of Maronite President Camille Chamoun, included the issue of adherence to the National Pact, but also wider regional tensions and interests.
The conflict in 1958 did not stem from any of the confessional groups questioning the actual proportions of the power sharing agreement enshrined in the National Pact, but rather how power was wielded by the Maronite elite. Although dissent was beginning to brew within Lebanon during the 1950s due to the elite’s rampant corruption and growing disparities in the socioeconomic sphere the main factor in launching the 1958 conflict can be said to have been conflicting ideas regarding Lebanon’s foreign policy alignment and national identity.
President Chamoun had already in 1956 taken the side of the UK and France in the Suez Crisis against Egypt’s widely popular President Nasser, prompting the Muslim population to question his loyalty to Lebanon’s Arab identity. Pan-Arabism, Nasser’s main ideology, was extremely popular amongst Lebanon’s Muslims, who envisioned a United Arab Republic that would include Lebanon. When it became clear that Chamoun supported pro-Western and anti-Nasserist foreign policy stances a clear split occurred. Coupled with this was Chamoun’s electoral gerrymandering during this tenure as President, which resulted in the traditional Sunni and Druze elites’ representation being all but wiped out in the 1957 parliamentary elections. Chamoun also wished to modify the constitution so that it would be possible for him to remain in office beyond the one six-year term proscribed.
Waves of strikes shook Lebanon in late 1957 and were often met by violence from security forces. A spiral of violence had evolved in May 1958, with the now disenfranchised Muslim elite calling for open revolt and security forces responding with widespread repression. The proclamation of unity between Egypt and Syria, which created the United Arab Republic in 1958, added further to the flames as Nasserist sentiment increased.
Chamoun wished to deploy the army to restore order but the army’s commander, General Chehab, refused since he believed the army should be neutral during internal disputes to avoid it splitting in half along confessional lines. Chamoun subsequently deployed the Lebanese gendarmerie and began to employ militias (such as the Maronite Kataeb Party, also known as the Phalanges at a later stage) and the SSNP (Syrian Socialist National Party, PPS) to support his claims. Help was relatively easy to come by, as many Christians felt threatened by the outpourings of a Pan-Arabist sentiment they did not share. Soon the issues that had at one time mostly concerned foreign policy alignment and general criticism of the elite inflamed sectarian tensions.
Battles broke out all over the country, pitting the Government of Lebanon’s police and gendarmerie, supported by Christian militias, against a wide range of different, mainly Muslim, groups. Foremost among these was the Independent Nasserite Movement (also know as al-Mourabitoun) which is viewed by the UCDP as making up – together with the Government of Lebanon – the warring dyad of the 1958 conflict. Other militias also fought the government and its supporters, but the main driver amongst the rebels was this pro-Nasser organisation. The bulk of fighting stood in Beirut and in Tripoli and reached the intensity of ‘War’.
Initially, the opposition to Chamoun had great fortunes, capturing almost two-thirds of Lebanese territory and splitting Lebanon into different “fiefdoms” controlled by leaders of the traditional elite. The fighting cannot be said to have been carried out purely along confessional lines though, as several Christian militias fought each other during the approximately five months of battles, as did Muslim groups of differing clan- and political loyalties.
The crisis heightened on 14 July, as the pro-Western government of Iraq was toppled and the pro-Western Baghdad Pact (which counterweighted Nasser’s alliance) fell apart. President Chamoun thus called for U.S. intervention. Initiating the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine (to intervene to stop the spread of Communism) U.S. President Eisenhower sanctioned “Operation Blue Bat”, sending U.S. Marines and the Mediterranean Fleet to Lebanese shores. Over 25 000 U.S. troops landed in Beirut on 15 July, but did not engage in hostilities. The U.S. landing nevertheless locked the conflict in a stalemate.
The U.S. then became a key actor in persuading President Chamoun to resign from his post. The Presidency was instead taken up by General Chehab, who ascended to this post in late September. He was widely accepted due to his neutral stand in the conflict. Lingering hostilities between the Maronites and the Muslim opposition were acquiesced by his promises to adhere to the National Pact and the formation by Rashid Karami of a “reconciliation cabinet”. U.S. forces subsequently evacuated Lebanon in October as the crisis had ended.
Roots and beginnings of the Lebanese Civil War (1974-1975)
The 1958 Lebanese crisis had managed to turn political disagreements into sectarian strife between Lebanon’s confessional groups. The scale of that crisis was, however, soon to be overshadowed by the extremely bloody and savage conflict that would engulf the tiny republic between 1975 and 1990. The root causes of the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War and the crisis of 1958 bear much resemblance, though most of the factors that led to the outbreak of war in 1958 had become more severe by 1975.
The compromise that ended the 1958 crisis did little or nothing to change the rules of the game in Lebanon. Power remained tightly guarded by the urban Maronite and Sunni elites, who also controlled a disproportionate amount of the country’s wealth in addition to controlling politics. In terms of the confessional groups and their stake in power and the economy the Maronites were on the top of the pyramid, followed by the Sunnis and with the Shia sect at the bottom. Especially the Shia felt disenfranchised politically and economically, and mainly inhabited the poor southern suburbs of Beirut and the marginalised eastern and southern parts of Lebanon.
Since the census of 1932, on which the 6:5 proportion of parliament in favour of the Christians hinged, the Muslims (and especially the Shiites) had grown considerably in number. This prompted calls for a new census with the argument that new demographic realities should be reflected by an updated version of the National Pact (the unwritten agreement that dictated confessional power sharing). In short, the Maronite grip on power was challenged.
Also, the massive influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon following the 1948 and 1967 Israeli-Arab wars had by the 1970s reached more than 300 000, this also tilting power in favour of the Sunnis since most Palestinians were of this religious persuasion. Amongst the Palestinian refugee population could also be found the forces of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) and other guerrilla groups who made up a formidable fighting force of over 15 000 men who were keen not to lose their last foothold on the Israeli border. The fact that the Palestinian groups in Lebanon also at times acted as a “state-within-the-state”, building roadblocks and clashing with Christian militias and security forces, did little to assuage the fears of the Maronite elite. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon – and also the devastation it wrought on the country in the form of Israeli attacks, which especially embittered the southern Shias – thus became yet another contributing factor to the outbreak of the civil war. Maronite politicians Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel even called for a referendum on the Palestinian presence, with the left-leaning segments of Lebanon denouncing the government for hindering the Palestinian struggle.
The Palestinian issue thus set the right-wing Christian Maronite proponents of the status quo on a further collision course with the Muslim and Druze left-wing that wanted radical changes to be made to the Lebanese polity; changes that would inevitably diminish Maronite political power.
In simplified terms the run-up to and the main battle of the Lebanese civil war stood between the mainly Christian/Maronite right-wing and the mainly Muslim and Druze left-wing, the latter being supported by the PLO and Rejectionist Front groups. This view is, however, only partly true, as internecine fighting within these blocks was very common. The right-wing can rightly be described as being conservative and Western-oriented, whilst the left-wing was made up of progressive socialist outfits as well as groups supporting a larger share in power for the Muslim masses.
Tensions had been rife in Lebanon all through 1974, with several protests and demonstrations by the various political groups oftentimes turning into acts of violence, both by the protesters and by the army and police forces. Such demonstrations set Lebanon on the path of a violent spiral, where force by one side was met by force by the other and which the ostensibly neutral army could not control due to its institutionalised weakness.
Commonly, the event that triggered the outbreak of the civil war is said to have been the attack by Kataeb party militants (also known as the Phalange Party, Pierre Gemayel’s Maronite right-wing party) on a bus in Beirut carrying Palestinians. The attack – itself a reprisal for an attack by unknown gunmen on a church service attended by Gemayel on the same day – killed 28 Palestinian commandos from the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). Soon armed clashes erupted all over Beirut between the Phalangists and Palestinian commandos, with the left-wing opposition calling for the dissolution of the Phalange party and its expulsion from the government. Note that this event is not seen by the UCDP as the outbreak of the conflict, since the parties involved lack an incompatibility and none of them can be viewed as being the government of Lebanon.
In terms of actors the main challenger of the status quo in 1975 (and throughout most of the conflict) was Kamal Jumblatt’s Lebanese National Movement (LNM), an umbrella group including parties such as the Druze-based Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Jumblatt himself, the Independent Nasserite Organisation (or Mourabitoun, one of the main rebel groups of the 1958 crisis), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), to mention just a few of the larger groups. Several Palestinian organisations also joined the LNM, such as the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The PLO – the largest Palestinian group – was never a member, but at times supported the LNM in combat.
In the UCDP’s view the government at the outbreak of the conflict is represented by President Frangieh, the militias under his control (the Zghorta Liberation Army) and the national forces of the army, police and gendarmerie. On the side of the status quo can also be found the forces of such politicians as Pierre Gemayel (the Phalangists) and Camille Chamoun (the National Liberal Party and its ‘Tigers’ militia). The latter groups are, however, not representatives of the government at this stage. It is not possible to view the entire Lebanese cabinet as representing the government, since the cabinet at most times contains elements of some or all of the parties fighting each other (in essence a consequence of the Lebanese power-sharing system).
The start date of the conflict (when it crosses the 25 battle-related deaths threshold) is by the UCDP instead set to 2 September 1975, when violent clashes broke out in Zghorta and Tripoli between members of the LNM and President Frangieh’s Zghorta Liberation Army (sometimes referred to also as the Marada Brigade). By this time the fighting in April in Beirut had spawned an arms race within Lebanon, with political parties and strongmen across the country arming and training the private militias that would conduct the bulk of the fighting in the years to come.
Initial fighting (1975)
The initiation of fighting in Lebanon in mid-April 1975 soon caused a governmental crisis, with Prime Minister Rashid Solh’s government resigning in May and a military government resigning the same month. In late June a ‘rescue cabinet’ was formed under new PM Rashid Karami. In an attempt to preserve the unity of the country the Lebanese army did not intervene to any major degree in the clashes throughout 1975.
The ceasefire that ended the three days of clashes in Beirut in April was broken on 20 May, as new clashes between the Phalangists (supported by other Christian right-wing groups) and Palestinians (supported by the Muslim left-wing) erupted in Beirut; mainly around the Tal al-Zaatar refugee camp. This new outbreak of hostilities prompted Lebanon’s competing parties and strongmen to arm and train private militias throughout the country and to establish footholds of local control in areas such as Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre.
The complete descent into anarchy came with the fighting throughout August and September, which engulfed not only Beirut but also the cities of Zghorta, Zahle and Tripoli. These clashes also portrayed the conflict in its correct guise as Palestinian forces begun to refrain from direct and overt involvement and the rivalling Christian right-wing versus Moslem left-wing configuration stepped into the fore. Before these clashes in Zghorta it was estimated that between 700 and 2300 people had been killed in factional fighting throughout the country. The Zghorta and Tripoli fighting represents the start of the armed conflict in the UCDP’s view, since it for the first time pitted the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) against forces loyal to and under the direct control of President Frangieh. It is important to note, however, that the bulk of the fighting still stood between the Christian right-wing groups (the Phalangists and the National Liberal Party, NLP) and the Moslem left-wing (the LNM).
As the situation in Beirut deteriorated in mid-September, with the army and security forces for the first time having been involved in clashes, the Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam flew to Beirut on 19 September and held talks with “all parties”. These meetings included President Frangieh, the Phalange leader Gemayel and members of the LNM. The exact topics of talks is unclear, but yielded a ceasefire on 20 September. The leaders of the LNM and the main Christian militias also agreed to work together in a ‘National Dialogue Committee’, which was tasked with probing possible reforms in the social, economic and political spheres so as to resolve the conflict. The internal security forces and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) were tasked with upholding the ceasefire. This committee held several meetings in the weeks that followed, but could not agree on the issues at the heart of the conflict. In general all sides agreed that Lebanon’s political system needed to be revamped, but could not agree on the extent or exact forms of such changes. The NDC became largely irrelevant as new hostilities broke out in October, and was succeeded by a nine-member ‘security committee’. This committee agreed on a ceasefire in early November; which subsequently broke down only a few weeks later.
In this next round of fighting in October, November and December clashes spread to new parts of Beirut, again to Tripoli and Zghorta and into the Beeka Valley. The army became involved in clashes with leftists in Tripoli, members of the Independent Nasserite Organisation and other Moslem leftists advanced in Beirut and fighting also broke out along Beirut’s beach front. Throughout December several new attempts were made by foreign dignitaries at forging ceasefires, but the ceasefires soon broke down as all parties violated them. In essence, the situation had reached a deadlock as political negotiations had struck a wall and ceasefires were constantly violated or ignored.
Descent into total war (1976)
In early 1976 the conflict entered a new phase as the major Christian right-wing groups (the Phalangists under Gemayel and the National Liberal Party under Chamoun) in January denounced any abrogation of the National Pact and publically denounced the 1969 Cairo agreement that guaranteed the Palestinians a presence in Lebanon. Brutal blockades of Palestinian refugee camps in and around Beirut followed. As a consequence the Palestinian forces in Lebanon felt forced to finally side with the leftists in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). In reaction the main Christian right-wing militias and parties soon created an umbrella movement of their own to counter the LNM and Palestinian alliance, with the Phalange (Kataeb party) and the National Liberal Party merging into the Lebanese Front (LF). Other groups, such as President Frangieh’s Zghorta Liberation Army, also joined this alliance at a later stage. Fighting had by this time de facto partitioned Lebanon into Moslem and Christian enclaves, with the Christian ‘heartland’ being found north of Beirut. Towards late March the Maronite militias also stated that they were setting up parallel administrative structures in the areas under their control so as to create their own Christian state within Lebanon.
New fronts opened in January 1976, as Druze members of the PSP (Progressive Socialist Party, LNM leader Jumblatt’s party) began to besiege Christian villages in the Chouf Mountains, and as the Lebanese army’s air force attacked joint LNM-Palestinian militias in Damour. January of 1976 also witnessed the war’s first large-scale massacres, such as the Karantina massacre carried out by Christian militias mainly against Palestinians, and the Damour massacre of Christian civilians by Palestinian forces and LNM.
The army’s involvement against the LNM and Palestinians at Damour had strong repercussions within the army’s ranks. Traditionally the army had been controlled by the Christian Maronite establishment, and contacts with President Frangieh and Maronite leader Chamoun were probably what influenced it to become active when the Christian-held town of Damour was attacked. This taking of sides, however, caused the army to rupture along sectarian lines; as had all of Lebanese society. Under the leadership of Lieutenant Ahmed Khatib (a Sunni Moslem) the Moslem sections of the army revolted against its top leadership and declared that it would overthrow the government. The Christian sections of the army remained loyal to President Frangieh, whilst the Moslem sections (mainly Shiite) demanded his resignation and employed force to reach this end. These events saw the start of the Government of Lebanon versus the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) dyad. In March Khatib was joined by more troops, as Brigadier Aziz Ahdab declared he would overthrow President Frangieh and institute a military regime. He soon joined forces with Khatib. By the end of March the LAA had seized control of almost half of the country.
Syrian involvement as a third party throughout mid-January, meeting with all parties within the Higher Military Committee (which had replaced the ‘security committee’ from 1975), led to a widely adhered to ceasefire on 24 January, after which conciliatory statements were made by President Frangieh in mid-February on reforms of some political areas. The President’s will to compromise on the core issues could, however, not stop the fighting, which exploded in March.
By March the government and its supporters within the Christian right-wing were severely outnumbered. The Palestinian forces (both the Rejectionist Front groups and the PLO) had sided with the LNM and large portions of the army had joined with the leftists also. The Syrian peace plan thus failed as the LNM and its allies went on the offensive, bombarding Beirut (including the Presidential Palace), the LAA fighting the right-wing militias in the south and intense clashes being fought in the eastern Beeka Valley. The LNM and the LAA, in March joined together by a ‘joint military command’, rapidly gained the upper hand, forcing President Frangieh to flee Beirut and enter the Christian heartlands north of Beirut. Seeing that the right-wing alliance and President Frangieh would inevitably be destroyed and overthrown respectively Syria decided on a radical change of strategy.
Responding to a request for help from President Frangieh Syrian troops entered into Lebanon to stave off his impending defeat. Syrian interests were of course more multifaceted than merely wishing to help President Frangieh. In May Syria had succeeded in getting Elias Sarkis elected as president; a seat he would take up as soon as Frangieh’s term ended in late September. Sarkis favoured the Syrian varieties of peace proposals and Syria thus had a large incentive to see Sarkis ascend to the presidency; something which would not be possible if the LNM conquered the entire country. In addition to this factor Syria was irritated by the PLO’s alliance with the LNM since a radical force such as the LNM in power would likely lead to confrontations with Israel into which Syria would inevitably be drawn.
The first Syrian troops entered eastern Lebanon on 9 April, taking up positions previously held by Palestinian forces that were loyal to Syria (such as As-Saiqa and parts of the Palestine Liberation Army, PLA). This small-scale intervention did little to stop the LNM and the LAA.
The Syrian intervention broadened in late May and early June when thousands of troops rolled across the border from Syria to move closer to Beirut, capture several towns held by the LNM and the LAA and to relieve pressure on besieged Christian towns, such as Zahle. By June some 12 000 Syrian troops were stationed in Lebanon (ostensibly as a ‘peacekeeping force’, but the UCDP codes these troops as being secondary warring parties).
As Syrian intervention continued in Lebanon the Arab League and Arab leaders held several meetings aimed at resolving the conflict. Lebanon was, however, not represented at these meetings to any significant degree, and the mainstay of talks took place with Syrian representatives with Syria now being one of the main power brokers in Lebanon. All talk of ceasefires was abandoned in late June though, when the LF attacked the (Palestinian) Tal al-Zataar and Jisr el-Pasha refugee camps in Beirut, killing hundreds of civilians. In response the LNM, the Palestinians and the LAA carried out renewed offensives. As a consequence bargaining positions hardened, with the rightists saying they would only negotiate after the disarmament of Palestinian forces and the leftists saying they would do the same only when Syrian troops had left Lebanon.
One breakthrough came in late July, as Syria and the PLO signed a ceasefire, with an attached demand for round-table discussions between Lebanese leaders on the Syrian peace plan that had been endorsed by President Frangieh in February. The Damascus agreement, as it was called, created conflict within the ranks of the Christian right-wing, with Chamoun’s NLP (which was besieging Tal al-Zataar) clashing with Gemayel’s Phalangists in Beirut; the reason for these clashes being Chamoun’s non-acceptance of the ceasefire. He instead pressed on his attack on Tal Al-Zataar, with the camp falling to his forces on 12 August after 52 days of siege. Over 2000 people, civilians and militants, are thought to have been killed in the siege and the atrocities that followed its fall. The ceasefire had thus collapsed, and in a joint alliance the Lebanese government’s forces, Syrian forces and the right-wing militias went on the offensive. Fighting continued into late September.
On 23 September President Frangieh was replaced by Elias Sarkis, who had been voted in as President in May (note that from this point on the Zghorta Liberation Army of Frangieh is no longer viewed as being an arm of the government). His ascension to the presidency coincided with a decline in conflict intensity, as Arab League mediation in September led to the declaration of a ceasefire and further negotiations from the departure point of implementing July’s Damascus agreement. With Sarkis in position (Sarkis being a relatively weak President, with no militia of his own) Syria, in collaboration with the rightist forces, continued to press its offensive in late September, with the ceasefire thus breaking down. The offensive was very successful, with the Syrians capturing several strongholds and villages. Fighting was especially intense in the mountains east of Beirut and around Sidon (southern Lebanon). These setbacks for the LNM, the LAA and the Palestinians soon led to negotiations on a cessation of hostilities and peace.
The first half of October saw a number of meetings between Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian representatives, and by 16 October all sides agreed to ceasefire after intervention by the government of Saudi Arabia. Heads of state of, amongst others, Lebanon and Syria subsequently met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for negotiations. Palestinian delegates were also presented at these talks, at which the attending parties discussed a cessation of hostilities and the possibilities of peace negotiations. The talks ended on 18 October, when those present signed the Riyadh Agreement; a ceasefire which would allow for the initiation of a comprehensive peace plan. Armed with this plan, agreed upon by the main power broker Syria, Sarkis then met with the Lebanese leftist alliance and its Christian right-wing adversaries on 20 October. At these negotiations the warring parties accepted the terms of the ceasefire, which came into force on 21 October.
The Riyadh agreement (which does not qualify as a peace agreement since it did not deal with the incompatibility) had amongst its most important stipulations the stationing in Lebanon of up to 30 000 Arab peacekeepers, the disarmament of militias and a withdrawal to positions held before April 1975. By November 1976 at least 25 000 peacekeepers, mainly Syrian ones, were present in Lebanon and the ceasefire was generally adhered to. This mandate for peacekeeping, agreed upon by the Arab League and the warring parties, transformed the Syrian forces stationed in Lebanon into a third party enforcement mission. Of importance were also the stipulations of adherence to the 1969 Cairo agreement (which regulated the presence of Palestinian forces in Lebanon) and the PLO’s promise to not intervene into Lebanese politics in the future.
The agreement contained no political stipulations, which were to be worked out at a later stage under the auspices of President Sarkis. The agreement thus only ended the fighting, and did not resolve the actual conflict. During November and December the peacekeepers of the ADF (Arab Deterrent Force) spread out across Lebanon, taking up positions from north to south. Acceptance of the peacekeeping forces was widespread, with not serious incidents taking place. This phase of the conflict thus ended with the ceasefire of 21 October.
In practice Lebanon had fallen under almost complete Syrian dominance through the vehicle of the ADF, whilst the leftist alliance of the LNM, the LAA and Palestinian forces had – for the time being– been defeated.
Syrian hegemony and factional warfare (1977-1981)
The ceasefire of 21 October 1976 and the arrival of the ADF (Arab Deterrent Force) peacekeepers put an end to open warfare with the government of Lebanon between 1977 and 1981 (as per UCDP criteria). The country was, however, far from peaceful as the core issues of the conflict were unresolved and the opposing camps not militarily defeated. Several incidents of violence and large-scale clashes would plague the country throughout this period. Almost none of these abovementioned clashes, however, involved the government and the state-based conflict is thus viewed as not being active in 1977-1981.
In Beirut acts of violence were rampant, with sectarian violence and outright clashes claiming thousands of lives throughout this period. Numerous assassination attempts and bombings of party and militia offices shook the fragile peace over the years. One of the most prominent killings was the assassination of the LNM’s (Lebanese National Movement) and the PSP’s (Progressive Socialist Party) leader, Kamal Jumblatt in March 1977. He was replaced as leader in May by his son, Walid Jumblatt.
In the Christian-dominated north and in Beirut during this period (1977-1981) the Maronite right-wing militias clashed with the ADF (Arab Deterrent Force) on several occasions as relations between these two parties deteriorated. In 1977 the clashes mainly stood over issues of disarmament and control over territory as the Syrian-dominated ADF sought to tighten its grip over Lebanon. Relations between Syria and the Maronites, however, worsened as the years went by as the latter’s vision of a future Lebanon clashed with that of Syria. It became clear to the Gemayel and Chamoun that Syrian President Assad planned to make Lebanon dependent on, if not part of, Syria. The Maronites instead wished to orient Lebanon westwards, and also propagated that Lebanon be carved up into sectarian cantons within a federal or confederate state. This was totally unacceptable not only to Syria but also to the LNM. As a result Syrian leanings on the conflict’s core issued tilted towards the Moslem left-wing throughout 1977-1981. Fierce clashes were fought between the Maronite militias and the ADF, especially in Beirut in July 1978 and in Zahle in early 1981.
Important changes also took place within the Maronite camp during this time, as the Phalange party militia (under the command of party leader Pierre Gemayel’s son, Bashir Gemayel) moved to become the undisputed dominant party on the right-wing. Already in 1976 the Phalangists, the NLP (National Liberal Party, under Camille Chamoun) and the Zghorta Liberation Army of former president Frangieh had merged their forces under the joint command of the LF (Lebanese Front). Control over this movement had not only economical benefits but also decided who spoke for the bulk of the Maronite community. Slowly Bashir Gemayel thus begun to eradicate his opponents, starting with Frangieh’s clan. On 13 June 1978 hundreds of Phalangist militants stormed the house of Tony Frangieh (the ex-president’s son), killing Tony, his wife and daughter and some thirty of his supporters.
Internecine clashes did not stop there and tensions also increase between the Phalangists and the NLP. Sporadic clashes throughout 1977-1979 exploded in 1980. Control over the economic resources that grew rapidly within the Christian enclave of Lebanon –which had booming drug, night club and casino businesses– was a triggering cause of Bashir Gemayel’s move to crush the NLP and its Tigers militia. In July 1980 the Phalangists moved against Chamoun, with the fighting killing some 350 people and forcing Chamoun to “agree” to unify his forces with the Phalangists. In November Bashir carried out a last offensive against remnants of the NLP and took full control of the Lebanese Front. Thus, in 1982 the Gemayel clan controlled the Maronite militias and the Christian enclave almost completely. Bolstered by this power Bashir declared his interest in ascending to the presidency of Lebanon.
Bashir’s anti-Syrian stance of course made him the last pick of the Syrians. But not only Bashir’s anti-Syrian stand irritated the Syrians; his collaboration with Israel was another factor, one that also made him anathema to the LNM. Israeli-LF cooperation was strong throughout 1978-1982 as Israel transferred weapons, ammunition and even stationed military advisors in the Christian enclave. This cooperation was also present in southern Lebanon, where the SLA (South Lebanon Army, a relatively autonomous group within the Lebanese Front) grew to become an Israeli proxy army.
On the leftist side relations with Syria were calm as the LNM and the Palestinians took care not to provoke the Syrian-dominated ADF further, having faced its might in 1976 with crushing consequences. The LNM instead took to institutionalising its rule in the areas of Lebanon it controlled, much in the same fashion as did the LF. Clashes with the Maronite right-wing, however, continued both in Beirut and in the south, with the latter area seeing the bulk of fighting up until the Israeli siege of Beirut which was to come in 1982. The LNM’s demands on the government were the opposite of the LF’s during these years, with the group wanting the complete abolishment of sectarianism as a political vehicle. These divergent demands were, naturally, hard to consolidate into a single platform for President Elias Sarkis who had promised moves towards national reconciliation after the ceasefire in late 1976. Throughout the period of 1977-1981 the LNM was relatively happy with the pro-Syrian government’s proposals on peace and reform, since Syria’s ideas were much closer to those of the LNM’s than were the LF’s. Syria’s clear shift towards supporting the Moslem leftists and not the right-wing also brought on a moderate stand in regard to challenging Syria.
Throughout 1977-1982 the bulk of fighting in Lebanon stood in the southern parts of the country, where the ADF could not deploy due to Israeli objections. In the south Palestinian forces and the LNM faced off with the SLA of Major Haddad and its Israeli protector. Severe infighting also plagued the Palestinian forces.
The situation in the south deteriorated rapidly and in March 1978 the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) launched an invasion into southern Lebanon in an attempt to rid the border area of the Palestinian militant presence. This fighting between Israel and the Palestinian forces is viewed as being part of the Israel (Palestine) conflict (see that conflict’s page for more information). Among other things this invasion led to the posting in southern Lebanon of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) peacekeeping troops so as to deescalate fighting between Israel and the Palestinian forces. In the long run this posting of peacekeepers did little to stop the violence and cross-border raids between the Palestinians and Israel continued. The situation would reach a climax in June 1982 as a second Israeli invasion of Lebanon rolled across the border (this offensive also being part of the Israel-Palestine conflict).
Negotiations on the Lebanese conflict during this time period (1977-1981) did not focus on the core issues of political reform, but instead on the highly important issue of the presence of Palestinian forces in the country. President Sarkis held –separately and in conjunction with Lebanon’s various militias– several meetings and talks over the years to resolve this issue. A breakthrough appeared to have been reached with the Chtaura agreement of July 1977, with this agreement specifying how the 1969 Cairo agreement on Palestinian presence would be implemented. However, the agreement had little effect on the fighting in the south and the Palestinian issue remained as divisive as ever.
Over the years several plans were concocted by President Sarkis in regards to national reconciliation. The idea of creating a government containing all of the contending parties, however, failed to materialise. Failure to move forward with national reconciliation caused Prime Minister Hoss to resign in 1980. Instead Shafiq Wazzan created a new government and became Prime Minister on 22 October 1980. Wazzan, being pro-Syrian, secured a vote of confidence in parliament on a national reconciliation plan in mid-December of 1980, which included affording “special ties” to Syria. This move infuriated the LF which had just released a new manifesto calling Syrian ADF forces ‘occupiers’.
At the end of 1981 Syrian support had thus shifted from the Maronites to the LNM, Bashir Gemayel had seized control of the LF and begun to claim the presidency with his anti-Syrian stance and Israel and the Palestinian militants were locked in an ever-increasing spiral of violence. The fierce fighting Zahle in early through mid-1981 between the Syrian ADF and the LF only heightened the problems. In 1982 the Palestinian and Lebanese conflicts would become more intertwined than ever before.
Israeli intervention and the return to conflict (1982)
At the beginning of 1982 and up until June the situation in Lebanon was deadlocked. The right-wing LF (Lebanese Front) was under the firm and confident control of Phalangist Bashir Gemayel, the Syrian ADF (Arab Deterrent Force) was strictly opposed to the right-wings demands, the Lebanese government still powerless and the LNM (Lebanese National Movement) completely set on not bending in the face of rightist demands. This deadlock was to be radically removed, beginning in June 1982.
Tensions and fighting between Israel and the Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon (primarily the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Rejectionist Front groups) had increased significantly since the relative calm that prevailed a few months after the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978. In early 1982 Israel made it clear that it had far-reaching plans to invade Lebanon and crush the PLO should the opportunity arise. Following the shooting to death of the Israeli ambassador to London by unknown assailants the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) streamed across the border with 75 000 troops and 2 500 armoured vehicles supported by the air force and gunships. Palestinian forces fought back best they could, supported by Syrian troops and the LNM. It did, however, not take long before the Israeli forces swept away the resistance and besieged Beirut (for more information on this fighting, see the Israel-Palestine conflict). Note that this fighting, which targeted Palestinian forces, is viewed as belonging to the Israel (Palestine) conflict.
The Israeli invasion dealt a crushing blow not only to the PLO, which was forced to abandon Lebanon almost completely, but also severely weakened the LNM and its Syrian allies in the ADF. Most analysts agree, however, that the Israeli invasion likely did not only intend to crush the PLO but was also an attempt to bolster the candidacy to the Lebanese presidency of the Lebanese Forces’ (the Lebanese Front’s militia) leader Bashir Gemayel. Bashir, who was more pro-Israeli than most other senior politicians in Lebanon at the time, was thought by Israel to be a man whom could sign a peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel and thus close one of the fronts in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether or not this was the plan the invasion did set the scene for Bashir’s ascendancy. After reaching Beirut the Israeli forces expelled President Sarkis from the palace at Baabda and soon linked up with Lebanese Front militias in the surrounding area.
A brutal siege of Beirut followed, with artillery, air and naval bombardments continuing for weeks to force out the PLO. The siege was lifted on 25 July, but Israeli troops were to remain in Beirut for several more months as well as in Lebanon for several years. In late August a peacekeeping force labelled the MNF (MultiNational Forces) arrived in Lebanon to supply protection during the PLO’s exit from Lebanon to Tunis; the deal reached between Israel and the PLO for ending the onslaught against the Palestinians in Beirut.
As the siege ended Bashir Gemayel made public his candidacy for the presidency, which was of course opposed by the LNM, Syria and other Moslem groups. The latter groups could not, however, field their own candidate as they were internally divided on the issue. Attempting to foil Bashir’s plans to become president of Lebanon most Moslem candidates thus boycotted the election on 23 August. The boycott failed as a two-thirds parliamentary majority still showed up at the elections (most likely enticed both by threats and money). Thus, Bashir Gemayel seized the presidency.
From this point the UCDP views the government of Lebanon as being controlled by Bashir Gemayel in his position as the President of Lebanon. As the LF’s forces were also under his command those troops are viewed as being an extended arm of the government.
It did not take long for the LNM to proclaim that it would not accept Gemayel’s rule, calling the vote making him president the victory of “the candidate of Israeli tanks”. Through stating that all foreign troops (Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian) must leave the country Gemayel also angered Syria.
On 14 September the armed conflict ignited once more as Bashir Gemayel, along with 26 others, were killed by a bomb in Ashrafiya in East Beirut. The killing was carried out by a member of the SSNP (Syrian Social Nationalist Party), which was a member group of the LNM. The killing of Bashir had catastrophic consequences when Israeli forces, on 17 September, facilitated the entrance into the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila of LF militiamen under the command of Elie Hobeika. From 17-18 September these militiamen, under the eyes of the Israeli forces, slaughtered between 700 and 2000 (figures are disputed) Palestinian civilians in the camps. This massacre led to an outcry in Israel and the eventual departure of Israeli troops from Beirut.
In Bashir’s stead his brother Amin Gemayel took up the presidency. Support for him stemmed from the fact that he was now the powerful head of the Lebanese Front, that he lacked connections with US interests, and since he was said to be a more level-headed politician than his brother. Initially Amin Gemayel received support from both Syria and the LNM. Throughout the rest of the year only a few sporadic clashes took place between the Lebanese Front militia and some of the LNM’s member groups (mainly in the Chouf Mountains and around Aley).
Maronite rule in Lebanon (1983-1987)
During the first few months of his rule President Amin Gemayel and his government were relatively accepted by the warring parties in Lebanon. Many of his policies, however, soon alienated the little support he had among the leftist factions and also diminished his support among the right-wing.
Directly after assuming the presidency Gemayel asserted his power in Beirut through evicting the Palestinian forces present in West Beirut. Following this right-wing line Gemayel also established a pro-Western government, which attempted to establish good ties with the US. The US, in turn, begun to pressure President Gemayel to sign a peace accord with Israel; something Gemayel was not exceedingly willing to do as it would undermine his position. Tripartite talks on this with Israel and the US begun in December 1982. With Israeli forces still being stationed across the country south of Beirut there was no peace in Lebanon, as Amal and Islamic Amal fought the Israeli troops. Also, Amal grew as a force among the Shiite population, soon becoming a force to be reckoned with in Lebanese politics.
Negotiations with Israel continued into 1983, and in May of that year the US special envoy, Philip Shultz presented a draft agreement for Lebanese-Israeli peace. The agreement was a very far-reaching one, which would seriously undercut Lebanese and Syrian mobility vis-à-vis Israel. Syria naturally opposed the agreement, which was nevertheless voted through in the Lebanese parliament as it was believed that it would bring on a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Both Amal and the LNM voiced severe criticisms of the agreement, prompting President Gemayel to postpone the actual signing of the agreement. Further alienating Syria President Gemayel and the government abrogated the mandate of the Syrian ADF (Arab Deterrent Force), ending its spate as a third party enforcer of the 1976 ceasefire agreement.
Although Gemayel did not sign the peace agreement with Israel this was not enough for the leftist forces. On 23 July the LNM reconvened all of its leading parties in a congress to found the NSF (National Salvation Front). This was, in practice, the first time since the end of the fighting in 1976, that all of these influential parties and militias had met together. In essence the NSF was, however, a continuation of the LNM. At the meeting the member groups opposed Gemayel’s proposed treaty with Israel, and also vowed to bring down the ‘Phalangist hegemony’. Soon after, Amal joined this call for the destruction of the new Maronite dominance.
It did not take long before heavy fighting broke out again. In May fighting took place in the Chouf Mountains –the stronghold of Jumblatt’s Druze PSP– as President Gemayel tried to seize control of these areas. Also, from 28 August to 1 September Amal and government forces fought fierce battles in Beirut as the government forces attempted to expel Amal militias from West Beirut. Amal thus became active as a warring party fighting to overthrow the government of Gemayel. Further fighting between the government and Jumblatt’s forces took place throughout September as Israel unexpectedly withdrew its f forces from the Chouf; likely as punishment for Gemayel’s failure to sign the peace agreement. This bout of warfare was very brutal, with massacres of both Druze and Christians being carried out, and soon spread towards the capital.
Feeling the pressure of the battle-hardened Druze and Amal forces President Gemayel requested help from the outside. The call was answered by the US and France; supporters of Gemayel’s government. These two countries did not have to station troops in Lebanon, since a significant number of troops were already stationed in Beirut as part of MNF II (Multinational Forces II). These were troops that had returned to Beirut to protect Palestinian civilians after the massacre in Sabra and Shatila. The fighting soon escalated, with US and French warships and fighter jets attacking the LNM and Amal positions. Further escalation followed as Syria sided with the leftists and Amal. Internal Lebanese elements did not take US and French involvement lightly, and two suicide car bombings of the US and French barracks in October left approximately 240 and 60 dead respectively.
Fighting slowed as the parties met for a reconciliation conference in Geneva in October. The conference did not yield many results, but at the least ended with agreement on Lebanon being an Arab country and a call for President Gemayel to draft a document for complete Israeli withdrawal. There was, however, not much movement on these issues by Gemayel and fighting begun again and continued into 1984.
By February the tide had again turned in favour of the LNM and its Amal ally. The US and French forces had evacuated Lebanon, the Lebanese army had been routed from its forward positions in the Chouf and Souq al-Gharb, and LNM and Amal militias had yet again taken control of West Beirut. As a consequence President Gemayel cancelled the pending peace agreement with Israel and became more lenient in terms of national reconciliation. More meetings with the national reconciliation conference followed in March, with some deals being reached on reform of the army and security issues. Strides towards total reconciliation were, however, absent and a stalemate between the parties set in once again. One of the main issues was Gemayel’s insistence that all militias disarm before political reform would begin, whilst Amal and the LNM wished to see reform before disarming. Fighting thus continued in bouts throughout the last months of 1984 and through 1985.
The fall of President Gemayel, however, came not through the groups on the left-wing, but through intra-Maronite disputes and conflicts. Ever since the death of his brother Bashir, President Gemayel had been struggling to control the militias of the Lebanese Forces, who were in general much more radical than the president. In February 1985 Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces, attempted but failed to separate the militia completely from its political leadership in the Phalangist Party. Gemayel then expelled Geagea from the Phalangist party, only to find Geagea seizing control of most of the Lebanese Forces troops and thus control over the bulk of the Christian enclave in the country. Further splits followed, as Elie Hobeika –the leader of the forces that committed the massacre in Sabra and Shatila– was voted chairman of the Lebanese forces, relegating Geagea to chief-of-staff. Hobeika had grand ambitions and accepted the patronage of Syria, which had by now turned from negotiating with the traditional Lebanese political elite to talking directly with the more powerful militia leaders. Syria’s dealings also lead to Amal and the LNM allying into the NUF (National Union Front) to confront the Maronites and the government.
At the end of 1985 Syria had brokered agreement between the NUF and Hobeika on the political reform of Lebanon. President Gemayel was, however, not on board. On 28 December the NUF leaders and Hobeika signed the Damascus Agreement, declaring far-reaching political reforms in parliament, the army and regarding the president’s power. The split between the faction of the Lebanese Forces that supported Hobeika and President Gemayel was thus complete.
Hostilities between the two soon broke out, leading to the start of a new dyad (Government of Lebanon versus Lebanese Forces – Hobeika faction). At first (in January 1986) Hobeika attacked the Lebanese Forces militias still under the command of Samir Geagea, before turning his guns on President Gemayel himself, attacking his forces in Beirut and Gemayel’s home in Metn. This joint threat meant that Gemayel and Geagea quickly reconciled to take on the threat from Hobeika. Together Geagea and Gemayel defeat Hobeika’s forces, expelling him from the Christian enclave. Some 400-1000 people were killed.
With all parties to the conflict having been weakened throughout 1985 and 1986 through infighting (the intra-Maronite clashes and severe fighting between the PLO and Amal) the conflict’s activity was relatively low for the last six months of 1986, with the bulk of fighting instead standing between Amal on one side and the PLO and the PSP on the other. The conflict thus became inactive in 1987 and continued to be so in 1988.
Throughout this period movement on political reform was, however, extremely slow and the deadlock in regard to political and military reform remained. Insecurity, however, reigned in the country, with groups such as Hezbollah, Amal, PLO, LNM and Syria fighting with high intensity. Kidnappings and assassination attempts were rampant. Amongst others Prime Minister Karami was assassinated in 1987.
As 1987 drew to a close a new crisis loomed at the horizon, as President Gemayel’s term was about to end. With the balance of power so finely weighed and with no candidate with widespread support existing this would prove to spark new warfare, but also the end of the civil war.
Fall of the Maronites and Syrian peace (1988-1990)
The political crisis of succession to the presidency struck in 1988, as President Gemayel’s six-year term as president was due to end in late September. The crisis stemmed from there being no compromise candidate acceptable to all parties available at the same time as no single party had the power to force through a selection of their own. President Gemayel, the Lebanese Forces (LF) under Geagea and General Michel Aoun (controlling the Lebanese Army) all supported a strong Maronite president able to withstand Syrian pressures. The NUF, Amal and Syria, on the other hand, wanted a candidate that would support Syria and the more leftist views of what was needed to create peace.
The elections –slated for late Septebmber– were effectively blocked by the Maronite parties as they managed to undermine the necessary quorum in parliament through holding back Christian parliamentarians. Thus, President Gemayel resigned before a successor to his post, as well as that of the Prime Minister, could be appointed.
Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Selim Hoss and his cabinet, all of whom had resigned several years earlier, withdrew their earlier resignations in an effort to resolve the crisis. Gemayel, however, solved it in his own way by appointing General Michel Aoun (the Maronite Christian head of the army) as Prime Minister and head of an interim military government. The military government was supposed to be composed of three Christians and three Muslims but since the Prime Minister chosen by Gemayel was a Christian, and not a Sunni Muslim, the Muslims did not accept their posts.
By 22 September 1988, Lebanon was left with no President and two governments: one headed by the leader of the mainly Christian Lebanese Army (Aoun) and the other by a Sunni Muslim (Hoss). The new as well as the old government claimed that they had acted according to constitutional law. The constitution did not provide an immediate solution to the problem as it was tradition that dictated that the President should be a Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. Internationally the government led by Hoss came to be seen as having the most legitimacy; UCDP also treats the Hoss-led administration as the government of Lebanon. At first, Aouns government was also seen as a legitimate alternative by some states and by most Christians in Beirut, to a great extent because he dared to stand up against the Syrians, but after Aoun began fighting the fellow Christian LF militia (as well as the Hoss government) he seemed to have lost much of his credibility.
Authority in the Maronite camp was now split between General Aoun and Geagea’s Lebanese Forces. Former President Gemayel soon went into exile and his Force 75 militia was forcefully absorbed into the LF, further expanding Geagea’s power base. The 1989 to 1990 period thus contains two dyads; the government against the Lebanese Army under Aoun, and the government against the LF, led by Samir Geagea.
Fighting between the Lebanese Army under Aoun and the Government of Lebanon began in early March, as the Lebanese Army launched a blockade on what it considered to be illegal militia posts in Beirut. In response, forces controlled by Syria and the Hoss government attacked Lebanese Army positions with mortars and artillery. The Lebanese Army responded in kind and by 15 March 1989, more than 25 people had been killed as a result of the battles. On 17 April 1989 the LF joined its former belligerent, the Lebanese Army, against the Lebanese government in a clash that left 23 people killed. Before May 1989 there were more than 25 battle related deaths in the Government-Lebanese Forces dyad also.
The only secondary warring party active during the relevant period was Syria. (Iranian and Israeli troops were only involved in communal violence or in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 1989-1990). Syria was also a part of the incompatibility since the Lebanese Army and the LF saw the ousting of the Syrian forces as a prerequisite for peace. The involvement of Syria brought with it the involvement of its rival Iraq, who supported the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese Forces with weapons. The Iraqi support was however diminished by the end of 1990 after the international response to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
Although there were no clear cases of negotiations over the incompatibility between the parties during the period, there were many cases of third party mediation. Mediators included France, the Vatican, the European Community and the Arab League. Most third-party involvement failed, but the parties did agree on cease-fires in May and September 1989. The 1989 cease-fire terminated the involvement of the LF in the conflict. In April 1994, Samir Geageas potential return to the conflict was effectively ended when he was arrested on charges of murder.
The Lebanse Civil War finally ended through a mixture of political reconciliation and reform and sheer force. In the sphere of reforms the most important agreement was reached when Lebanese parliamentarians undertook negotiations at an Arab-brokered conference at Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1989. Though the warring parties did not take part in the negotiations, these negotiations still deserve mention since they regulated significant aspects of the incompatibility and involved parliamentarians who represented groups that had been involved in the conflict during its earlier years. The agreement, signed 22 October, provided for, amongst other things, a transfer of power from the traditionally Christian President to the parliament and the cabinet, an equal proportion of parliamentarians for Muslims and Christians and the disarmament of all militias. The agreement also stipulated that sectarianism as a formula for representation in parliament and government would be removed (the main LNM demand from the start of the conflict in 1975), although no date was set for this to take place.
General Aoun rejected the Taif agreement since it did not stipulate the immediate removal of Syrian forces; it instead rewarded Syria with a special role to play in Lebanon’s future until the Taif agreement had been implemented (which it never was).
Concerning force the civil war was ended through the military defeat of the Maronite forces’ last representative; General Aoun. Aoun and the LF were at odds almost from the beginning of Aoun’s rule as the parallel leader of Lebanon since both attempted to represent the Christian community. Relations between the two parties broke completely in late 1989, as the LF chose to accept the Ta’if Agreement that Aoun had rejected. In late January 1990 Aoun subsequently ordered the closure of all Lebanese Forces barracks in East Beirut. Fighting soon erupted across the entirety of the Christian enclave between Aoun’s and Geagea’s forces. As a result the Lebanese Forces withdrew what little support it still gave Aoun, leaving him isolated against the Hoss government, the leftist militias and Syria.
On 13 October, with Aoun severely outnumbered and increasingly unpopular amongst the Maronites due to his war against the Lebanese Forces, the Hoss government and Syria launched their final assault on Aoun’s forces. Aoun was decisively crushed by this onslaught, fled to the French embassy and unconditionally surrendered. Some sporadic fighting occurred after this date, but all of Aoun’s forces were soon either defeated or had rejoined the Lebanese army under the Hoss government. The conflict thus terminated through the vicroty of the government side.
IS clash with Lebanese troops in border town
The conflict over government in Lebanon has not been active since the 1990s but resumed in 2014 as a consequence of the Islamic State’s advancements in the region. In August 2014, is together with Jabhat al-Nusra, clashed with Lebanese troops in and around the border town of Arsal, following the arrest of a rebel commander. This marked the first major confrontation between the is and Lebanese troops. A large number of security forces, rebels and civilians were killed in the clashes that lasted for several days. A number of security forces were also taken hostage during the clashes. The Lebanese Army managed to retake control over the town in mid-August, but is continued to have a presence in the area.
The fighting ended following a ceasefire agreement in which the militants were allowed withdraw from the Arsal area. Negotiation efforts then continued with the focus of releasing the hostages. Several demands were raised, including Hezbollah’s full withdrawal from Syria, protection of Syrian refugees in the Arsal area and the release of IS-linked prisoners. While some hostages were released, a few were killed and the majority remained in captivity.
Qatar was invited by the Lebanese government to help with the mediation. In December, however, Qatar announced that it would end its mediation efforts aimed at the release of the Lebanese soldiers, citing the failure of those efforts.
