SUMMARY

Lebanon, which achieved independence in 1943, has for a long time been a patchwork of different religious groups, with the most important ones in terms of size being the Christian Maronite, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims and the Muslim Druze. In order to ensure political and confessional peace, Lebanon relied on an elaborate, albeit unwritten, political power-sharing arrangement upheld by the National Pact (Mithaq al-Watani in Arabic) established in 1943. The National Pact, which has held paramount importance for the composition of the Government of Lebanon, contained a series of confessional-based power-sharing provisions. For example, it stipulated that the President would always be a Maronite Christian, that the Prime Minister would always be a Sunni, and that the Speaker of the House would always be a Shiite. In the legislative assembly, the seats were distributed according to a confessional quota system, which maintained a 6:5 advantage in favor of Lebanon’s Christian groups, especially the Maronite. The political system imposed by the National Pact meant that influence over the Government of Lebanon was disproportionally concentrated in the hands of the Maronite until the early 1990s. The system imposed by the National Pact strongly contributed to the 1975-1990 Lebanese intrastate conflict, as it aggrieved many of Lebanon’s non-Maronite groups. Following the signing of the Taif Agreement in 1989, the confessional-based quotas in the Lebanese legislative assembly were balanced between the Christian and Muslim groups, as each side was granted 64 parliamentary seats. The Taif Agreement also transferred most executive power from the presidency to the cabinet and the prime minister; however, the old confessional distribution of the executive offices remained.

In Lebanon, the UCDP was faced with the difficulty of determining what actor constituted the “Government of Lebanon” for most of the 1975-1990 armed conflict over government. By convention, the UCDP considers the actor in control over the capital (in this case, Beirut) as the government. However, for most of the time 1975-1990, Beirut was divided between the warring factions. In simplified terms, Christian/right-wing militias (such as the Lebanese Forces) controlled East Beirut, while Muslim/left-wing militias (for example NSF) and Palestinian groups controlled West Beirut; the army was confined to its barracks and the presidential palace in Baabda. In order to attain a workable operationalization of the “Government of Lebanon”, the UCDP opted to define it as being controlled by the political party whose candidate was President of Lebanon. During (and before) the Lebanese civil war considerable power was vested in the presidency, this in fact even being part of the incompatibility of the 1975-1990 conflict, as the presidency was always accorded to a Christian Maronite. This solution in many respects reflected the reality of the situation in Lebanon during the civil war, with (mainly) Muslim and Leftist parties challenging the domination of the state apparatus by the Christian Maronite and rightist parties. Consequently, the armed forces of the Government of Lebanon were viewed as being those parts of the army and security forces that were loyal to the President, and the militias that were controlled by the President’s political party and/or umbrella organization. For example, the Lebanese Forces were considered as a de facto government armed force until 1988, as it was linked to the ruling Maronite group.

This solution was used up until the rebellion of General Michel Aoun and the Lebanese Forces in 1989-1990; during these years, a different situation was in place as Lebanon lacked a president. From 22 September 1988, the legitimate hold on government power in Lebanon was contested, with both General Aoun (Maronite, prime minister of a military caretaker government) and ex-Prime Minister Selim Hoss (Sunni Muslim, withdrew his previous resignation to solve the political crisis) leading separate governments. Both Aoun and Hoss claimed to act in accordance with the Lebanese constitution; internationally, the Hoss-led government was seen as having the most legitimacy. UCDP also treated the Hoss administration as the Government of Lebanon; its armed forces was largely comprised of Druze and Muslim militias, heavily supported by Syrian troops. The “rival government” of General Aoun was treated as a non-state actor (see Forces of Michel Aoun).

Before the amendments agreed upon in the Taif Agreement came into effect in 1992, the Government of Lebanon was led by a succession of presidents drawn from the Maronite Christian group. Notable examples included Suleiman Frangieh (in office 1970-1976) who held the post at the start of the Lebanese civil war, and Amine Gemayel (in office 1982-1988) who came to power in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in June 1982. It was in connection to Gemayel’s resignation that the aforementioned conflict between Aoun and Hoss emerged; it was Gemayel who appointed the military caretaker government led by Aoun.

After the Taif Agreement came into effect following the general elections of 1992, the Government of Lebanon has been led by a succession of Prime Ministers from the Sunni Muslim group. A notable example was Rafic Hariri (in office 1992-1998 and 2000-2004), the first Prime Minister to wield most of the executive power; Hariri was later assassinated in 2005. Furthermore, during the fighting between the Government of Israel and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon in 2006 (see Israel: Southern Lebanon for more information), Fouad Siniora (in office 2005-2009) served as prime minister. As of 2018, Saad Hariri (in office 2009-2011, and 2016-) held the position of prime minister.

In 1976, the Government of Lebanon received secondary warring support from Syria in the fighting against both NSF and LAA; this year, Syria deployed 12 000 troops to Lebanon. Furthermore, Syria provided secondary support to the Lebanese government in the 1989-1990 conflict against the Forces of Michel Aoun; Prime Minister Hoss had a pronounced pro-Syrian stance, which explained the Syrian decision to intervene against Aoun. As the Government of Lebanon was engaged in fighting against Amal and NSF in 1983 and 1984, it received secondary warring support from the United States of America and France. The American and French troops in Lebanon had been deployed as part of the second Multinational Forces mission (MNF II) in late 1982. The United States of America, France, Syria, Algeria, and Israel have also provided secondary non-warring support (in the form of, for example, weapons and training) to the Government of Lebanon at various points in time.