SUMMARY
Lebanese Arab Army (LAA, alternatively known as the Movement of Ahmad al-Khatib, or the Arab Army of Lebanon/AAL) was an armed group active in the Lebanese conflict over government. Lebanon has for a long time been a patchwork of different religious groups, with the most important ones in terms of size being the Christian Maronite, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims and the Muslim Druze. In order to ensure political and confessional peace, Lebanon relied on an elaborate, albeit unwritten, political power-sharing arrangement upheld by the National Pact (Mithaq al-Watani in Arabic). The Pact (established in 1943) dictated that legislative power in the assembly would be shared 6:5 in favor of the Maronite, that the President would always be a Maronite, that the Prime Minister would always be a Sunni, and that the Speaker of the House would always be a Shiite. However, intergroup tensions in Lebanon was reaching a breaking-point approaching the mid-1970s, as the country’s less favored groups grew increasingly aggrieved by the political and economic domination of the Maronite and Sunni elites. These tensions were aggravated by the influx of Palestinian refugees from Israel, and the increasing influence of PLO in Lebanon. It was generally accepted that these tensions exploded following clashes between right-wing Christian militias and Palestinian fighters, a crisis that forced the Lebanese government to resign. Following this, Lebanon descended into a bloody conflict 1975-1990, characterized by inter-sectarian strife. In simplified terms, the two main factions of the conflict were the Christian/Maronite right-wing groups and the Muslim/Druze left-wing groups, with the latter being supported by PLO and other Palestinian organizations. It was in this context that LAA emerged. Apart from demanding the resignation or removal of President Suleiman Frangieh from office, the LAA also demanded wide-ranging reforms of the army, which traditionally had strong ties to the Maronite elite; LAA also claimed that the Maronite political elites were colluding with right-wing Christian militias. Furthermore, the group claimed that it was fighting for Lebanon’s “Arabism”, the idea that Lebanon was an Arab state.
LAA was formed in January 1976, as the Lebanese army fractured along sectarian lines when faced with the increasing sectarianism of the Lebanese civil war. At the time, Christian Maronite officers controlled the upper ranks of the army, whilst the lower ranking officers and rank and file were dominated by Muslim recruits. The group emerged following a mutiny among Muslim army troops at the barracks in Hasbayya. Lieutenant Ahmed al-Khatib, a Sunni Muslim, was the founder-leader of LAA. Following the mutiny at the Hasbayya barracks, more military units joined the LAA. For example, troops led by Brigadier Aziz Ahdab, the Sunni Muslim commander of Beirut, joined the group in March 1976. LAA was initially active in and around the Beqaa Valley, but was able to expand its activities to many parts of Lebanon throughout 1976. By absorbing deserters from the Lebanese armed forces, the LAA was able to field more than 4000 fighters in March 1976; however, the group quickly shrank to just a few hundred by the end of 1976.
As indicated above, the LAA initially received considerable support from Palestinian factions active in Lebanon. Its primary financial supporter was Fatah, the dominant group within PLO. Aside from providing financial support, it was suggested that Fatah played a central role in the formation of the LAA; one of the LAA’s stated goals was to defend the Palestinian resistance, which underpinned the close connections between it and the Palestinian factions. LAA also fought alongside fighters from PLO and “Nasserite” (a blend of Socialist and pan-Arabism) forces from [LNM/NSF].
The primary cause for the LAA’s rapid decline was a Syrian military intervention in June 1976, and the ensuing fierce clashes between the LAA and Syrian troops. The LAA was also hard-hit by defections, as many of its commanders and cadres was aggrieved by the waning support from PLO, nominally the groups closest ally and benefactor. In January 1977, Syrian authorities detained most of the LAA’s top leadership (including al-Khatib) after it was invited to Syria for a meeting with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. After this, the LAA was completely politically and militarily marginalized, and ceased to function as an armed faction.
