SUMMARY
In spring 2011, major protests against the regime of Bashar al-Assad broke out. While at first concentrated to a few cities, the protests quickly spread over large parts of the country, posing a considerable threat to the government. As a reaction, the regime began using armed force to suppress the protests (see also: one-sided violence Government of Syria - Civilians). Several months into the protests and the violent crackdown, the situation in Syria was very tense. The different groups within the society regarded each other with suspicion and mistrust. The divide of Syria's society followed two basic lines: a political and an ethnic. The political divide separated those supporting the uprising and criticizing Bashar al-Assad from the ones who continued to support the president. The chosen affiliation oftentimes also depended on whether one profited from Bashar al-Assad's economic liberalization in the last years, or whether one suffered from the thereof resulting increase of prices of basic goods. The ethnic divide separated the Sunni Muslims from the Alawite Shiites. The Sunni represent the huge majority of Syria's population, while the Alawite only account for roughly 10 %. Yet, Bashar al-Assad is Alawite, and the Alawites held on to all key positions in the state, the army, and the economy. Oftentimes, these two lines of divide correlated, i.e. the Sunni majority being economically weaker and opposing Bashar al-Assad for religious and political reasons, while the Alawites supporting the president for both religious and political reasons.
When the uprisings started in spring 2011, Bashar al-Assad successfully implemented a strategy to assure loyalties, using, and aggravating the existing societal divides. He spread fear among his supporters of a potential Sunni-dominated religious state, Muslim extremism as well as retaliation attacks against those who supported him. In doing so, he successfully linked his own personal faith to the faith of his supporters, limiting the risk of a "palace revolution" and deepening the divide within the society. At the same time, he ordered the use of strong force on the largely peaceful demonstrations and hence closed all doors to a potential dialogue. With the blood toll going into the thousands, frustration among the protesters increased, leading to a growing number of violent incidents, increased mistrust, and, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, led to a radicalization of the protesters and increased talk about retaliation for the killings.
Against this background, smaller incidents of violence between the two camps became increasingly frequent. The situation was particularly tense in the city of Homs, the main hotspot of the uprising. While a majority of the inhabitants of Homs supported the uprising, some smaller neighborhoods were mainly inhabited by Supporters of al-Assad. The situation escalated in mid-July after the bodies of three abducted al-Assad supporters were found dead and mutilated. This provoked intense clashes between the two sides, first in beating each other with sticks and, after a few hours, also using firearms. The police and security forces observed the situation, without intervening.
The non-state conflict between Opponents of al-Assad and Supporters of al-Assad is first included in UCDP data in 2011. On 17 July of that year, clashes between the two groups led to more than 25 battle-related deaths.
