SUMMARY
Syrias society is very heterogeneous and already prior to 2011 tensions between different groups of the society existed. The increasing violence and the tense political situation deepened those existing splits within the society further, resulting in a general climate of suspicion and mistrust. The divide of Syrias society followed two basic lines: a political and an ethnical. The political divide separated those supporting the uprising and criticizing Bashar al-Assad from the ones who continued to support the president. The chosen affiliation oftentimes also depended on whether one profited from Bashar al-Assads economic liberalization in the last years, or whether one suffered from the thereof resulting increase of prices of basic goods. The ethnical divide separated the Sunni Muslim from the Alawite Shiites. The Sunni represent the huge majority of Syrias population, while the Alawite only account for roughly 10%. Yet, Bashar al-Assad is Alawite, and the Alawites held on to all key positions in the state, the army and the economy. Oftentimes, this two lines of divide correlated, i.e. the Sunni majority being economically weaker and opposing Bashar al Assad for religious and political reasons, while the Alawites supporting the President for both religious and political reasons.
When the uprisings started in spring 2011, Bashar al-Assad successfully implemented a strategy to assure loyalties using and aggravating the existing societal divides. On the sides of his supporters, he spread fear of a potential Sunni-dominated religious state, Muslim extremism and of retaliation attacks should he be overthrown. This successfully resulted in a perceived close link between the faith of his supporters and himself, and limited the risk of a "palace revolution" to a minimum. With this in mind, many of Assads supporters were afraid of a potential post-Assad future and regarded, following the arguments of the government, the opposition as foreign founded terrorists endangering the unity and independence of Syria. Hence, seeing their personal and their countrys future at stake, supporters of Assad considered it as their duty to become active and to defend themselves.
Supporters of al-Assad have been involved in the non-state category of UCDP organised violence.
