SUMMARY

Syrias society is very heterogeneous and already prior to 2011 tensions between different groups of the society existed. The increasing violence and the tense political situation deepened those existing splits within the society further, resulting in a general climate of suspicion and mistrust. The divide of Syrias society followed two basic lines: a political and an ethnical. The political divide separated those supporting the uprising and criticizing Bashar al Assad from the ones who continued to support the president. The chosen affiliation oftentimes also depended on whether one profited from Bashar al Assads economic liberalization in the last years, or whether one suffered from the thereof resulting increase of prices of basic goods. The ethnical divide separated the Sunni Muslim from the Alawite Shiites. The Sunni represent the huge majority of Syrias population, while the Alawite only account for roughly 10%. Yet, Bashar al Assad is Alawite, and the Alawites held on to all key positions in the state, the army and the economy. Oftentimes, this two lines of divide correlated, i.e. the Sunni majority being economically weaker and opposing Bashar al Assad for religious and political reasons, while the Alawites supporting the President for both religious and political reasons.

When the uprisings started in spring 2011, Bashar al-Assad began using extreme violence against his opponents (see one-sided violence "Government of Syria - civilians"). The higher the level of violence grew, the more determined Assads opponents became. In a short time, hatred against Assad reached a very high level, and everyone not opposing Assad was looked at with utmost suspicion. Over time, the scope of mistrust and hate broadened beyond the person of Bashar al-Assad alone and began to include his supporters as well - a mistrust that was equally returned by the other side.

Opponents of al-Assad have been involved in the non-state category of UCDP organised violence.