SUMMARY
In 2018, tensions in Tripoli between a collection of powerful armed groups informally called the ”Tripoli Militia Cartel” and armed groups from outside the capital increased. Through 2016 and 2017, the militias comprising this cartel – the Special deterrence Force (SDF), TRB, Nawasi Battalion, and Ghaniwa Brigade – had expanded their control over the capital by driving out its rivals. This was done with the tacit approval of the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj, as it needed the support the militias to safeguard its own position. However, the government soon lost whatever little control it had over the militia cartel, which grew increasingly powerful and wealthy from extorting government institutions and by control vital economic and strategic infrastructure in Tripoli. This caused considerable grievance among armed groups that were excluded from this scheme, and in August 2018, the Kaniyat militia from Tarhuna attacked Tripoli with the intention of driving out the cartel militias. A more in-depth description of the background to the 2018 Tripoli militia conflict as well as a description of the late August fighting can be found here. It should be noted that the militia fighting described here was a direct continuation of the August violence, albeit involving a slightly different constellation of forces.
While a 4 September ceasefire brokered by the United Nations had halted the fighting between Kaniyat and several of the cartel militias, tensions remained high in Tripoli. Despite creating a new force – comprised of Zintani and Misratan militias – charged with maintaining security in Tripoli, the GNA-led Government of Libya still did not control a majority of the capital, which remained occupied by various independent militias. The situation was destabilized further in early September by the reemergence in Tripoli of Salah Badi, a notorious militia commander that vehemently rejected the legitimacy of the GNA government. Badi – who had been a commander in the Libya Dawn coalition – had actively attempted to prevent the GNA from assuming government power in 2016, as he supported the former “National Salvation Government” (NSG) that he had helped to put in power in 2014. In the confusion that was caused by the August fighting in Tripoli, Badi’s Jabhat al-Samud militia entered Tripoli near the highway that links the International Airport to the central parts of the city. Soon after this, Badi appeared in a video message, where he announced his intention to “cleanse” Tripoli of “the corrupt”, an apparent reference to the cartel militias and the GNA, and urged the people of Tripoli to support him. Labeling himself as a caretaker of the “17 February Revolution” – the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 – Badi also stated that “[t]hose who remain [in Tripoli]] now only have two options[…] surrender or face their punishment”.
By mid-September, the UN-brokered ceasefire was growing increasingly fragile. As a direct consequence of the threat posed by Kaniyat and Jabhat al-Samud against their position, the Tripoli militia cartel and their allies formed a superficial umbrella body called TPF (Tripoli Protection Force), which was intended to protect their interests in the capital. TPF included SDF, TRB, the Nawasi Battalion, the Ghaniwa Brigade, and Brigade 301. On 19 September, TPF launched what it called “Operation Badr”, a military offensive aimed at removing Jabhat al-Samud and Kaniyat – which themselves coordinated their military activities - from Tripoli. In response, Badi claimed that he was leading a “Tripoli Liberation Operation”, which he later renamed “Operation Liberation of State Institutions”. As had been the case with the first bout of violence, the fighting between the militias was concentrated to southern and southwestern Tripoli. For example, heavy fighting took place in the Ayn Zara, Khalat al-Furjan, and Wadi al-Radi neighborhoods, as well as along the highway linking Tripoli International Airport to downtown Tripoli. The clashes were also focused on the Hamza Barracks in the al-Habda neighborhood, where Jabhat al-Samud clashed repeatedly with TPF forces. Much of the fighting took place in heavily populated areas, and the indiscriminate use of heavy weapons – including unguided Grad rockets – caused considerable civilian casualties; for example, eight civilians were killed by indiscriminate fire in a single day. As had been the case with the August fighting, large numbers of civilians were forced to flee their homes, and emergency services had difficulties reaching the wounded because of the militia fighting.
After several days of clashes, TPF forces – mainly from the Ghaniwa Brigade – forced Kaniyat to abandon Yarmouk military camp, which it had captured in August. Parallel to this, Jabhat al-Samud was forced to retreat from several positions; TPF claimed that it had forcefully driven the group back, but Salah Badi maintained that his forces had retreated because they lacked ammunition. In fact, some sources suggested that Badi had overestimated the support Jabhat al-Samud would receive from other armed groups, and thus overreached its military capability. For example, Badi had claimed amidst the fighting that large numbers of reinforcements would arrive in Tripoli to support his attack, but no such forces appeared. Adding to the confusion, the Misrata Military Council issued a statement on 22 September that the town had mobilized its armed forces in order to join the attack against the Tripoli militias; however, no Misratan forces joined the battle. As the fighting abated on 23 September, Jabhat al-Samud and Kaniyat had made no significant advances, and lost several important positions. While TPF had prevailed militarily, the Tripoli militias had lost much of the veil of legitimacy they had enjoyed prior to the outbreak of violence. On 26 September, the Libyan government facilitated a new ceasefire. In a move that caused much resentment in Misrata, the United Nations issued sanctions against Salah Badi, singling him out as a key figure behind the Tripoli fighting.
In the aftermath of the Tripoli fighting, the Libyan government intensified its efforts to reform the capital’s security arrangements. For example, new attempts were made to convince militias – particularly TPF – to surrender its positions to regular police forces. This appeared to have been, at least superficially, successful as both the Nawasi Battalion and SDF agreed to hand over its positions around Tripoli Port and Mitiga Airport. However, it was uncertain whether this withdrawal of militia forces would be completed. It was also unclear whether TPF would continue to exist as a functioning alliance, as there were signs of infighting between its constituent factions. As such, the security situation remained precarious at the end of 2018, and the risk of renewed clashes was high.
The non-state conflict between Jabhat al-Samud, Kaniyat and TPF is first included in UCDP data in 2018. In September of that year, clashes between the groups had resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.
