SUMMARY
TPF (Tripoli Protection Force) was an armed militia coalition active in Libya. Following its formal ascension to government power in Libya in March 2016, the so-called Government of National Accord (GNA) struggled to assert itself. While a rival government affiliated with the House of Representatives controlled most of eastern Libya, western Libya was largely controlled by various local or region armed groups, many of which had been established in the direct aftermath of the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi. In order to bolster its influence, the new GNA-led Government of Libya engaged with several of these groups, giving them a degree of legitimacy in return for armed support, which further increased the power and influence of certain militias and factions; it was in this context that TPF emerged. TPF did not have any overtly stated political goals, and it claimed that it was not opposed to the Government of Libya. The main purpose of the group was most likely to protect the particularistic interests of its constituent factions, which all occupied strategically important and economically valuable infrastructure in Tripoli.
TPF emerged on 19 September 2018, as a collection of powerful armed groups commonly called the “Tripoli Militia Cartel” and some of its allied factions joined together under a common umbrella. The factions comprising TPF were the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) led by Haitham al-Tajouri, the Ghaniwa Brigade led by Abd al-Ghani al-Kikli, the Nawasi Battalion led by Abd al-Latif Qaddur, Brigade 301, and Abdel-Raouf Kara’s Special Deterrence Force (SDF, also known by its Arabic acronym RADA). While all factions comprising TPF had been “nominally” affiliated with the Government of Libya prior to 2018, Kara’s SDF initially had the strongest ties to the government. SDF was originally created as part of the Supreme Security Committees (SSC), a de facto gendarmerie force established in 2012. SDF was largely comprised of so-called Madakhila, a term used to denote followers of the Saudi Salafist preacher Rabi’ al-Madkhali; the Madakhila considered political Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and most jihadists as apostates. For the first years of its existence, SDF played a relatively minor role in Tripoli’s militia dynamics, and avoided being involved in large-scale fighting, such as the 2014 clashes. During the rule of the National Salvation Government (NSG) from late 2014 to March 2016, SDF strengthened its position by taking control over Mitiga, the only functioning airport in Tripoli. During these years, SDF functioned as a de facto gendarmerie force of the NSG-led Government of Libya. When the Government of National Accord (GNA) took over government power from the NSG in March 2016, SDF was one of the first group’s to side with the GNA and new Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj. The new GNA-led Government of Libya had courted SDF prior to its arrival in Tripoli, as the group controlled areas close to the port, where the new government intended enter the capital. The decision to support al-Serraj drastically increased SDF’s power and influence, and it was one of the militias most closely affiliated with the Libyan government from 2016 to mid-2018. For more detailed information on the origins of TPF’s other constituent factions, please consult their respective actor pages.
The so-called Tripoli Militia Cartel was in essence the direct predecessor to TPF, even if it never existed as more than an implicit cooperation scheme between several powerful armed factions in the capital. One of the main contributing factors behind the emergence of the cartel was fighting between the Libyan government and forces loyal to former NSG Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghawill in 2017. The members of the would be cartel – that is, TRB, SDF, Ghaniwa Brigade, and the Nawasi Battalion – all decided to support the Government of Libya as Tripoli was attacked by al-Ghawill loyalists. In the aftermaths of these clashes, the militias that had remained loyal to Prime Minister al-Serraj were allowed to purge any group perceived as anti-government from the capital, all with the government’s tacit approval. Consequently, the four militias expanded their influence in Tripoli, taking control over economic infrastructure and neighborhoods housing government institutions. Some less influential militias – such as Brigade 301 – allied themselves to the four cartel militias. While the Tripoli Militia Cartel was nominally loyal to the GNA, it quickly grew influential enough to distance itself from any true government control; the cartel even extorted government institutions for various favors. In May 2018, Brigade 301 and TRB even evicted the Presidential Guard – a force tasked with protecting the government – from its positions in several parts of Tripoli. As militia fighting intended to break the cartel’s dominance over the capital erupted in Tripoli in late August 2018, it became apparent that the Libyan government had no control over the Cartel militias, which acted completely on their own behest. As a consequence of the August fighting, SDF – the cartel militia most closely affiliated with the government – lost its formal security mandate in mid-September, as Prime Minister created a new security force in Tripoli, comprised mainly of Zintani and Misratan militias. The creation of TPF was thus – most likely – intended to safeguard the cartel militia’s positions in Tripoli from other armed groups that wanted a share of the economic benefits and influence derived from controlling parts of the capital. TPF appeared to have been a superficial umbrella body, and its constituent factions did not develop a joint command structure; instead, each faction likely remained under the control of its respective leader. TPF’s factions did nevertheless coordinate their military activities. The exact number of fighters deployed by TPF was not known, but the figure was likely in the thousands; the group also had access to heavy weapons, such as artillery.
Given its previous affiliation with the GNA, TPF was sometimes described as “pro-government” or “nominally loyal to the government”; the group itself also claimed that it was not opposed to the Government of Libya. However, as already indicated above, TPF acted according to its own agenda and on its own initiative completely outside of the government’s control; as such, the UCDP considered it a separate non-state actor. Furthermore, there was no indication that TPF received any direct support from government forces. It was however likely that TPF received support from various smaller, albeit unnamed, militias in Tripoli, as the group’ constituent factions had forged alliances with a number of actors.
As had been the case with the Tripoli Militia Cartel, TPF was an uneasy alliance with endemic tensions between its constituent factions. For example, fighting and clashes between the cartel militias had been a common occurrence in Tripoli, and this pattern continued also after the creation of TPF. The rivalry within the coalition was most likely caused by mutual distrust, and by “turf wars” for the control over important parts of the capital. As of late 2018, it was highly unclear whether TPF would continue to function as a functioning umbrella, or whether changing militia dynamics would disintegrate the group.
