SUMMARY
Kaniyat (alternatively Kani Brigade, or “7th Brigade Tarhuna”) was an armed group active in Libya. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s security and military institutions suffered an almost complete collapse. Consequently, Libya experienced a rapid proliferation of armed militias and “brigades” – many comprised of fighters who had participated in the 2011 uprising – that sought to establish themselves as local or regional powerbrokers; it was in this context that Kaniyat emerged. The group controlled Tarhuna, a town just southeast of the capital Tripoli. As of 2018, Kaniyat’s primary goal was to strengthen its own strategic and economic position in and around Tripoli.
The exact origins of the group was unclear, but it emerged at some point before mid-2015. It was suggested that the group may have had links to the Libya Dawn coalition, but it was unclear if it was part of it. After its emergence, Kaniyat quickly began to strengthen its position by taking full control over Tarhuna, as well as expanding its influence in Tripoli’s southern suburbs. Kaniyat also supported the Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil in 2017, but it was not clear to what extent it participated in the fighting between this group and the Government of Libya. Kaniyat’s decision to support al-Ghawil was most likely motivated by its own rivalry with militias supporting the Libyan government, particularly the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB); in early 2017, TRB had forced Kaniyat to abandon its positions near the strategically important Tripoli International Airport. By late 2017, Kaniyat had switched its allegiance to the Government of Libya; the motivation behind this move was not known. This link was however severed in early 2018, likely because Kaniyat was displeased by the government’s inability to curb the influence of the so-called “Tripoli Militia Cartel”, a collection of armed groups – including Kaniyat’s rivals TRB - that had taken control over the capital.
Kaniyat was closely linked to the al-Kani family, and its top commanders were Mohamed al-Kani and his brothers. The group’s fighters were primarily drawn from Tarhuna, but it also included members from other militias that had been forced to leave Tripoli by the aforementioned militia cartel. While Kaniyat did not have an overarching ideology, it was known to include a relatively large number of hardline Islamists. Kaniyat was also known for its brutal suppression and even killings of local rivals in its areas of operation.
In 2018, Kaniyat cooperated militarily with Jabhat al-Samud, a militia from the town Misrata. The cooperation between Kaniyat and Jabhat al-Samud appeared to have been an “alliance of convenience”, as both groups were opposed to TPF, a collection if militias controlling most of Tripoli. However, both groups had previous links to each other, as they had been part of the forces that supported Khalifa al-Ghawill in 2017.
In April 2019, Kaniyat aligned itself with warlord Kalifa Haftar and his forces, known in the UCDP data as Forces of the House of Representatives, as Haftar launched a large-scale offensive on Tripoli. Kaniyat was subsequently integrated into Haftar's forces as the 9th Brigade and since 6 April 2019, the group is coded as part of the Forces of the House of Representatives by the UCDP.
Jabhat al-Samud (Steadfastness Front) was an armed group active in Libya. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s security and military institutions suffered an almost complete collapse. Consequently, Libya experienced a rapid proliferation of armed militias and “brigades” – many comprised of fighters who had participated in the 2011 uprising – that sought to establish themselves as local or regional powerbrokers; it was in this context that Jabhat al-Samud emerged. The group was formed following the disintegration of the Libya Dawn coalition - the de facto armed forces of the Government of Libya, at the time called “National salvation Government” (NSG) – in the spring of 2015. Formally established in June 2015, Jabhat al-Samud’s stated objectives were – at least nominally - to maintain security in Libya’s capital Tripoli, and to act as a “custodian” of the 2011 revolution. In essence, Jabhat al-Samud was intended to function as a direct successor to Libya Dawn; it should however be noted that Jabhat al-Samud was far smaller than its predecessor, and its support base was much narrower. The group was also opposed to the “Government of National Accord” (GNA), which took over government power from the NSG in March 2016. Jabhat al-Samud categorically rejected the GNA’s legitimacy, as it supported the previous NSG-led government. In 2018, the group also announced that it would “cleans” Tripoli of corrupt elements, an apparent reference to the GNA-led Government of Libya and militias nominally aligned with it.
Jabhat al-Samud was founded and led by Salah Badi, a veteran militia commander from the town Misrata; in essence, the group served as a vehicle for Badi’s own personal interests and ambitions. Badi was a former officer in Gaddafi’s army who had fought under the umbrella of the NTC rebel organization during the 2011 uprising, before becoming an elected parliamentarian in Libya’s General National Congress (GNC) 2012-2014. After resigning his seat in parliament, Badi eventually became one of the most prominent commanders of the Libya Dawn coalition, which helped putting the National Salvation Government (NSG) in government power following clashes in Tripoli in the summer of 2014. Badi was also a staunch opponent of the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) – signed in Skhirat in December 2015 - that had brought the Government of National Accord (GNA) to government power at the expense of the NSG. Prior to the GNA’s arrival in Tripoli, Badi had organized protests against new Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj, and Jabhat al-Samud attempted to prevent his arrival by force; a large-scale confrontation with pro-GNA militias was only avoided after an intervention by authorities in Badi’s hometown Misrata. Consequently, Badi also served as one of the most prominent commanders of the forces loyal to former NSG Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghawill; in May 2017, he led the pro-Ghawill “Fakhr Libya” (Libya Pride) – a collection of militias, including Jabhat al-Samud – that clashed with government-loyal militias in Tripoli. Following the defeat of al-Ghawill’s forces in 2017, Badi appears to have spent time in Turkey, before eventually returning to Libya at some point in mid-2018.
In 2018, Jabhat al-Samud cooperated militarily with Kaniyat, a militia from the town Tarhuna. The cooperation between Jabhat al-Samud and Kaniyat appeared to have been an “alliance of convenience”, as both groups were opposed to TPF, a collection if militias controlling most of Tripoli. However, both groups had previous links to each other, as they had been part of the forces that supported Khalifa al-Ghawill in 2017. Jabhat al-Samud also had close links to the Salah al-Burki Brigade, another anti-government faction present in Tripoli and its environs. Jabhat al-Samud also enjoyed support from several factions in Misrata, but it was unclear if it received any direct material or fighting support.
