SUMMARY
In 2011, the NTC rebel organization overthrew Libya’s long-time dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and subsequently established itself as the new Government of Libya. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, the new NTC-led government failed to restore order in Libya, which led to a precarious security situation. One of the most pressing issues facing the government was the large number of revolutionary fighters (commonly referred to as “thuwwar”) that had fought for the NTC during the uprising, but now refused to disarm. In many parts of the country, the thuwwar militias established themselves as autonomous local or regional powerbrokers. In a bid to appease the often heavily armed thuwwars and militias, the Libyan government put many of these groups on an official government payroll. In return, a plethora of armed groups agreed to function as de facto security forces; this also contributed to a militarization of Libyan politics, as support from armed militias became a pivotal foundation for political influence. Libya was also ideologically divided, with the main fault line – in simplified terms - being drawn between two camps: an emergent Islamist and “pro-revolutionary” movement (which was supported by a majority of the thuwwar), and the “anti-Islamists”, which included secular liberals, nationalists, and some defectors from the Gaddafi regime. While the two camps were far from coherent movements, they still provided a salient political division of Libya that actively exacerbated existing tribal and factional tensions. Another important – and related - divide was that between the pro-revolutionary thuwwars – who wanted a complete removal of all remnants of the Gaddafi era – and those armed factions and tribes that had previously been favored by Gaddafi, or who had supported the former regime. For example, many thuwwar groups from towns and regions disfavored by Gaddafi sided with the Islamist factions, as the latter sought to completely reform Libya’s old discriminatory political system.
Reflecting this dynamic, one of the most salient and intense rivalries in post-2011 Libya was that between militias from the towns Zintan and Misrata. While both towns had contributed fighters to the NTC during the 2011 uprising, the Zintanis and Misratans became competitors for power and influence, particularly in the capital Tripoli. As fighting subsided in 2011, the Zintanis and Misratans moved quickly to occupy important locations in the city in order to bolster their own politico-military position; for example, the Zintanis captured Tripoli international airport, and the Misratans occupied the port area. Furthermore, during the uprising against Gaddafi, the town of Misrata itself had suffered much destruction and death at the hands of pro-Gaddafi forces. After the uprising, this led to considerable suspicion among many Misratans against the Zintanis, as Zintan had been considered “Gaddafi stronghold” in the years before the Arab Spring. The Misratans were also aggrieved by the practice of some Zintani militias to recruit members from ex-Gaddafi military units. Politically, the Misratans – like many other thuwwar - aligned themselves with the emergent Islamist factions, and they took a pronounced pro-revolutionary stance; many of the thuwwar militias viewed themselves as the “caretakers” of the revolution, even after fighting formally ended. Conversely, the Zintanis chose to align itself with the National Forces Alliance (NFA), a liberal-leaning political organization that was one of the “anti-Islamist” factions.
The implementation of the so-called “Political Isolation Law” (PIL) – which banned anyone who had been affiliated with the Gaddafi regime from holding public office – in May 2013 added further political tension to the Zintan-Misrata relationship. The General National Congress (GNC, Libya’s legislative assembly) had implemented PIL under pressure from Islamist factions, hardline Misratans, and several other thuwwar groups. This effectively excluded several prominent political officials, of which many were associated with non-Islamist factions. The implementation of this law also demonstrated the political leverage held by the thuwwar militias, as hundreds of Islamist and pro-revolutionary armed fighters “besieged” central Tripoli for weeks in order to force the GNC to adopt the PIL. On their part, the Zintanis viewed the PIL’s implementation process as a direct attempt by Misarat to expand its influence in Tripoli.
The political situation in Libya deteriorated further in late 2013 and early 2014, as the Islamist-dominated GNC voted to extend its own term limit without holding parliamentary elections. As a result, Khalifa Haftar – a former Gaddafi-era general who had participated in the 2011 uprising – began agitating against Libya’s Islamists in February, and even demanded the resignation of the government and dissolution of the GNC. On 17 May, Haftar’s LNA militia launched an attack (dubbed Operation Karama/Dignity) against various Islamist groups in the town Benghazi. Inspired by Haftar’s anti-Islamist campaign, militias affiliated with the Zintan Military Council – the al-Qa’qa and Sawa’iq Brigades – stormed the Libyan parliament building on 18 May and demanded the dissolution of the GNC. After this, the GNC agreed to revoke the extension of its term limit, and to convey parliamentary elections on 25 June. The elections – which replaced the GNC with a new “House of Representatives” – had a very low voter turnout, and resulted in the Islamist parties losing most of their seats in the legislative assembly to various non-Islamist factions, particularly the secular-leaning and nationalist ones. Libya’s Islamist parties – such as the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and the Salafist al-Wafa faction – actively attempted to discredit the elections; the JCP in particular wanted to avoid a reversal of the PIL by the new parliament. There was also a concern within the Islamist bloc that the thuwwar militias would be left without state funding, and that they would be forced to demobilize. This also meant a relative loss of power for the Misratans, who were aligned with the Islamists. As a result, tensions between the Zintanis and Misratans in Tripoli increased further.
By July, the security situation in and around Tripoli had become highly volatile, with Zintani and Misratan militias engaging in sporadic clashes. Fearing complete political marginalization, hardline Misratans and Islamic factions formed an armed coalition, which was given the name Libya Dawn. While the largest contingent of Libya Dawn was drawn from Misrata, the coalition also included Tripoli-based militias. On 10 July, Libya Dawn issued an ultimatum to all Zintani forces in Tripoli, demanding their complete withdrawal from the capital. As the militias affiliated to the Zintan Military Council refused to comply, Libya Dawn launched a large-scale attack against Tripoli on 13 July. Making use of artillery and rockets, Libya Dawn forces advanced on the Zintani strongholds at Tripoli international airport and the Camp 7 April military base. The fighting was intense, and more than 40 people were killed during the first week alone. As clashes continued, the newly elected House of Representatives was unable to convene and appoint a new government; most of its deputies were also forced to evacuate Tripoli, and relocate to the eastern Libyan town Tobruk.
While most of the fighting between Libya Dawn and the Zintan Military Council took place in southern Tripoli, clashes also spread to its northern neighborhoods, and to areas south of the city. For example, clashes took place in Gharyān as Libya Dawn tried to stop reinforcements from Zintan. The fighting was heavy in many districts of Tripoli, and claimed hundreds of lives. The fighting also took a heavy civilian toll, particularly as a result of indiscriminate shelling by both sides; for example, 23 Egyptian workers were killed as their home was struck by a Grad rocket in late July. On 23 August, the Zintan Military Council’s militias were forced to withdraw from Tripoli international airport; after this, Libya Dawn declared that the Zintanis had been expelled the city completely. Following its victory in Tripoli, the Libya Dawn coalition facilitated the return of the defunct GNC to government power on 24 August; this new government was called the "National Salvation Government" (NSG), or alternatively the "New GNC". After this date, Libya Dawn came to function as the de facto armed forces of the NSG-led Government of Libya.
Information about the renewed clashes that erupted between the Zintan Military Council and their allied tribal militias and Libya Dawn forces in September can be found on the Government of Libya – Zintan Military Council dyad page.
