SUMMARY
The Zintan Military Council (sometimes referred to as ZMC) was an armed group active in Libya. The group was commonly described as one of the primary “anti-Islamist” actors in Libya, referring to its opposition towards the various Islamist factions and militias that dominated Libyan politics in the years following the 2011 uprising against Muammar Qaddafi. The primary goal of the group was to remove the General National Congress (GNC)-led Government of Libya from power. The Zintan Military Council was also defined by its intense rivalry with Misrata, a town supportive of Libya’s Islamist factions.
The Zintan Military Council was set up during the early stages of the 2011 uprising against Dictator Muammar Qaddafi; its forces then supported the National Transition Council (NTC) in the fight against the Qaddafi regime. The Zintan Military Council was set up as the main coordinating body for roughly 20 militias (some of which were referred to as “brigades”) from the area around Zintan, a town of 50 000 people in western Libya’s Nafusa Mountains; the town was the main stronghold of the Zintan tribe. Muhammad Ali Madani led the Zintan Military Council until he was killed in fighting against Qaddafi’s forces on 1 May 2011. By 2014, Mukhtar Khalifa Shahub was believed to occupy a central position in the group’s leadership structure. However, the overall command of the Zintan Military Council appears to have fallen to Osama al-Juwaili following the death of Madani. Al-Juwaili also briefly served as Libya’s Minister of Defense from November 2011 to September 2012 as part of the NTC-led transitional government. After 2011, al-Juwaili did not function as a battlefield commander; the individual militia leaders, such as Imad al-Tarabulsi and Uthman Mulayqita, filled those functions.
In the immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising, militias from Zintan and Misrata moved quickly to occupy strategic locations in the capital Tripoli. The two towns, which despite having fought on the same side in the 2011 conflict, thus emerged as competing powerbrokers in post-Qaddafi Libya. Aside from the constant turf wars between the Zintanis and Misratans, the rivalry also gained an ideological dimension. Zintan chose to align itself with the National Forces Alliance, a liberal-leaning political organization, while the Misratans chose to side with the emerging Islamist factions. Not only was Zintan able to assert considerable influence over national politics via the presence of Zintani militias in the capital Tripoli, the town itself became a de facto self-governing “city-state”. The group also had comprehensive and effective organizational structures, which made it highly capable of filling informal governance functions in its areas of control. As of 2017, the Zintan Military Council remained one of the most powerful factions in Libya, and was seen as a key factor for the Government of Libya’s ability to assert its influence in the western parts of the country.
The Zintan Military Council mainly operated in western Libya, in an area that roughly corresponded with the historical Tripolitana region. Aside from Zintan itself, the group also exerted considerable influence over the Nafusa and Wershafana areas. Prior to July 2014, the group maintained a strong presence in the capital Tripoli, where it for example controlled the Tripoli International Airport. The Zintan Military Council had access to 3000-5000 fighters, which were considered some of the most militarily capable in Libya. Two of the more notable Zintani militias were the al-Qaqaa (led by Mulayqita) and al-Sawaiq (“Lightning Bolt”, led by al-Tarabulsi) brigades.
The most defining feature of the post-2011 political landscape in Libya was political actors’ reliance on the support of powerful militias and tribal groups to assert any significant power. The Zintan Military Council’s relations to other groups in Libya were highly influenced by these militia politics. For example, the Zintanis vigorously supported the efforts of Khalifa Haftar and his LNA militia to dislodge the GNC-led Government of Libya government from power in 2014. It also supported the House of Representatives in fighting the Government of Libya from October 2014. After 15 October 2014, the Zintan Military Council became part of the Forces of House of Representatives and thus ceased to exist as an independent actor in the UCDP data (for more detailed information on this, please consult the Forces of House of Representatives actor page). This support remained through 2015, even if the Zintani forces significantly reduced their military activities during the year.
In 2016, the Zintan Military Council became increasingly detached from the Forces of House of Representatives. This process was driven by several factors, such as active efforts by al-Juwaili to reconcile Zintan and Misrata, increased willingness to engage in dialogue with the Government of Libya, and the conflictual personal relationship between al-Juwaili and Haftar. The rift became apparent in December 2016, when the Zintan Military Council publicly denounced Haftar’s plans to march on Tripoli. Then, on 4 June 2017, al-Juwaili was appointed by the Government of Libya as commander of the Western Military Region, signaling a definitive split from the Forces of House of Representatives. On 4 June 2017, the Zintan Military Council thus became part of the forces supporting the Government of Libya.
As indicated by the name of the group, the Zintan Military Council was an armed group representing the Zintan tribe; the rank and file members of the group were drawn from within the tribe. The Zintan Military Council also received warring support from militias affiliated to the Wershafana tribe in 2014.
