SUMMARY
Libya Dawn (alternatively Fajr Libya or Operation Libya Dawn) was an armed coalition group active in Libya. The main goal of Libya Dawn, which was mainly comprised of Misratan and Islamist groups, was to counter the “anti-Islamist” operations launched in May 2014 by the Zintan Military Council and its allies in the Libyan National Army (LNA).
The Libya Dawn coalition was created in July 2014 as a response to a “coup” by Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the LNA militia, and his allies in the Zintan Military Council. Haftar had already in February called for the dissolution of the Libyan parliament, albeit without any significant effect. Then, on 17 May, the LNA launched Operation Karama (Dignity) in Benghazi, which was intended as a first step towards removing Libya’s various Islamist factions from power. Parallel to the LNA’s assault on Benghazi, forces subordinated to Haftar’s allies in the Zintan Military Council stormed the Libyan Parliament in Tripoli on 18 May, and again demanded the resignation of the Islamist-dominated “General National Congress” (GNC) government. Following the turmoil in May, Libya’s various Islamist factions and parties suffered a disastrous loss in the parliamentary elections held on 25 June; the new legislative assembly, the House of Representatives, was almost completely dominated by moderate and non-Islamist candidates. Several pro-Islamist and anti-LNA/Zintan militias refused to accept the electoral outcome and jointly launched “Operation Libya Dawn” against Zintani forces stationed in Tripoli in July; “Libya Dawn” soon became the official name of the coalition.
As mentioned, Libya Dawn was comprised of a broad range of factions united by their resistance against LNA and the Zintan Military Council. These factions included forces from the coastal town Misrata, Libya Shield Force (LSF) militias, Tripoli-based Islamist militias affiliated to former Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) commander Abdelhakim Bilhadj, the “Knights of Janzour” armed group, the Tripoli-based Ghaniwa Brigade led by Abd al-Ghani al-Kikli, a Salafi brigade from Zawiya led by Sheikh Shaaban Hadiya, as well as various armed Amazigh and Berber groups.
By far the most militarily capable of the factions comprising Libya Dawn were the Misratan forces, which fielded around 200 militias with a combined force of 25 000-40 000 heavily armed fighters. During the early stages of the 2011 uprising, the Misratans had first been mobilized as the “Misrata Union of 17 February Revolutionaries” (Ittihad Thuwwar 17 Febrayir Misrata) to support the National Transitional Council (NTC). During the uprising, Misratan forces played a key role in the battles for Tripoli and Sirte, and were involved in the killing of Muammar Qaddafi. In the immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising, militias from Zintan and Misrata moved quickly to occupy strategic locations in the capital Tripoli. The two towns, which despite having fought on the same side in the 2011 conflict, thus emerged as competing powerbrokers in post-Qaddafi Libya. Aside from the constant turf wars between the Zintanis and Misratans in Tripoli, the rivalry also gained an ideological dimension. Zintan chose to align itself with the National Forces Alliance, a liberal-leaning political organization, while the Misratans chose to side with the emerging Islamist factions. The Misratans were also aggrieved by the Zintanis’ propensity to recruit former members of Qaddafi’s security forces. One of the most prominent commanders within the coalition was Salah Badi, a former parliamentarian from Misrata.
The second most prominent component of Libya Dawn, the Libya Shield Force (LSF), had originally been created in 2012 by the Government of Libya to curb the proliferation of independent tribal and local armed groups. The LSF included 12 divisions (or “Shields”), officially tasked with providing security in the absence of functioning national armed forces and police. The 12 divisions, each responsible for a defined geographic region, were organized from revolutionary brigades established during the 2011 uprising; the LSF thus allowed the revolutionary militias to remain mobilized as auxiliary forces. However, this meant that many Shield forces, despite being nominally under the government’s command, were used to pursue particularistic agendas of local strongmen; many of the LSF divisions also had intimate connections to Libya’s Islamist movement. While intended to serve as de facto government armed forces, large parts of the LSF thus operated largely independent from any centralized command. In May 2013, components of the LSF even participated in the events that forced the Libyan parliament to pass a political isolation law, which banned former Gaddafi-era officials from holding any public office; this law greatly favored the Libyan Islamist parties. Some of the LSF divisions were comprised of a single militia, such as Libya Shield 7, which was entirely manned by the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade. It is also worth noting that a large share of the Misratan forces mentioned above were organized in the LSF’s “Central Shield” division. While the LSF was intended to be under the authority of the Libyan Chief of Staff, its divisions were in reality independent from any true centralized command structure. At the peak of its influence in 2013 and 2014, the LSF was far more powerful than any regular security forces. However, not all 12 separate “Shields” joined Libya Dawn; notable exceptions were Libya Shield One and the aforementioned Libya Shield 7, both stationed in Benghazi, which instead opted to join Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council on 20 June 2014.
Both Qatar and Turkey allegedly supported Libya Dawn, primarily by providing the group with weapons. However, neither Qatar nor Turkey appeared to have had any significant influence over the actions of the Libya Dawn militias. It was also suggested that Sudan provided support to the Libya Dawn; however, no details regarding this alleged support has been possible to find.
After Libya Dawn expelled forces loyal to the Zintan Military Council from Tripoli, it facilitated the return of the “New GNC”/National Salvation Government (NSG) to government power on 25 August 2014. After this date, Libya Dawn became the de facto armed forces of the NSG-led Government of Libya, and thus ceased to exist as an independent actor in the UCDP data. Even as a faction within the government forces, Libya Dawn ceased to exist during 2015 following internal disagreements between its Misrata- and Tripoli-based militias.
