SUMMARY
APCLS (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain, Alliance of the Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo) was a Mayi Mayi militia active primarily in Masisi territory of Nord Kivu Province in DR Congo (Zaire). The group originated from the PARECO (Coalition des patriotes résistants congolais), an armed alliance that supported the Government of DR Congo in its conflict against CNDP. During the 2008 Goma Peace Process, APCLS split from PARECO after refusing to participate fully in the peace agreement or integrate into FARDC.
APCLS was formed as a local militia resisting refugee returns and as a force in land conflicts with ethnic Hutu and Tutsi communities often referred to locally as “Rwandophones”. APCLS narratives emphasized the defense of “autochthonous” Hunde communities against perceived demographic marginalization and loss of ancestral land in Masisi and Rutshuru territories. The group framed its mobilisation in explicitly autochthonous terms; in a 2010 statement it described itself as defending “indigenous Congolese” populations of Masisi, Rutshuru, and Walikale against what it characterized as attempts to remove them from their ancestral territories. The group was generally well accepted in predominantly Hunde areas and was often perceived locally as an essential self-defense force for the survival of the Hunde community. In later years the group adopted a broader nationalist and anti-Rwandan political discourse. During the 2011 elections, the movement reportedly sought to shape voter registration processes in Masisi and Walikale territories. They established a political branch and reportedly sought political party registration. Although a former ally to the Government of DR Congo in its conflict against M23, they stated their new aim in October 2012 to overthrow the Government of Joseph Kabila.
APCLS was mainly active in Masisi territory, particularly around Lukweti, Kitchanga, Nyabiondo, and neighboring areas of central Nord Kivu Province. The group maintained influence over rural population centers, road networks, and mining areas in parts of Masisi and Walikale territories. Periodically APCLS also operated in coordination with allied armed groups in Rutshuru territory.
APCLS was predominantly composed of ethnic Hunde combatants and maintained strong relations with local Hunde communities in the Lukweti area of Bafuna groupement, Masisi territory. The movement was reportedly supported financially by segments of the Hunde business community in Goma. Membership estimates varied considerably over time. APCLS leader General Janvier Buingo Karairi claimed to command three brigades totaling approximately 4500 combatants, although other estimates placed the group’s strength between 500 and 2500 fighters. UN reporting following internal fragmentation in 2018 estimated Janvier’s faction at approximately 200–250 combatants. Between December 2022 and January 2023, APCLS reportedly recruited around 200 additional combatants as armed groups remobilised in response to the resurgence of M23. The movement operated through decentralized Mayi Mayi-style command structures in which local commanders retained significant autonomy. APCLS fighters were primarily equipped with small arms and light weapons. Unlike several rival armed groups in Masisi territory, APCLS reportedly controlled relatively few major mining sites before 2018. The movement instead relied heavily on local legitimacy, ethnic protection narratives, support networks, and informal taxation systems. APCLS and allied groups imposed taxes on civilian movement, motorcycles, vehicles, timber exploitation, and local trade, particularly around Kitchanga and Mweso.
Initially, APCLS cooperated with the Government of DR Congo against M23. However, in October 2012 the movement broke with the government and declared its intention to oppose the presidency of Joseph Kabila. APCLS subsequently strengthened its anti-Rwandan position and formed alliances with FDLR and Nyatura factions. In 2017, APCLS became an important ally of CMC. From 2020 onwards, APCLS participated in a series of shifting military alliances in Masisi and Rutshuru territories. In early 2021, APCLS joined the “Alpha 60” coalition alongside NDC-R factions and Nyatura groups to resist FARDC operations and rival armed groups. During 2021 and 2022, APCLS also clashed repeatedly with the NDC-R/Bwira faction led by Mapenzi in Masisi territory. APCLS accused Mapenzi and associated commanders of collaborating with M23 and recruiting combatants on behalf of the movement.
In 2018, APCLS fragmented after former deputy commander Mapenzi Bulere Likuwe established APCLS-Rénové following disputes with Janvier Karairi over mining revenues, leadership, and political orientation. The split intensified intra-Hunde tensions in Masisi territory. Mapenzi subsequently allied with NDC-R and reportedly received support or tolerance from elements within FARDC. Reports indicated that combatants from the APCLS Mapenzi–NDC-R coalition committed killings, rape, looting, and attacks against civilians perceived to support Janvier Karairi’s faction. Following military pressure from the APCLS Mapenzi–NDC-R coalition, APCLS Janvier forces retreated northward into predominantly Hutu areas where they strengthened alliances with Nyatura Jean-Marie Nzayi, Nyatura Kavumbi, Nyatura Benjamin, UPDC, and dissident FDC Luanda factions.
APCLS was led by General Janvier Buingo Karairi, a long-standing Mayi Mayi commander involved in multiple conflicts in eastern Congo since the early 1990s. Karairi formed his first militia during the Hunde-Hutu conflict in Kitchanga, Masisi territory, in 1993. He later joined AFDL during the campaign against the Mobutu regime in 1996 and subsequently aligned with Mayi Mayi groups during the Second Congo War beginning in 1998. Following the 2003 peace agreement, Karairi briefly integrated into the national armed forces before deserting, reportedly protesting the influence of RCD and Rwanda within the new Congolese army. According to MONUSCO, the president of the political wing of APCLS was Hangi Augustin.
On 9 May 2022, APCLS effectively ceased to operate as an independent group when it joined the Alliance des résistants de la patrie (ARP), an alliance between armed groups formed in Pinga to fight M23 alongside the Government of DR Congo. Janvier Karairi was the leader of the ARP alliance. Through this integration, APCLS later became part of the VDP alliance established in 2023. Within the VDP structure, Janvier Karairi Boingo reportedly assumed a senior leadership role coordinating intelligence and coalition activities.
The FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) is a Hutu-dominated rebel group based mainly in the eastern parts of the DR Congo (Zaire), which violently opposes the government of Rwanda. In its early years news reporting oftentimes referred to the group as simply ex-FAR and/or Interahamwe. Even though the group over the years has transformed, evolved and recruited new troops, FDLR has continued to be the main group that organises the remaining Rwandan genociders keeping its Hutu extremist ideology.
An embryo of FDLR was formed in early 1999 as the leaders over the ALIR II (Armes Pour la Liberation du Rwanda II, Army for the Liberation of Rwanda II), fighters, fighting alongside the government of the DR Congo in their war, felt a need to reorganise themselves. ALIR II had been integrated into the army of President Kabila to be used in the civil conflict, which pitted Kabila’s forces and allies against a variety of rebel groups and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda. Formally FDLR was formed as a political party on 1 May 2000 in Lubumbashi.
After the direct and operational merger of the large numbers of soldiers controlled by ALIR's two branches the FDLR became a group composed of four different elements: ex-FAR soldiers (former soldiers of the Hutu regime in Rwanda), Interahamwe militiamen, young men recruited in the vast refugee camps of the eastern DR Congo (Zaire) and ethnic Hutu citizens of the DR Congo (Zaire) and Tanzania. The majority of the members of the FDLR were likely post-genocide recruits, but significant portions of the group were individuals that were associated with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
FDLR, rejected the PALIR/ALIR denomination, since the group did not want to be associated with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Instead FDLR placed the limelight on its new political program for a multi-ethnic Rwanda through political dialogue or armed insurgency. The armed wing of FDLR was referred to as FOCA (Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi), and was initially led by General Paul Rwarakabije. The main theater of operations for the FDLR was the eastern DR Congo, mainly the Nord and Sud Kivu regions, but the group has made several forays into mainly western and north-western Rwanda.
FDLR’s most vital supporter has been the Kabila regime of the DR Congo (Zaire), who used the group as an important proxy against Rwanda, which in turn supported those rebel groups in the DR Congo (Zaire) that had been fighting to take government power. The support mainly took the form of the FDLR receiving funding and supplies from Kinshasa. This support was however officially ended when the FDLR was declared unwanted by the government of the DR Congo in 2002, severely weakening the group. Officers in the Nord and Sud Kivu regions have however continued to locally support different FDLR branches. In 2005 the government of the DR Congo also turned against the FDLR, launching armed offensives against the group so as to destroy it and mitigate any Rwandan pretenses for military action inside the DR Congo (Zaire). In 2009 the Rwandan and Congolese governments launched a joint offensive against FDLR, this offensive have been followed by both periods of covert support and periods of open conflict with the Congolese army. FDLR was also supported by different Congolese tribal Mayi Mayi self-defence groups, receiving weapons from them and also at times joining them in operations against common enemies. Alliances between the FDLR and the Mayi Mayi groups have however tended to shift between allegiance and conflict. After June 2012, FDLRs main allies has been different Nyatura factions.
In 1999 the President of FDLR was Col. Aloys Ntiwirigabo, in December 2001 he was replaced by Dr Ignace Murwanashyaka. In November 2009, Murwanashyaka was detained in Germany for war-crimes and later died in April 2019. Gen. Gaston Iyamuremye (aka Gaston Rumuli or Victor Byiringiro) took over the leadership.
The political wing has, as has the military contingent of the FDLR, suffered from factionalism, seeing some members break off into Rastas, FDLR-RUD, FDLR-Soki, FDLR-Mandevu and CNRD. The military wing of FDLR, FOCA, was led by General Paul Rwarakabije until he defected to Rwanda in 2003. General Sylvestre Mudacumura replaced Rwarakabije but he was assassinated in September 2019. Mudacumura was replaced by General Pacifique Ntawunguka alias Omega. Another high-ranking military commander of the FDLR was General Augustin Bizimungu, who had previously been the Commander-in-Chief of the predecessor to FDLR, PALIR. FDLR has been involved in the intrastate, non-state and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
Nyatura Love was a local Hutu militia group that was created in 2016 in the Rutshuru territory of DR Congo by Muhawenimana Bunombe, a.k.a. John Love. The name Nyatura, means “those who hit hard” in Kinyarwanda.
Most Nyatura groups have been created in cooperation with the Rwandan Hutu rebel group FDLR. John Love had undergone military training with the FDLR before getting the blessing of senior FDLR commanders to create his own militia.
Nyatura Love consisted of approximately 100-200 combatants. The group was active a nonstate conflict against the NDC-R and Mayi Mayi Mazembe in northern Bwito chefferie, Rutshuru territory, as part of a temporary coalition with APCLS and FDLR before joining the CMC alliance in February 2017.
