SUMMARY
Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Résistance (CM-FPR or Coordination of Movements and Fronts of Patriotic Resistance) was a loose coalition of mainly Songhai and Peul (also known as Fulani) armed groups from the regions of Gao and Mopti in Mali, established on 21 July 2012. It sought to counter Islamic extremists, drug trafficking and armed groups seeking autonomy from the Malian state in the north. In particular, autonomy demands raised significant concerns about future Touareg domination in the north of Mali for these groups. Within the CM-FPR, groups included the People’s Movement for Protecting Azawad (a splinter group from the MAA), Alliance des communautés de la région de Tombouctou, Front de Libération des régions Nord du Mali, Force armée contre l’occupation, Cercle de réflexion et d’action, Ganda Koy, Ganda Iso and other smaller self-defense militias. Until the intervention of international forces into Mali in 2013, CM-FPR received support from the Malian national army. It is not known how many fighters were in the CM-FPR in total.
CM-FPR joined the Preliminary Algiers Platform, also known as the Platform of Algiers or Platform, on 14 June 2014. This was a wider coalition of groups and movements whose objectives did not include federalism or autonomy from the national state of Mali. It was formed by the Algerian authorities to assist the second round of negotiations between Malian armed groups and the Government of Mali. Other groups in the Platform that the CM-FPR were allied with included the Coalition for the Azawad Peoples (CPA), GATIA and MAA. During the first round of negotiations with the Government of Mali, the Touareg separatist groups CMA and High Council for the Unity of Azawad had not allowed the CM-FPR, as well as the MAA, to join the earlier negotiations.
CM-FPR was led by Harouna Toureh, a lawyer based in Bamako. Despite reporting of Toureh being dropped by the CM-FPR, his position as leader of CM-FPR was affirmed in statements issued on 7 January 2016 by various groups including the Vice-President of CM-FPR, Hama Aba Cissé. Nonetheless, leadership disputes and differences in opinion led to Ibrahima Abba Kantao, the President of Ganda Iso forming the splinter group, CM-FPR II, on 14 January 2014. During negotiations, CM-FPR II switched its support, in opposition to CM-FPR, to autonomy for the northern Azawad region. Despite having little in common with the other groups supporting this objective, CM- FPR II joined the CMA in August 2014 during the second round of negotiations. It is reported that this was likely to be motivated as a way to gain access to negotiations. However, CM-FPR III then splintered from CM-FPR II after clan disputes broke out. Led by Mahamane Alassane Maïga, CM-FPR III rejoined CM-FPR in May 2015.
GATIA (Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés: the Self-defence Group of Imghad Touareg and its Allies) was a pro-government self-defense group that emerged in the wake of the Malian army’s withdrawal from the northern town Kidal, in May 2014.
The central government had been forced from northern Mali with the outbreak of the two state-based conflicts (one over the territory Azawad and one over government power) in 2012 (see Mali: Azawad and Mali: Government). Even though the country’s armed forces had returned to northern Mali with the help of an international intervention force, its hold on the region was tenuous, at best. Furthermore, for a long time it was not allowed back into Kidal, the separatist stronghold of CMA (originally MNLA), only re-gaining access in June 2013. In May the next year, fighting erupted between the armed forces and CMA, forcing the former to withdraw south, towards the Niger River region and to barracks in the north.
With the Malian army’s withdrawal, Kidal and a number of other northern towns were once more under the control of the separatists. The northern population is divided between a number of different ethnic groups, with the Tuareg people making up a majority of the inhabitants, followed by Arabs, Fulani and Songhay. There are deep divisions between these groups (as well as within especially the Tuareg community); they do not share the same culture or traditions and they have different interests and political agendas. These divisions have been exacerbated by the Malian state’s divide-and-rule tactics in the region. One distinct question of contention between these groups concerns the establishment of a separate state in the northern part of Mali. While this is something that especially parts of the Tuareg community have been fighting for, sections of the Arab population and the Fulani and Songhay oppose the idea, fearing that it would mean living under Tuareg domination. As for the Tuareg community, it is also deeply split on the issue. Internal divisions along clan lines have long impeded Tuareg efforts of opposition to Bamako and the south; this was the case during the rebellions in the 1990s and 2007-09 (see Mali: Azawad) and this remained so in the uprising that began in 2012. MNLA was by and large led by certain sub-clans within the Kel Adagh confederation, especially the noble Ifoghas and Idnan, based in the Kidal area. While the group strived for broad-based support among the Tuareg, especially one clan (also within the Kel Adagh confederation) remained in opposition to the new organization: the vassal Imghad, who stayed loyal to the idea of a unified Mali and fought on the side of the Bamako regime.
GATIA was a mainly Imghad armed group that was founded after the events in Kidal, but was not formally announced until August 2014. At its inception it was believed to number around 1000 well-trained fighters. Made up in part by a pre-existing Imghad militia, most analysts agree that the main core consisted of breakaway Imghad and Arab soldiers from the Malian army, led by General El Hajj ag Gamou. Ag Gamou was an in important Imghad, who had been involved in the Tuareg uprising in the 1990s. After the signing of a peace deal, he joined the Malian army, where he rose in the ranks and became Deputy Chief of Staff in 2010. Since he kept his position in the army, his role in the creation of GATIA indicated the close link between the two, even though it was strongly denied by the state. The group’s Secretary General was Fahad Ag Almahoud.
The main aim of GATIA, as outlined by Ag Almahoud, was to protect its communities against CMA. He then went on to say that the members of the group “support the peace process, […] recognize the territorial integrity of Mali and […] are not asking for autonomy. We want to work with the Malian government to bring stability to the country”. It was also clear that the leaders of the group realized that only armed groups were given seats at the negotiation table, wherefore forming one was a necessity to have a say.
Aside from its links with the government, GATIA was also allied with a number of other actors in northern Mali. In 2014, two groupings of armed movements were slowly forming in the context of the ongoing peace negotiations: Bamako-loyalists and those in favor of extensive autonomy or even independence. The former united under the banner Platform, whereas the latter was called CMA. In August, GATIA joined the Platform alliance, and as such came to cooperate closely with its member groups: MAA and CM-FPR. However, despite intermittently fighting together, the groups failed to create a joint military structure, which its opponent CMA did.
GATIA has been active in the non-state category of UCDP organized violence.
MAA (Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad: Arab Movement of Azawad), after 2014 sometimes referred to as MAA-Bamako, MAA-Ahmed or MAA-Loyalist, was an ethnic Arab armed group that emerged in the context of the armed conflict in northern Mali in 2012 (see Mali: Azawad).
The population in the northern part of Mali is divided between a number of different ethnic groups, with the Tuareg people making up a majority of the inhabitants, followed by Arabs, Fulani and Songhay. There are deep divisions between these groups (as well as within especially the Tuareg community); they do not share the same culture or traditions and they have different interests and political agendas. These divisions have been exacerbated by the Malian state’s divide-and-rule tactics in the region. One distinct question of contention between these groups concerns the establishment of a separate state in the northern part of Mali. While this is something that especially parts of the Tuareg community have been fighting for, sections of the Arab population and the Fulani and Songhay oppose the idea, fearing that it would mean living under Tuareg domination.
As the separatist Tuareg rebel group MNLA (later CMA) launched its rebellion in early 2012 and together with Islamist Ansar Dine seized the northern part of the country in a lightning offensive, wealthy businessmen from the Arab community in Tomboutou initiated the formation of MAA. Initially called FNLA (Front national de libération de l'Azawad: National Liberatino Front), the group opposed both MNLA’s separatist agenda, and the hard-line Islamist ideas of Ansar Dine and fellow Islamist groups AQIM and MUJAO. MAA had support among several Arab communities, especially the Berabiche and Kunta sub-groups and it initially declared that its primary objective was to defend the interests of the Arabs of northern Mali. Furthermore, aside from physically protecting its constituency, having an armed group has historically been the way for a community to get a seat at the negotiation table in the Malian context.
The group, which numbered around 500 fighters at its inception and some 2000 in 2016, was led by Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed. He had been an important figure also in the conflict in northern Mali in the 1990s, when he led the Arab rebel group FIAA.
MAA’s relationship with other armed groups in the north shifted over the years. Despite initially opposing CMA’s separatist ambitions, there were early indications of links between the two groups. One reason for this may be that MAA chairman Ould Sidi Mohamed before assuming leadership of MAA had declared allegiance to MNLA (later CMA). Indeed, the two groups eventually formed a bond, but not before experiencing a spate of fighting during the first half of 2013 (see MAA-CMA). Subsequently, in the context of the two armed camps that were slowly forming in the north – Bamako-loyalists and those in favor of extensive autonomy or even independence – MAA initially sided with the latter together with MNLA and a number of other groups. However, the year 2014 saw a split in the movement, caused by the decision of Ould Sidi Mohamed to change his allegiance and side with the pro-Bamako camp. With that MAA became part of what was formalized as “Platform” in June 2014; a number of movements that sought national unity and opposed the idea of an independent northern Mali. In this loose coalition, the group was joined by e.g. CM-FPR and GATIA. With this, a faction of MAA under Sidi Ibrahim Ould Sidatti broke away, and chose to remain in the pro-independence camp. Also this camp evolved into a coalition of like-minded groups in June 2014, called CMA.
MAA has been involved in the non-state category of UCDP organized violence.
