SUMMARY
The non-state conflict between CMA and GATIA is closely tied to many other conflicts in Mali, especially the CMA - CM-FPR, GATIA, MAA conflict and the conflict between the Malian state and CMA, where the former was fighting to create a separate state in northern Mali, called Azawad. In a sense, they are all the same conflict, played out in different constellations, in different time-periods.
The struggle for an independent Azawad dates far back and has generally been depicted as a vision of the Tuareg population of northern Mali. However, the situation is far more complex than that. Aside from the fact that there are ethnic groups in northern Mali that are vehemently opposed to the idea, there are also tensions within the Tuareg populations. Tuareg society has traditionally been hierarchical, with nobility and vassals. There is a history of tension and competition between the different sub-clans, coming to a head with the question of an independent Azawad. CMA is mainly made up of the Ifoghas sub-group, which is the Tuareg nobles who have rules over other Malian Tuaregs since the colonial era. Thus, many of the other sub-groups view the independence-project with skepticism. The Imghad sub-group, who make up the bulk of GATIA, is traditionally a vassal group and have been known to be especially opposed to the idea of an independent north, fearing that it would simply mean continued subjugated to the Ifoghas clan.
The separatist Tuareg MNLA (later CMA) launched its armed struggle against the Malian state in 2012. It quickly seized large swaths of territory, forcing the Malian army to retreat, whereby the other ethnic groups in the region acted quickly: a number of new groups were created, and already established militias were re-mobilized. With the Malian army absent from large parts of the north over the following years, non-state fighting between Mali-loyalists and separatists became a common phenomenon. Over time, this situation became gradually more complex with the emergence of an increasing number of armed actors, all jockeying for positions.
Attempting to get a negotiation process off the ground, Algeria worked to bring together the many disparate groups under one unified front during the first months of 2014. Divisions were too deep, however – both between Tuarge groups and other ethnic groups, and within the Tuareg community – and the attempt failed. By June the various groupings had clustered into two main camps – one pro-independence and one seeking national unity. The former, which included MNLA, MAA-Ould Sidatti, CPA and CM-FPR II, took the name CMA, whereas the latter, comprising MAA, CM-FPR and later GATIA, was called Platform. The groups in CMA integrated its military forces into one command structure, while the Platform groups continued to act independently, albeit oftentimes fighting together.
During the process leading up to the launching of talks, as well as during the entire negotiation process, there was intermittent fighting between the two camps, as they scrambled for positions of strength. Since the government remained largely absent from the north, the two camps also continued to compete for control of territory and the main trafficking routes. In this time period, most of the fighting took place in the CMA - CM-FPR, GATIA, MAA constellation.
Despite the continued violence, a peace agreement was signed in May 2015. However, while signatories included the government and the Platform groups, only a small portion of CMA agreed to it, prompting continued negotiations. A little over a month later, on 29 June 2015, the remaining parts of CMA signed the accord, which granted the northern region some autonomy, but made clear that the territorial unity of the country was to persist. Furthermore, the agreement provided for the integration of the rebels into the security forces in the north and for improved representation of the region in state institutions.
It was in the stalling implementation process that the violence became dominated by fighting between CMA – GATIA, as the two groups competed for territorial control. In July 2016, Kidal town – the capital of Kidal region – became the flashpoint of the conflict. With both groups nursing ambitions to control Kidal, tensions were on the rise. On 17 July, a meeting was held in Niger capital Niamey, and CMA and GATIA signed a declaration outlining a framework for power-sharing in the town. Despite this, heavy fighting erupted in Kidal two days later, resulting in GATIA being pushed out of the town. August saw yet another bout of fighting in the area and while the level of violence decreased after this, tensions remained high as both CMA and GATIA reinforced their positions in the region.
In parallel, during the fall both groups promised to join the new joint patrols stipulated in the peace agreement, called Mécanisme opérationnel conjoint (MOC). Subsequently, by early January 2017, contingents from CMA and GATIA were assembled and waiting to take part in MOC’s in Gao town. However, before this could get off the ground, the camp where they were housed was struck by a suicide attack that killed 77 people. The attack was claimed by AQIM, who is fighting in a parallel conflict with the Malian government. Hopes of unity in the face of this attack were quickly dashed, and fresh clashes soon erupted between CMA and GATIA.
July 2017 saw a string of set-backs for GATIA. In a matter of weeks, the latter was forced from many of its bases, and by the end of the month, they were completely dislodged from the Kidal region, retreating to Gao. CMA subsequently pushed further south and on 29 July entered the town of Menaka without a fight. GATIA, for its part, retreated yet again. In August, the two groups agreed to a truce and in a strong symbolic development, Kidal’s mayor was allowed back to the town for the first time since May 2014. The following month, a proper ceasefire agreement was signed in Bamako, stipulating for the creation of a special commission of senior CMA and GATIA coordinators, charged with avoiding a resumption of fighting. Under the agreement, GATIA fighters were also to be allowed back into Takalotte, from which they were pushed in July after a big battle, and which had been one of the group’s most important bases. On 10 October, CMA and GATIA signed a new local agreement called Anefis Two, aimed at setting up local security arrangements to keep peace in Kidal region.
The non-state conflict between CMA (Formerly MNLA) and GATIA is first included in UCDP data in 2016. In July of that year, clashes between the two groups had resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.
