SUMMARY
The non-state conflict between CMA (formerly MNLA) on the one hand and CM-FPR, GATIA and MAA on the other, was played out in the context of the scrambling for positions of strength in the lead-up to and initiation of negotiations in Algeria. This, in turn, was part of a process that had started in 2012, when CMA (originally MNLA) launched a separatist armed struggle aiming to create a separate state in northern Mali, called Azawad. The mainly Tuareg CMA did not represent the entirety of the northern population, however. On the contrary, many northern communities were vehemently opposed to the idea of a separate Azawad. The population in the northern part of Mali is divided between a number of different ethnic groups, with the Tuareg people making up a majority of the inhabitants, followed by Arabs, Fulani and Songhay. There are deep divisions between these groups (as well as within especially the Tuareg community); they do not share the same culture or traditions and they have different interests and political agendas. These divisions have been exacerbated by the Malian state’s divide-and-rule tactics in the region.
While a separate state is something that especially parts of the Tuareg community have been fighting for, sections of the Arab population and the Fulani and Songhay oppose the idea, fearing that it would mean living under Tuareg domination. When the separatist Tuareg MNLA (later CMA) quickly seized large swaths of territory, forcing the Malian army to retreat, the other ethnic groups in the region acted quickly: a number of new groups were created, and already established militias were mobilized. With the Malian army absent from large parts of the north over the following years, non-state fighting between Mali-loyalists and separatists became a common phenomenon. Over time, this situation became gradually more complex with the emergence of an increasing number of armed actors, all jockeying for positions.
Attempting to get a negotiation process off the ground, Algeria worked to bring together the many disparate groups under one unified front during the first months of 2014. Divisions were too deep, however – both between Tuarge groups and other ethnic groups, and within the Tuareg community – and the attempt failed. By June the various groupings had clustered into two main camps – one pro-independence and one seeking national unity. The former, which included MNLA, MAA-Ould Sidatti, CPA, and CM-FPR II, took the name CMA, whereas the latter, comprising MAA, CM-FPR and later GATIA, was called Platform. The groups in CMA integrated its military forces into one command structure, while the Platform groups continued to act independently, albeit oftentimes fighting together.
It was in this context that fighting between CMA on the one hand and CM-FPR, GATIA, and MAA on the other erupted. Attempting to strengthen their positions before the negotiations were launched in mid-July, the two camps clashed in Tabankort and Anefis areas. After these initial clashes, fighting continued intermittently. Since the government remained largely absent from the north, the two camps continued to compete for control of territory and the main trafficking routes. Despite the continued violence, a peace agreement was signed in May. However, while signatories included the government and the Platform groups, only a small portion of CMA agreed to it, prompting continued negotiations. A little over a month later, on 29 June 2015, the remaining parts of CMAsigned the accord, which grants the northern region some autonomy, but makes clear that the territorial unity of the country will persist. Furthermore, the agreement provides for the integration of the rebels into the security forces in the north and for improved representation of the region in state institutions.
The non-state conflict between CMA (formerly MNLA) on the one hand and CM-FPR, GATIA, and MAA on the other is first included in UCDP data in 2014. In July of that year, fierce fighting in the Anefis and Tabankort areas caused more than 25 battle-related deaths.
