SUMMARY
The Forces of the House of Representatives (alternatively called the “Tobruk-based” or “eastern-based” government, or by the name of its major militia, the Libyan National Army/LNA) was an armed Libyan organization formed in 2014. In UCDP data, the “Forces of the House of Representatives” was used to label all forces fighting for the House of Representatives; the name was thus not a formal one used by the group itself. Originally created as Libya’s legislative assembly after the general elections held in June 2014, the House of Representatives and its government was intended to replace the “General National Congress” (GNC, a transitional legislative body) in government power at the time. However, following pressure from armed Islamist factions (including Libya Dawn) and former GNC officials, the House of Representatives was forced out of Tripoli in August 2014 (for more detailed information on this, please consult the Government of Libya actor page). Following its departure from Tripoli, the House of Representatives procured the support of armed groups and militias already engaged in fighting the various factions supporting the Islamist-dominated National Salvation Government (NSG, sometimes called the “New GNC”). The goal of the House of Representatives was to overthrow the Government of Libya, and thus reestablish its control over government power. However, reflecting the highly fragmented political landscape in Libya during the 2010s, the group was also involved in several non-state conflicts closely linked to the state-based violence in the country.
From August 2014, the House of Representatives was one of two rival parliaments (the other being the NSG-affiliated parliament in Tripoli) claiming to be the supreme legitimate political authority in Libya; at this point, it was a strictly political actor without any armed forces. The Forces of the House of Representatives was, however “created” on 15 October 2014, when the House of Representatives officially aligned itself with the Libyan National Army (LNA) militia, led by General Khalifa Haftar, and the LNA’s allied forces in the Zintan Military Council. Both these armed groups were staunchly opposed to the Islamists controlling the Government of Libya, and thus offered their support to the House of Representatives after it was forced from Tripoli. At the time, the LNA was fighting against an Islamist alliance in Benghazi, and the Zintanis were fighting against the NSG-led Government of Libya. However, the House of Representatives had initially refused to align itself with any armed groups, and instead urged all militias to disarm; it was also skeptical against Haftar as an individual, as he had a reputation of being a “renegade”. Nevertheless, the House of Representatives eventually endorsed General Haftar, and after 15 October, the LNA and its allied Zintan Military Council forces became its de facto “army”.
Until the spring of 2016, the House of Representatives was Libya’s internationally recognized government (see Government of Libya for more information). However, as UCDP definitions stipulate that the party in control of a state’s capital be considered the government actor, the House of Representatives was treated as a non-state (rebel) group, as it was placed in the eastern town Tobruk rather than Tripoli. The President (or chairman) of the House of Representatives was Aguila Saleh Issa, a position he acquired in 2014. The House of Representatives also maintained its own government, based in the town Bayda, which as of 2017 was led by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani. Since March 2015, Khalifa Haftar was the official top military commander of the Forces of the House of Representatives. As the House of Representative’s conflicts against the government and against various other non-state groups progressed, Haftar’s position was strengthened. While he did not hold a formal political office, Haftar gradually emerged as one of the most central powerbrokers in eastern Libya, and he was ostensibly able to assert considerable influence over the House of Representatives. In fact, Haftar’s LNA was so influential that it over time became virtually synonymous with the House of Representatives. It was suggested that Haftar’s long-term goal was to establish himself as the leader of a unified Libya, either by winning a prospective future election or by military force. Another important military commander was Wanis Bukhamada, the leader of LNA’s elite “Saiqa Brigade”, a former regular military unit from Benghazi.
The House of Representatives did not exhibit a unitary ideology, other than being opposed to the “revolutionary” Islamist agenda of the NSG-led Government of Libya; the House of Representative’s support-base was thus comprised of a plethora of different groups and factions, many of which were “anti-Islamist”. It also drew support from factions and ex-officials that had been affiliated with the Gaddafi regime, and (counterintuitively) from various Islamist factions, primarily in the form of minor militia groups subordinated to the LNA. Even after the dissolution of the NSG government in 2016, the House of Representatives (especially Haftar and the LNA) maintained its anti-Islamist orientation. It should also be noted that during this period, the support for major political actors in Libya was to a significant extent determined by preexisting intergroup and inter-tribal relations, which could in part explain the lack of coherent ideological direction. For example, the decision of the Zintan Military Council to support the House of Representatives was in large part explained by the rivalry between the towns Zintan and Misrata. The two towns were competing for influence, and as the Misratans had sided with Libya’s Islamist factions, the Zintanis sided with the “anti-Islamist” groups, including the LNA and the House of Representatives.
In December 2015, the House of Representatives and the NSG-led Government of Libya signed the Libyan Political Agreement (sometimes called the “Skhirat Agreement”), which attempted to reconcile the two rival governments. The primary results of this agreement were a set of power-sharing measures, which included that the House of Representatives was recognized as the legitimate legislature in Libya, and that the NSG would eventually be replaced with a “Government of National Accord” (GNA); the GNA was to be formed by a new executive body, the “Presidency Council”. The House of Representatives would however have to approve the suggested members of the GNA (see Government of Libya for more detailed information). However, the Libyan Political Agreement proved insufficient to reconcile Tripoli and Tobruk/Bayda, as many key actors on both sides refused to accept any compromises. One actor particularly opposed to the agreement was Khalifa Haftar, who in late 2017 declared the agreement defunct. The agreement was nevertheless ratified, mainly because of intense international pressure. Several external stakeholders, such as Western countries and the United Nations, were deeply invested in reconciling Tripoli and Tobruk, so that more effort could be directed towards curbing the growth of IS in Libya. The House of Representatives also refused to ratify the suggestions for the GNA presented by the Presidency Council, and continued to maintain its own rival government led by al-Thani. Following the signing of the agreement, the House of Representatives also lost its status as an internationally recognized government. Given their investment in producing the agreement, the Western countries and the UN chose to recognize the new Presidency Council and the GNA as the legitimate Government of Libya.
The main stronghold of the Forces of the House of Representatives was found in eastern Libya. The House of Representatives itself was based in Tobruk, not far from the Egyptian border, while al-Thani’s government presided in Bayda; Haftar’s LNA headquarters were located in Marj. By the end of 2017, the LNA had captured most of Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city. In general, the House of Representatives concentrated much of its military activities in Libya’s coastal regions, where most larger towns and vital oil infrastructure is located. In 2017, the LNA conducted operations in Libya’s strategic “Oil Crescent”, and expanded its operation in the central Jufrah and Sabha districts. By the end of 2017, the House of Representative controlled or maintained presence in about two thirds of Libya, in areas roughly comprising the historical Cyrenaica (east) and Fezzan (southwest desert) regions. It is however worth noting that as of 2017, the House of Representatives did not maintain any permanent governance or military structures in Fezzan, which was dominated by various local groups and tribes.
During the 2010s, major political actors in Libya, including the House of Representatives, were highly reliant on their ability to draw support from powerful militia groups in order to solidify their political relevance. For the House of Representatives, the by far most important armed support group was the LNA, which served as the coordinating body for a vast majority of its armed forces. In the UCDP data, all militias and “brigades” fighting alongside the Tobruk government’s forces, usually at least nominally under the LNA’s command, were included in the Forces of the House of Representatives. This included many smaller militias and various tribal forces; for example, the House of Representatives has maintained close ties to elements from the Toubou tribe, which at times functioned as a form of “proxy” fighting force in Libya’s southern desert regions. During fighting against the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, the LNA also deployed relatively small “neighborhood militias” known as the “Sahawat”, and the Katibat Awliya’ al-Dam (“Avengers of Blood”) militia comprised of family members of those killed previously during fighting in Benghazi. Furthermore, and despite its anti-Islamist orientation, the LNA also deployed various Salafi militias, which were opposed to the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. In early 2018, Haftar claimed that he commanded 75 000 troops; however, this number was likely exaggerated.
The militia politics of Libya were highly fluent with constantly changing loyalties. One actor that exemplified this particularly well was the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), a powerful militia led by Ibrahim Jathran, which first fought for the House of Representatives and then the Government of Libya. Furthermore, the Zintan Military Council, which had been a pronounced supporter of the House of Representatives, making up an important constituent part of its military wing, gradually withdrew its support. The Zintani forces had never been integrated to the same extent as the LNA, and in 2016 there was a growing rift between the two groups; for example, the Zintanis in December 2016 publicly denounced Haftar’s plans to march on Tripoli. In March 2017, the Zintan Military Council also accused Haftar of violating the “spirit” of the revolution against Gaddafi. On 4 June 2017, the Zintan Military Council definitively switched its allegiance to the GNA-led Government of Libya; after this date, the leader of the Council, Osama al-Juwaili, became the commander of the government’s Western Military Region. This switch was also enabled by a de-escalation of the tensions between Zintan and Misrata mentioned above.
The two most important external backers of the Forces of the House of Representatives were Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Egypt provided a significant amount of weapons to the group, and was seen as its primary foreign patron. While Egypt refrained from providing any direct secondary warring support, the Egyptian Air Force conducted airstrikes against the town Derna. These strikes were conducted in order to prevent attacks from Islamist groups on Egyptian territory, but Egypt newer formally acknowledged that the strikes were made in conjunction with the House of Representatives fighting against the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council. It was suggested that the Egyptian support to the House of Representatives in general, and Khalifa Haftar in particular, was motivated by the shared goal of preventing the spread of political Islam. The United Arab Emirates also supplied weapons and funding to the House of Representatives. The United Arab Emirates may also have provided pilots to operate LNA aircraft; however, this could not be confirmed. Russia has also provided some support to particularly the LNA, such as funding and by meeting with Haftar to bolster his domestic legitimacy. Nevertheless, Russia refrained from directly providing weapons to the LNA, and instead chose to sell weapons to Egypt, which then transferred them to Libya.
