SUMMARY
This conflict began on 15 October 2014 as a direct continuation of fighting that had broken out on 17 May 2014, when General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) militia launched “Operation Karma/Dignity” to capture the eastern town Benghazi from several Islamist factions controlling the town. The fighting in Benghazi was a result of the political chaos and increasingly deteriorating security situation that had emerged in Libya following the ousting of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. In essence, the Benghazi conflict reflected a countrywide struggle for political and military influence between an ever-increasing number of local and regional militias and factions. Adding an ideological dimension to the tensions, most factions belonged to one of two major camps: an emergent Islamist movement, and the “anti-Islamists”. While the two camps were not coherent movements, they still provided a salient political division of Libya that actively exacerbated existing tensions. Haftar’s initial offensive on 17 May 2014 had been part of a campaign he had launched to purge Libya of “terrorists” and Islamist influence. For a more detailed description of the background to the fighting in Benghazi, as well as more details regarding the conflict events from 17 May to 19 June 2014, please consult the ASL – LNA and February 17 Martyrs Brigade, Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade – LNA conflict pages. For more information regarding events in Benghazi between 20 June and 14 October, see Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council – LNA.
On 15 October 2014, House of Representatives forces – comprised of the LNA militia - led by General Haftar launched an offensive to break out of its base at Benghazi’s Benina airport, which was besieged by the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. Haftar’s forces had been cornered at Benina during fierce fighting in September and October, and the Shura Council commanders had announced that victory in Benghazi was imminent. However, the 15 October offensive rapidly pushed back the Shura Council fighters, not in small part because Haftar’s fighters received reinforcements from former Gaddafi-era military units (in particular the 204th Tank Battalion) in Benghazi that had previously stayed neutral; these regular military units did not recognize the authority of the government in Tripoli. Within a week, the House of Representatives forces captured a large base belonging to the Shura Council. Over the course of October and November, fierce street battles raged in Benghazi. The House of Representatives forces drove back the Shura Council, successfully capturing several neighborhoods and strategic locations. As their forces were pushed back, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council began to rely more on suicide attacks to disrupt the advance of Haftar’s forces. The House of Representatives’ offensive did not stall until it attempted to capture the Port of Benghazi, which was heavily defended.
In early 2015, the Islamic State (IS) also began launching attacks against Haftar’s forces in Benghazi (for more information about this, see Forces of the House of Representatives – IS). This meant that it became harder for the UCDP to attribute specific conflict events in the town to a particular dyad, as it was not always made clear what group the House of Representatives forces were engaged in fighting. Consequently, fatality numbers provided by UCDP for Benghazi were – particularly during 2016 – lower than most other estimates. However, the arrival of IS in Benghazi did not alter the conflict dynamics in any significant way. The fighting between House of Representatives forces and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council was characterized by fierce clashes in Islamist-controlled neighborhoods, in combination with airstrikes and intense shelling.
Gradually, House of Representatives forces moved in and captured the Shura Council neighborhoods one by one during 2015 and 2016. Despite grinding to a halt several times, the House of Representatives forces’ offensive was able to confine the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council to a small area of the town by the end of 2016. In a parallel development, IS was forced to retreat from Benghazi in January 2017. In 2017, Haftar’s fighters began the final push to capture the remaining neighborhoods held by the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. During the year, battles took place in, for example, the al-Sabri, Souk al-Houk, and “12 Blocks” neighborhoods; on 28 December, House of Representatives forces captured the Sidi Akribesh district, which had been the last part of Benghazi held by the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. After this, it was believed that most remaining Shura Council fighters left Benghazi; it did however remain uncertain whether the group continued to exist, or if it was disbanded entirely.
The non-state conflict between Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and Forces of the House of Representatives is first included in UCDP data in 2014. In mid-October of that year, clashes between the two groups had resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.
