SUMMARY

In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising against long-time Dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan state suffered severe fragmentation as weak central authorities failed to contain the power and influence of local and regional militias. One region of particular importance to Libya’s post-Gaddafi authorities was the so-called “Oil Crescent”, an area in eastern Libya containing a large share of the country’s lucrative oil infrastructure. In an attempt by the Libyan government to secure this region, a local militia commander called Ibrahim Jadhran – who had fought under the NTC against Gaddafi – was made commander of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), an armed unit charged with protecting the oil infrastructure, in 2012. However, Jadhran – a native of the eastern town Ajdabiya – utilized his control over the Oil Crescent to drastically expand his own power, which he then utilized to press demands against the Libyan government for greater autonomy in “Cyrenaica”, a historical region comprising the eastern half of Libya. In 2013, Jadhran’s PFG was acting outside the Libyan government’s control, and even attempted to sell oil at its own behest. By controlling important oil ports like As Sidrah and Ras Lanuf, Jadhran established himself as one of the most important powerbrokers in eastern Libya. As the Libyan conflict over government was reactivated in 2014, Jadhran sided with the eastern-based House of Representatives against the Government of Libya in Tripoli. However, Jadhran fell out with the House of Representatives in late 2015, and his PFG lost control over the Oil Crescent in 2016; Jadhran himself was eventually forced into exile, presumably in Algeria. Even after the House of Representatives took control over the oil ports, the area remained contested; for example, SDB tried to capture the region in both 2016 and 2017.

In mid-June 2018, Jadhran reemerged in the Oil Crescent as the head of a motley coalition intended to recapture several oil ports from the House of Representatives. Jadhran’s forces were comprised of ex-PFG members, fighters from Jadhran’s Magharba tribe, and ex-SDB fighters. However, the exact nature of SDB’s involvement in the 2018 attack on the Oil Crescent was contested, since the group allegedly dissolved itself already in late 2017. Sources within the House of Representatives – the primary rival of SDB – claimed that the group played a pivotal role in the events, while several other, less partisan sources pointed towards Jadhran only being supported by extant remnants of SDB. There were also allegations that Jadhran’s forces included a large contingent of “Chadian mercenaries”, a term commonly used to denote Toubou fighters from southern Libya and northern Chad.

On 14 June 2018, Jadhran’s forces attacked House of Representatives’ positions near As Sidrah and Ras Lanuf, successfully capturing at least parts of the oil installations around the two towns. The fighting was intense, causing dozens of fatalities on both sides. Some sources claimed that Jadhran’s attack on the Oil Crescent may have been launched at this time because a large share of the House of Representatives’ forces were already engaged in an ongoing offensive in Derna, which would have made it less capable of defending the Oil Crescent. In response to Jadhran’s attack, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure in the area, and most of the oil production was halted. Following the successful attack, a triumphant Jadhran appeared in a video clip, where he denounced the Libyan National Army (LNA) – the largest militia fighting for the House of Representatives – as a “terrorist organization”. Jadhran also claimed that the oil installations would not be occupied by his forces, and that the NOC would be granted access to them; the truthfulness of this claim was highly contested. Furthermore, Jadhran claimed that he was loyal to the Precedency Council, the executive body of the Government of Libya in Tripoli; Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj – the head of the Tripoli government – for his part vehemently rejected Jadhran’s actions as illegitimate, denying any links to the attack.

Jadhran’s occupation of As Sidrah and Ras Lanuf was however short-lived, as the House of Representatives, mounted a large counter-offensive within a week of the initial attack. Forces from the LNA militia quickly overran Jadhran’s positions, driving his forces from the oil installations as well as from the town Ras Lanuf itself. The human losses resulting from this attack were significant, and scores of fighters on both sides were killed. Jadhran’s forces were forced to retreat, most likely into Libya’s central desert, and forces loyal to the House of Representatives reestablished full control over the Oil Crescent. However, the fighting damaged parts of the oil installations, including a storage facility, which reduced the oil export capacity in the region. In the aftermath of the fighting, both the United Nations and the United States bestowed sanctions on Jadhran as punishment for undermining the security situation in Libya.

The non-state conflict between the Forces of Ibrahim Jadhran and the Forces of the House of Representatives is first included in UCDP data in 2018. In June of that year, clashes between the two groups had resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.