This dyad belongs to the conflict Ethiopia: Oromiya
Summary of conflict Ethiopia: Oromiya
Oromiya is the largest Ethiopian state and the Oromo ethnic group makes up around half of the 55 million Ethiopian inhabitants. Marginalized in the economic- and political life of the country, the Oromo rebel group OLF launched an armed struggle for independence in 1973. The conflict has been ongoing since then, initially pitting the rebels against the Dergue military regime, then from 1992 until 2018 against the TPLF-dominated EPRDF-led government, and from 2018-19 onwards against Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party. Being Oromo, and initially pro-political reform, Abiy Ahmed’s ascent to power temporarily cast the Oromo question in a different light. He de-criminalized OLF and a peace process was initiated whereby the rebel group gave up its armed struggle and transformed into a political party. However, the process was fraught with problems and in April 2019, OLF’s armed wing, OLA, declared that it had “detached itself” from the former, and that the failure of the government to implement the peace agreement forced it to continue the armed struggle.
After a 2024 characterized by major upheavals within OLA, with a large faction breaking away and signing a peace deal with the government, 2025 was a less tumultuous year in the conflict. Fighting appears to have de-escalated slightly, but it is problematic to talk about definite trends in the levels of violence, given the difficult information situation in the country. Many parts of Oromiya remained embroiled in conflict, and some analysts noted that aside from clashes between OLA and security forces, the former also began carrying out assassinations. Another noteworthy development during the year was an uptick in trans-regional attacks by OLA, from western Oromiya into neighboring Benishangul-Gumuz region, as part of a broader strategy to expand operational depth along the western frontier and to exploit weak state control in this area.
Background to the conflict
Oromiya is the largest Ethiopian state and the Oromo ethnic group makes up around half of the 55 million Ethiopian inhabitants. The region is bordered by the Somali- and the Afar regions, as well as by Djibouti, in the east, by Sudan in the west, by Somalia and Kenya in the south and by the Amhara region in the north. It is, both ecologically and agriculturally, the richest part of the country with agriculture making up the backbone of the economy.
What today constitutes the Oromiya region came under Ethiopian control in the last decade of the 19th century. The Oromo people have, since then, had little influence and representation within the country, in proportion to their size. This, together with numerous unpopular government policies, for example banning the Oromo language, has led to a widespread discontent within the Oromo group.
The Oromo Liberation Front
In the 1960s and early 1970s, suppression of Oromo cultural, social, and political movements together with the hanging and imprisonment of some of the leaders of these movements, forced politically conscious Omoros to either flee the country or engage in politics clandestinely. Many of the ones who fled received military training abroad and subsequently returned in the early 1970s to fight for a free Oromiya.
Parallel to this, secret Oromo study circles developed into political groups and began to produce and distribute pamphlets calling for revolution and decolonization. These two processes merged in late 1973, when a secret conference was held in Addis Ababa. Out of this congress, the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) was formed in January 1974. The conference also produced the new movements first political program, which clearly stated the main objective of OLF to be "the realisation of national self-determination for the Oromo people and their liberation from oppression and exploitation in all forms". Only three months later, in April 1974, OLF initiated the armed struggle.
Over the years, OLF has experienced internal splits and tensions between its intellectual, radical, and often Christian wing and its more traditional Muslim and animist supporters. These two major groupings are also geographically separated, with the former being based and active mainly in western Oromiya, whereas the latter can be found in the east and south. However, in spite of this, the movement has managed to survive and remain intact during the course of the conflict.
Conflict against the Dergue
When OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) launched its armed struggle in 1974 the country was in upheaval. There was widespread discontent with the ruling Emperor, Haile Selassie and in September 1974 he was ousted in a military coup. The emperor was seceded by a military government, the Dergue. The new government failed to gain widespread popular support in the country and faced no less than six different armed conflicts through the 1970s and 1980s, four fought in regions striving to gain independence (one of which was Oromiya, the conflict in focus here), one over governmental power and one against neighboring Somalia. This situation made for many opportunities for cooperation between the various rebel groups active around the country. In the OLF case, it cooperated militarily with both TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front), fighting to overthrow and replace the Dergue, and EPLF (Eritrea Peoples Liberation Front), fighting for an independent Eritrea.
Apart from the national context, also the regional context provided opportunities for the rebel group. Relations between Ethiopia and neighboring Sudan were tense during the Dergue-period and the two countries attempted to destabilize each other by supporting rebel groups opposing the neighboring state’s regime. Thus, while Ethiopia funneled Soviet weapons and Libyan money to Sudanese rebel group SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army) and allowed them to have bases on Ethiopian territory, the Khartoum government let OLF train its soldiers in south-western Sudan.
To contain the rebel group and isolate it from the people, the Dergue regime in the 1970s initiated policies of resettlement, villagization, and collectivization. By doing this, it succeeded in limiting OLFs influence, and the organization experienced a difficult first decade. Subsequently, in the early years of the conflict, OLF had little strength and its operation zone was limited to eastern Oromiya. By the mid-1980s, however, the Dergue's policies had started to backfire, as the Oromo population largely viewed them unfavorably. OLF was able to rally an increasing following and spread its operations to western Oromiya. In spite of this, the rebel movement did not pose a serious threat to the regime, as the government army was superior in both organization and equipment. Due to the lack of outside support during most of the conflict, OLF has had to build up its military resources through a series of surprise attacks on the government forces and the subsequent capture of their weapons and other material, a strategy which has had limited success. Thus, when the Dergue became increasingly pressured and weakened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was not due to setbacks in the conflict fought against OLF, but in the conflicts against EPLF and EPRDF (see the conflict descriptions for the territorial conflict over Eritrea and the one fought over government power).
In May 1991 EPRDF forces seized the capital, Addis Ababa, and the Dergue was defeated. OLF subsequently took part in a number of conferences on the future of the country. In the July Conference on 1-5 July in Addis Ababa, 24 groups and parties met and formed a multinational council or parliament in which OLF received 12 seats out of 87. The movement remained in this transitional council until prior to the elections the following year.
Conflict against the EPRDF government
The transitional council ruling Ethiopia after the fall of the Dergue regime was dominated by the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front) umbrella group, in which TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front) was the dominant force. Despite having cooperated occasionally during the 1980s, there were great rivalries between OLF and TPLF, and in the run-up to the June 1992 elections, these animosities led OLF to leave the government. Fierce fighting subsequently erupted, as OLF forces left their camps. EPRDF proved to be the superior military force and OLF suffered huge losses, forcing many to flee to Kenya.
Through the following years, the fighting continued intermittently. In late 1994 a new constitution was ratified, creating a controversial structure of ethnically based federalism. However, in practice, it provided little real power for the nine regional states, and OLF repeatedly stated that the changes are merely cosmetic and that the Oromo regional state is still dominated by northerners at the expense of the Oromo people.
After some years of very low conflict activity, the conflict between the EPRDF government and OLF escalated in 1999. Taking advantage of the fact that the country's armed forces were at the time engaged in a bloody interstate war against neighboring Eritrea, OLF launched an invasion from Somalia, and there was intense fighting between the parties. Through the year there were numerous reports of Eritrea supplying the Somali warlord Aideed with weapons - financed by Libya and transported by Yemen - intended for OLF.
Apart from the Eritrean support, which continued after 1999, OLF did not have any other foreign backer during its conflict against the EPRDF regime. However, as during the earlier phase in the conflict, when the group fought the Dergue military government, support has at times been forthcoming from other rebel groups within the country. For example, in 1996, OLF signed a military agreement on an alliance with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), fighting for independence for the Ogaden region in south-eastern Ethiopia. However, not much seems to have come out of it, and the parties still acted separately.
Over the years there have been various attempts to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict, but none of them have made any headway. The Carter Center failed in 1994 as did the US Congressman Harry Johnson in 1995. Talks were subsequently initiated in Germany in 1996 but broke down the following year. After this, the more moderate wing of the rebels was undermined and there was a shift in command structures, benefiting the more militant wing. Subsequently, the possibilities for a meaningful dialogue decreased.
In late 2004, the rebels came under considerable pressure to participate in the 2005 elections. OLF appeared to be on the brink of a major policy change and issued a statement saying that they were willing to negotiate with the government. However, in the end, the group decided not to take part in the elections, declaring them null and void. In late 2005 street protests in Oromiya were brutally put down by the government and the chances for negations seemed to have evaporated.
The year 2006 saw the government launch a large-scale offensive on rebel positions, but due to the extreme drought that hit the region that year, the offensive lost its momentum. Since then the conflict has continued, albeit on a low-intensity level. Due to the lack of non-partisan coverage of the situation very little is known about the actual fighting taking place. In general, the only way of really knowing if and to what extent clashes occur is to focus on independent reports covering other issues, such as attacks on civilians and cross-border activities. These oftentimes unconsciously corroborate that fighting is indeed taking place. In 2009, however, more concrete information became available when a Kenyan TV crew traveled inside OLF territory and spent a week with the rebels. It became clear that fighting was indeed still taking place and the rebels themselves admitted to losing between 10 and 20 fighters each month.
Since 2010 the Ethiopian government has cooperated increasingly close with the regime in Nairobi, which has caused considerable problems for the rebels. Kenyan troops have shared intelligence with their Ethiopian counterparts and hundreds of OLF fighters are reported to have been arrested and deported.
The armed struggle is overshadowed by other developments
In late 2015, and continuing through 2016 and into 2017, the Oromo question reached the international headlines; a feat rarely seen. Large-scale demonstrations by Oromos protesting against the government’s plan to integrate parts of Oromiya into the capital Addis Ababa were met with excessive force by the security forces (see Government of Ethiopia - civilians). The government attempted to link the protesters to OLF; labeled them “terrorists” and claimed that they were planning to destabilize the country. While the protests were by and large peaceful, they were met with a consistently repressive response from the Ethiopian forces, killing hundreds in 2016. On 2 October 2016, during the celebration of an important Oromo holiday (Irreecha) in Bishoftu town, attracting thousands of visitors, the security forces’ mishandling of the massive crowd caused a stampede, killing between 50 (according to the government) and 678 (according to the opposition). The government denied any responsibility, instead blaming “anti-peace elements”. This triggered an escalation of the protests, which in many places turned violent. There was fighting between armed Oromos and security forces in the West Arsi zone in Oromiya, and in some areas, protesters chased away local officials and declared self-governance. Oromo activists called this escalation the “week of rage” and on October 9, the Ethiopian government responded by declaring a countrywide six-month state of emergency. In March 2017, this was extended for another four months.
Aside from the anti-government protests, an additional crisis hit the Oromo region in late 2016, escalating in 2017: a conflict along the border between Oromiya and the Somali regional state, pitting both Oromo and Somali people against one another and more organized one-sided violence. These two developments completely overshadowed any potential OLF activity during the year, wherefore the conflict was recorded as inactive in 2017.
Political changes, a difficult negotiation process and the emergence of OLA
A new era was ushered in when Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, became prime minister in 2018. Signaling an openness to political reform already at the swearing in ceremony in April, the new prime minister announced that he would work to decriminalize many opposition organizations, including OLF, effectively opening up the political space in Ethiopia. OLF replied favorably, and in June parliament lifted the ban on three opposition groups, including the former. Subsequently, OLF declared a unilateral ceasefire and in August the parties met for talks in Asmasa, Eritrea, where the rebel leadership was based. On 8 August, an accord was signed, the details of which was never made public, which would go on to cause problems later on. Nevertheless, the main points of agreement were 1) a termination of hostilities; 2) that OLF were to conduct its political activities in Ethiopia through peaceful means; and 3) that a joint committee was to be established to implement the agreement.
On 15 September 2018, OLF-leader Dawud Ibsa returned to Ethiopia, and was welcomed by tens of thousands of supporters. Some 1500 of his Eritrea-based fighters put down their weapons and followed suit. From this point on, things turned more complicated, however. Since no details were revealed on what had been decided when it came to how the rebels were to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated, confusion spread, especially since Dawud Ibsa in October announced that he had in fact never agreed to the disarmament of OLF fighters, but that the parties had decided that they were to collaborate to ensure peace in the region. OLF fighters based in western and southern Oromiya refused to hand over their weapons, and a war of words ensued, where the government threaten to disarm them by force. It subsequently declared military rule of command posts in first western and then southern Oromiya, which is equivalent to martial rule, and the entire process was close to disintegrating.
In January 2019, some progress was made, however, as the parties met in Addis Ababa and agreed to set up a technical committee of 71 people drawn from the rebels themselves, the so-called Abba Gadas (i.e. Oromo elders), ODP (Oromo Democratic Party, the ruling party in Oromiya region), and other members of the Oromo community. The committee was tasked with facilitating the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed members of the OLF, which the parties agreed would take place within 20 days.
While some fighters did report for DDR, the process was fraught with problems and reports soon began circulating about the poor conditions in the camps, and that returnees were subjected to beatings and sent to detention centers. Together with the continued refusal of OLF’s western commander - known under the nom de guerre ‘Jaal Marro’ – to disarm, this caused the trickle of fighters entering rehabilitation camps to dry up. A few months into 2019, the cracks between the movement’s political leadership and armed wing were too wide to bridge, and caused the group to split. On 1 April, OLA (Oromo Liberation Army) subsequently declared that it had “detached itself” from OLF, and that the failure of the government to implement the peace agreement forced it to continue the armed struggle. The split was confirmed by OLF leader Ibsa the following month, when he signed an agreement disavowing links with armed groups operating in its name. Subsequently, in November the same year, OLF registered as a political party ahead of national elections, to be held in 2020.
Conflict against Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party government
OLA, for its part, kept up its armed struggle in western and southern Oromiya through the year, and what began as sporadic clashes escalated markedly as 2019 turned into 2020. The civilian Oromo population suffered in the context of escalating military engagements, as security forces operating under command posts began to kill and arbitrarily arrest those whom they suspected of supporting OLA.
In 2021, the conflict escalated even further, as OLA stepped up attacks and expanded its area of operation out of its western and southern strongholds, inching closer to Addis Ababa. In addition to carrying out operations in Oromiya, the group crossed into Amhara region’s Oromiya zone, where it linked up with enemies-turned-allies TPLF. The latter was embroiled in its own conflict with the government, and, having agreed to cooperate in August, the two groups joined forces in late October and pushed south towards the capital. However, when they were a mere 200 km from Addis Ababa, a government counter-offensive caused them to lose momentum, and they were forced to retreat.
After the dramatic events of 2021, violence continued to soar in the conflict in 2022, reaching a death toll not seen before in the post 1989-period. In the face of brutal government crackdowns in a series of offensives, OLA appeared to retain its appeal among sections of the population, and the group was difficult for the armed forces to pin down. With little to show for the large-scale offensives, the government resorted to the use of drones, which had a devastating effect on the civilian population.
At the start of the year, OLA had a significant presence in many parts of Oromiya, controlling several woredas in especially the southern and western parts (Guji, West Guji and the Welegas in particular). A large-scale offensive from March onward, saw fighting intensify also in West, North and East Shewa, surrounding Addis Ababa, and by the end of it, the government claimed to have significantly weakened the group. However, in June OLA proved them wrong by launching a number of attacks, sweeping over West Wellega, and making substantial gains. Furthermore, the group was able to attack larger urban centers on several occasions, forcing the security forces to leave. While not attempting to occupy the towns long-term, this was nonetheless a new development. Furthermore, by the end of the year, there were reports of OLA once more occupying rural areas in many parts of Oromiya.
When a new conflict erupted in neighboring Amhara region in 2023, it quickly became the main military focus for the government, and violence subsequently de-escalated in Oromiya. Furthermore, the fact that the military was needed elsewhere most likely also influenced the government’s decision to initiate talks with OLA for the first time. The process got off the ground in April 2023, when the two parties met for preliminary talks in Zanzibar. Mediated by IGAD, Kenya and Norway, the two parties were represented by e.g. Abiy Ahmed’s National Security Adviser Redwan Hussien and Gedion Timothwos, Minister of Justice for the government side, and OLA’s commander’s advisor Jiregna Gudetta and scholar and religious leader Banti Ujulu on the rebel side. The talks went on for a little over a week, ending in early May without any significant progress having been made. Little is known about the details of the talks, but it was indicated that the parties had failed to agree on some key political issues, with OLA demanding a greater political role in Oromiya, and proposing a power-sharing arrangement, which was rejected by the government. Nevertheless, both parties expressed a willingness to continue the dialogue. In November, after a serious uptick in fighting after the first round of talks ended, the second round got off the ground in Dar er Salaam. Preceded by three weeks of talks between senior officials and OLA representatives, the negotiations were attended by the group's Commander-in-Chief Jaal Marroo, flown in from the battlefield of western Oromiya with the help of external mediators. Also participating were senior military leaders from Ethiopia. The high-level participation indicated the seriousness of the parties, raising the hopes for a successful outcome. However, just like during the first round of talks, the parties failed to reach consensus, and the process ended in deadlock. The government blamed OLA, claiming that the group had made unrealistic demands. OLA, on the other hand, stated that an historical opportunity had been lost, and accused the government of attempting to co-opt the group’s leadership rather than wanting to engage in serious dialogue about the country’s fundamental problems. Just like after the first round, hostilities escalated after the collapse of the talks in November. As 2024 progressed, it was clear that the parties had left the negotiation phase behind them, focusing yet again on the military struggle. Subsequently, the level of violence increased and there was intermittent fighting across much of the region.
OLA splits
The second half of 2024 came to be dominated by the repercussions of developments within OLA. There had long been rumors of rifts within the movement, but it was not until in September that any of these were confirmed. At the end of that month, Yadesa Negassa, also known as Sagni Nagasa, former commander of the OLA’s central zone and a member of its executive committee, made an official statement announcing his exit from the group and accusing Jaal Marroo of authoritarian leadership. OLA, for its part, had a different version of events, claiming that Nagasa had been expelled some months earlier, on the grounds of having connections with ENDF officers. Regardless, Nagasa reached out to the government, indicating an openness to entering into negotiations, and by December, the two parties had signed an agreement. Hailed as a big success by the government, OLA dismissed the deal, claiming that it was made with a small group of former members expelled “months earlier for misconduct.” Nevertheless, this was clearly one of the most difficult challenges to its existence to date; not only had the group lost hundreds, if not thousands of fighters, Sagni Nagasa brought with him substantial insider knowledge about the inner working of the group, which could be used by the government moving forward. OLA reacted by going on the offensive, specifically in West Shewa, which had been Nagasa’s main area of influence, but also in East Shewa, clearly feeling the need to prove that they were still a force to be reckoned with. The government, for its part, also went on the offensive, wanting to strike a decisive blow to the group when it was still reeling from its loss. However, in the end, the split failed to lead to any substantial changes in the conflict. While conflict levels had dropped noticeably by early 2025, fighting continued and neither side was close to defeating the other militarily.
In February 2025, Sagni Nagasa became a security adviser to the Oromia president, while other former commanders from his faction received senior regional security and administrative posts. Hundreds of his fighters entered rehabilitation or reintegration centers, but half-way into the year, reports suggested that the promised DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) process had largely stalled or been abandoned and there were rumors that some later returned to the bush.
