This dyad belongs to the conflict Senegal: Casamance
Summary of conflict Senegal: Casamance
Casamance is a region in the south of Senegal where there has existed separatist sentiments since colonial times. The MFDC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamançe), initially a political party, called for independence in the early 1980s. From the onset of its armed struggle, the separatist MFDC has been fraught by internal splits. The early years of the conflict only saw sporadic clashes, but the conflict has, at times, been extremely brutal. There have been repeated negotiations between the parties during the conflict leading to a number of temporary ceasefires. In October 2012, peace talks were initiated between a faction of MFDC and the newly elected President Macky Sall, under the auspices of the Sant'Egidio community. In 2014 talks continued and resulted in an agreement on confidence-building measures.
Background to the Casamançe conflict
Casamançe is a region in southern Senegal, physically separated from the rest of the country by Gambia and the Gambia River. It is ecologically richer than the rest of Senegal, producing most of the country's food, rice, and cotton, and – prior to the armed conflict – generating much of Senegal's tourist revenues. The main ethnic group inhabiting the region is the Diola, among whom there have existed separatist sentiments since colonial times. Apart from being geographically separated from the other, larger ethnic groups in the country, the Diola also differ in religion and language. Unlike the Muslim majority, they are Christian or animist, and they do not speak Wolof, the nation's main language, or French, the language of government. In addition to these differences, there is a sense among the Diola that they themselves do not benefit from the region's richness, but that most earnings are directed to Dakar, the capital of Senegal.
The government side in the conflict has throughout the conflict been based on a relatively robust democratic system and a strong state. Independence leader and later President Léopold Sédar Senghor voluntarily stepped down from office in 1981, just before the Casamançe conflict broke out. Abdou Diouf then ruled the country for the coming 19 years. He was subsequently succeeded by Abdoulaye Wade, who defeated him in the March 2000 elections. Meanwhile, within MFDC, repeated splits have occurred beginning in the early 1990s.
The emergence of MFDC
In 1947, the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamançe (MFDC) was created as a political party. It mainly aimed to represent regional interests and was soon absorbed into the leadership of national political parties. Throughout the region, it was believed that in exchange for this co-option, the President had promised to invest considerably in Casamançe. The failure of these investments to materialize, together with the above-mentioned historical claims of separateness and the perceived economic and political unfairness, led to the revival of MFDC in the early 1980s. The movement now raised the stakes, calling for independence and organizing large demonstrations. The government responded increasingly hard-handed, and in December 1983, amidst mounting tension, a particularly large and aggressive demonstration was again dispersed violently, leaving an official death toll of 29. Subsequently, a number of activists left for the dense forests outside Ziguinchor, where they founded Atika, the armed wing of MFDC.
Throughout the conflict, MFDC has remained the sole organization fighting the government. However, since the early 1990s, serious splits have occurred within the movement. In 1991, following the signing of a ceasefire accord with the government, the armed wing of MFDC split into Front Nord and Front Sud, with the former willing to abide by the accords whereas the latter favored a military solution. Even though Front Nord has not been engaged in armed action against the government since then, it has kept both its weapons and its control of a zone close to Bignona, where the group members are active in timber and cannabis business. Front Sud, initially led by Léopold Sagna and supported by long-time MFDC secretary-general Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, has during the 1990s split even further, mainly due to personal rivalries. In the mid-1990s, Salif Sadio, another rebel fighter, replaced Sagna as the leader of Front Sud. However, Diamarcoune continued to recognize Sagna as a military leader, and a group of Sagna loyalists continues to be active along the Guinea-Bissau border. This faction has since divided even further. In spite of these splits, the political wing of the rebels, MFDC, has continued to – at least in theory – represent all factions in negotiations with the government. However, in practice, it has during the 1990s, and early 2000s become increasingly hard for the MFDC negotiators to control the different armed factions.
Armed struggle in Casamance
During the early years of the armed struggle, there were only sporadic clashes between the parties. The government, however, took the matter seriously and responded both politically and by force. An administrative reorganization was pursued, removing the term Casamançe from official discourse, and attempts to undermine MFDC were made through torture and intelligence. Simultaneously, in a move to appease the Casamançe population, public investments were redirected towards the region. These moves were to no avail, however, and the conflict increased in intensity during the 1990s. Apart from lulls in the fighting in 1991, 1994, and 1996 due to ceasefires, the conflict has been active and, at times, extremely brutal during the whole 1990s, continuing into the 2000s.
The rebels typically hide in the dense forests in the region or in the coastal mangroves, crisscrossed by a network of waterways, often conducting attacks during night time. This type of guerrilla warfare has proved impossible for the government troops to curb, in spite of their superiority in both numbers and equipment. Thus, government practices have become increasingly desperate, including measures like crop destruction, internment, summary executions, and at times even clearances of entire villages. Also, MFDC has increasingly targeted the civilian population, forcing them to take sides in the conflict. Subsequently, the civilian population has suffered heavy losses, and thousands of people have fled to neighboring Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. This shift from regular warfare between two armed actors became increasingly clear in 2002, when there were few clashes between government troops and MFDC forces. Instead, most of the activities reported were MFDC atrocities against civilians, such as looting, raping, and robbing. However, the picture is not clear-cut, and in 2003, there was a new upsurge in fighting between government troops and MFDC forces as the army launched a series of mopping up operations early in the year, following reports that the rebels were laying mines in the region.
Foreign support
There have been repeated claims of foreign support to the rebels, but these have been difficult to substantiate. Throughout the conflict, the Senegalese government has accused Guinea-Bissau of supporting the rebels and allowing them access to its territory. Guinea-Bissau has continuously denied these allegations, but there are numerous reports indicating the opposite. For example, in 1998, a high-ranking officer in the army in Guinea-Bissau, Ansoumane Mané, was accused by the President of illegally trafficking arms to the Senegalese rebels. He subsequently staged a revolt, and temporarily the whole focus of the Casamançe conflict shifted to its southern neighbor, with the Senegalese government sending troops to support the sitting government, whereas hundreds of MFDC rebels fought on the side of Mané, helping to prevent the Senegalese troops from capturing him. The main winner of these events appears to have been the Front Sud Sadio faction, which according to a number of reports, was rewarded by the new Guinea-Bissau president Mané through substantial military aid. However, at the end of 1999, the Sadio faction's luck turned, as Kumba Yalla was elected new President in Guinea-Bissau. He subsequently moved to normalize relations with Dakar and refused MFDC future access to its territory. The government has also claimed that both Iraq and Libya have sent weapons to MFDC fighters via Mauritania and that Gambia has allowed them to use its territory as a rear base. The situation is less complex on the government side, where it is clear that both France and the USA have supplied weapons.
Negotiations and agreements
Negotiations between the two parties to the conflict were initiated for the first time in late 1990. A team of military leaders represented the MFDC since the political leadership of the movement at the time was imprisoned in Dakar. In May 1991, the Bissau Accord was signed, calling for a ceasefire, as well as for the release of hundreds of Casamançe detainees, among them the political leaders of MFDC. However, the accord failed to address the fundamental question of Casamançe's future constitutional status, and large groupings within the movement were arguing for a military solution to the conflict. A follow-up meeting in Guinea-Bissau in April 1992 led to the signing of a further agreement, which in turn led to the split between Front Nord and Front Sud. Following a flare-up in fighting, new negotiations between MFDC and the government were initiated in early 1993, and in June, the Ziguinchor ceasefire agreement was signed, under which Guinea-Bissau was to act as guarantor. Apart from calling for a ceasefire, the accord also stipulated for the release of Casamançe prisoners, the non-reinforcement of government troops in the region, and the free return of refugees. Negotiations continued, and the truce was reasonably well respected through 1994, but in 1995 tensions mounted, and in June MFDC formally announced that they were no longer bound by the accord, and fighting resumed.
In September 1995, a Commission Nationale de Paix was established and sought dialogue with the MFDC. Diamacoune proposed that preliminary discussions take place in January 1996 to be followed by peace negotiations in a neutral country three months later. The proposed preliminary discussions did indeed take place in January 1996, but the peace negotiations were postponed indefinitely. However, in early 1998, Diamacoune indicated that MFDC was willing to give up the demand for independence in exchange for measures directed to ensure greater economic and social development in the region. The Gambia offered to act as mediator and started hosting regular meetings between the MFDC and the Senegalese government.
A year later, in January 1999, president Diouf and MFDC leader Diamacoune met face to face for the first time, and in December direct peace negotiations were formally opened. Due to Senegalese elections, the process was temporarily halted, but in December 2000, the new government of President Wade resumed negotiations. It was, however, becoming increasingly clear that the MFDC negotiators were unable to control the different armed factions. When there were reports of an agreement reached in 2001, there was no decrease in fighting, as hardcore elements of the rebels remained committed to independence at any cost. Negotiations continued through the following two years, and in October 2003, MFDC's secretary-general announced that the war was formally over. Despite this, most observers remained skeptical as some of the most militant factions did not support the statement.
In 2004, negotiations were held in secret, resulting in the signing of an accord on 30 December. The agreement called for a ceasefire, the voluntary integration of MFDC fighters into the country's paramilitary forces, economic recovery programs for Casamance, de-mining, and aid to returning refugees. Furthermore, a future negotiation process concerning the economic and political future of the region was stipulated. Despite the accord's high symbolic value, it was by late 2004 difficult to determine its potential to end the conflict in the long-term, as a number of hard-line factions immediately distanced themselves from the agreement. Negotiations on the implementation of the December 2004 accord were launched in the central town of Foundiougne on 1 February 2005. However, the talks were suspended after only two days, and new talks were scheduled to take place in late March. These talks were also postponed due to the divergences within the rebel group. MFDC is fraction-ridden and includes groupings that oppose the peace deal, and the rebel leadership wanted to arrange consultations between the various factions in order to include more factions in the peace process. The peace process was postponed yet again in December 2005.
In April 2012 Macky Sall was elected new Senegalese President, stating that solving the Casamance conflict was one of the first national priorities and that he was willing to work with neighboring Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in the search for lasting peace. On 13-14 October 2012, the Sadio faction of MFDC met with a government delegation in Rome, initiating a formal peace process under the auspices of Sant'Egidio community. The peace process continued during 2013, and in November, a break-through was reported, as the parties agreed on an agenda for further talks. Neither the mediators nor the two parties commented on what the agenda looked like, but sources close to the talks revealed that it included issues such as a ceasefire, disarmament, reintegration of former combatants, and the development of Casamance, but not independence and autonomy. In February 2014, the parties met again and signed an agreement on confidence-building measures.
Fractionalization of MFDC
From the beginning of its armed struggle against the Senegalese government, the separatist MFDC was fraught by internal splits. The first split occurred in 1992, following the signing of two accords with the government. Large parts of the movement, including its leading political figure Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, distanced themselves from the agreements, claiming that they did not resolve the fundamental question of Casamance's political status. Thus, the group split in two as the signatory of the accord, Sidy Baji and his followers left the movement. The latter faction subsequently became known as Front Nord due to the group's original area of military operation, north of the Casamance River. The remaining MFDC continued the struggle against the government, with an armed wing now known as Front Sud, led by Léopold Sagna. As the 1990s progressed, personal rivalries led to further splits in the movement. By the mid-1990s, the young Salif Sadio became increasingly influential within Front Sud, eventually challenging Sagna for the overall military leadership. As the political leader of MFDC, Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, continued to back Sagna, the movement split again, with Front Sud - Sadio breaking away.
After the split in 1992, Front Nord moved away from its armed struggle leaving Front Sud to fight the government on its own. Like Front Sud, Front Nord also experienced splits, the first one occurring when its leader Siday Baji, died in 2003. The group that broke away under the command of Magne Diémé now appears to have superseded the original Front Nord in size and strength.
Developments since 2005
In the early and mid-1990s, there were frequent reports of Senegal's southern neighbor Guinea-Bissau supporting MFDC, allowing them to have rear bases on its territory and providing them with arms. However, MFDC lost their traditional backer due to developments in Guinea-Bissau in 2005. In that year, Guinea-Bissau got a new president when president Nino Viera regained power. President Viera promptly decided to root the MFDC rebels from Guinean territory once and for all and launched an offensive against one of MFDCs factions - the so-called Front Sud-Sadio and their main base on the border with Senegal. Fierce fighting between Guinean troops and the MFDC-Sadio faction raged from mid-March to mid-April 2006, after which the rebels were forced to flee across the border into Casamance. Guinea-Bissau insisted that the operation was a strictly Guinean affair, launched to pacify the northern part of the country, wherefore it is not recorded as part of the Senegal - MFDC conflict.
Another development that affected the conflict was the death of MFDC political leader Augustin Diamacoune Senghor in 2007. Many regarded Senghor as the one person that stood a chance to unite the various rebel factions. Some analysts believed that his death reduced the chances for a peace process even further. Others pointed to the fact that as he did not have control over the armed factions, his death would probably not increase the level of violence.
The years 2009 - 2010 saw an escalation of the violence in Casamance, albeit not to the extent that it crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold whereby it would be recorded as an active conflict. There were a number of reasons given for the upsurge of fighting. One factor emphasized by many was the fact that the peace process remained deadlocked, which was a cause of great frustration among the rebel ranks. Another factor was - again – developments in neighboring Guinea-Bissau. In March 2009, both the countries' Commander in Chief Tagme Na War and President Nino Viera were shot to death. Despite the fact that the military claimed that this was not part of a coup and that the country continued to be run by a civilian administration, many in Senegal were worried about how this would affect the two countries relationship. The attitude of the Bissau regime towards the Casamance conflict has had a substantial impact on developments on the ground, and the cooperation between Dakar and Bissau 2000 - 2009 was an important contributing factor to why the region was calmer during these years than during the 1990s. Thus, if the new regime in Guinea-Bissau was to change course and become more positive to the rebels, this could strengthen MFDC, further reducing the chances for peace.
In December 2010, the government suffered a military set back as the rebels launched a big attack near the Gambian border, killing seven soldiers. The Senegalese military subsequently claimed that MFDC had gained access to new weapons as heavy artillery, grenades, and machine guns were used during the attack. The regime in Dakar accused Iran of being behind the new arms, as Iranian weapons on route to Gambia had been found in Lagos, Nigeria, in October. In protest, Senegal recalled its ambassador to Iran, and in February 2011, diplomatic ties were completely severed.
The round of fighting that had commenced in August 2010 continued into 2011, causing relatively high fatality figures. Despite the fact that the period July - November saw a de-escalation of the fighting, a new upsurge in December caused the 25 battle-related deaths threshold to be crossed. The conflict was subsequently recorded as active in 2011, for the first time in seven years. The fighting continued at a relatively high level during the first months of the following year, but then de-escalated.
