SUMMARY
MFDC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance, Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance) was a rebel group seeking independence for the Casamance region in Senegal. Engaged in an intrastate conflict with the regime from 1990, the group was fraught with internal splits resulting in a number of break-away factions.
Casamance, the southern-most region in Senegal, has a long history of separatist sentiments. The main ethnic group in the area is the Diola and it was among this group that the struggle for independence began during colonial times. Those favouring independence from Senegal tend to stress the distinctness of both the people and the region compared to the rest of the country. While the majority of Senegal’s population is Muslim and speak the language Wolof, the Diola are Christian or animists, speaking their own language. These differences are further emphasised by the fact that the region is physically separated from the rest of the country by Gambia and the Gambia River. Ecologically Casamance is richer than the rest of Senegal producing most of the countrys food, rice and cotton. There has been a widespread feeling among the region’s population that it is the government in Dakar that reap the fruits of this richness and not the people of Casamance.
It was against this backdrop that MFDC emerged in the early 1980s. Popular discontent was growing in the region and the movement organised large demonstrations on the streets of Ziguinchor, Casamance’s main city. Thus, initially MFDC was a political organisation that worked openly in the territory. However, the popular protests were met by military might, with the Senegalese government increasing the army presence and clamping down on separatists. Demonstrations were dispersed violently with people being killed and separatist leaders put in prison.
In response to the harsher climate, a number of MFDC activists in the mid-1980s left Ziguinchor and went underground, setting up the movement’s armed wing, Atika. In charge of training and organising the new group were Sidy Bajo and Léopold Sagna, both veterans from the Senegalese army. They spent the remains of the decade arming and training the new recruits. In spite of government attempts to undermine the group and win over the population, Atika gained in strength and by 1990 the group had launched its armed struggle against the regime.
During the 1990s, the group suffered from fractionalisation. The first split occurred in 1992, following the signing of two accords with the government. Large parts of the movement, including its leading political figure Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, distanced themselves from the agreements, claiming that they did not resolve the fundamental question of Casamance’s political status. Thus, the group split in two as the signatory of the accord, Sidy Baji and his followers left the movement. They subsequently became known as Front Nord. The remaining MFDC continued the struggle against the government, with an armed wing now known as Front Sud, led by Léopold Sagna. As the 1990s progressed personal rivalries led to further splits in the movement. By the mid-1990s, the young Salif Sadio became increasingly influential within Front Sud, eventually challenging Sagna for the overall military leadership. As Augustin Diamacoune Senghor continued to back Sagna, the movement split again, with Front Sud – Sadio breaking away.
It seems clear that MFDC in its early years received support from actors outside the country. At the outset armed only with hunting rifles and hand weapons, including bows and arrows and spears, early requests to Libya and Iraq for support were successful and arms deliveries were made via Mauritania and the Gambia. However, the external actor that played the most important role was Guinea-Bissau. The rebels share their ethnic identity with the population in Guinea-Bissau, Senegals southern neighbour. When Guinea-Bissau was fighting for independence from Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s the independence movement used Cassamance as a rear-base. This combination of inter-ethnic solidarity and historical debt meant that the MFDC rebels could use Guinea-Bissau as a safe haven. Whether this state of affairs was sanctioned at the political top in Bissau is a matter of debate, but it seems reasonably clear that at least elements within the national army at times supported the rebels in this way. However, the aid from Guinea-Bissau has fluctuated depending on the leadership in Bissau and the state of the relations between Senegal and its southern neighbour.
MFDC was from the outset led by Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, who was a political figure that functioned as a symbol for the secessionist struggle. However, in January 2007 he died, at the age of 78. Analysts considered this a great setback that would render it even more difficult to unify the various factions – something that is deemed as a precondition for the possibility of reaching a solution to the conflict. The armed faction that is considered closest to the political leadership of Diamacoune, and thus seen as its armed wing, was initially led by Léopold Sagna and, later by Ceasar Atoute Badiate.
MFDC has been involved in the intrastate and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
