This dyad belongs to the conflict Myanmar (Burma): Shan
Summary of conflict Myanmar (Burma): Shan
The territorial conflict over the Shan region dates back to 1958, when the first resistance group was formed with the aim to establish an independent Shan state. Fighting broke out the following year and has since continued with shifting intensity. Several groups have been active in the conflict, many of which has been heavily involved in drug trafficking. The largest groups active after 1989 are the MTA (Mong Tai Army), the RCSS (Restoration Council of Shan States) with its armed wing SSA-south, and SSPP (Shan State Progress Party) with its armed wing SSA-North. The conflict was coded as terminated due to low activity in 2015. Some sporadic events have been coded following 2015.
What are the Shan States
In colonial times, the territory of northeastern Myanmar (Burma) that borders China, Laos, and Thailand was ruled by local headmen, so-called sawbwas, which experienced substantial autonomy from the British authorities. The main reason for why these regions even had been included into the British colony was to protect the trade routes to China and to prevent French Indochina to extend further west. These sawbwas were primarily ethnic Shan, or Tai, but there were also several minorities in these areas including Kokang (Chinese), Kachin, Lahu, Lisu, Akha, Wa, Palaung, and Pa-O.
Whereas the Burman independence movement had limited influence on these areas, consultations were held with the sawbwas during the preparation of the transfer of power. At a meeting in Panglong on 12 February 1947, representatives of the Shan states agreed to join the Union of Burma provided they were granted internal autonomy and the right to secede after a ten-year period of independence.
This was not necessarily seen as an attractive outcome by all people in the Shan states. The Pa-O rebelled against the sawbwas in the southern Shan states, while the Wa expressed an ambition to be left out of any joint political administration.
The Chinese civil war spillover
When the Chinese Communist Party under Mao defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalists in 1949, tens of thousands KMT forces fled across the border from Chinese Yunnan into the Shan States. As the sawbwa police forces largely had been used for ceremonial purposes and the Burma army was pressured by the ongoing communist, Arakan, and Karen rebellions, nothing could prevent these forces from setting up camps in the area and preparing for a reinvasion of China. With assistance from the American CIA, the KMT bases in northern Burma remained for at least a decade but the event left a lasting impact on the Shan conflict.
The government of Burma tried to counter the KMT threat in the Shan states by imposing emergency rule, deploying forces into the area, and creating paramilitary units including the sawbwa police but also forces set up by local warlords. As many of these actors soon also became competitors in the booming opium trade, violence and disorder became increasingly prevalent.
Shan nationalism and the outbreak of conflict
The Shan nationalist movement started gaining strength in the mid-1950s when students at universities in Rangoon and Mandalay started forming cultural associations. When the government in 1958 refused to discuss the option of Shan secession and in April 1959 pressured the 34 sawbwas to formally give up their hereditary positions, a small underground resistance group was formed in 1958 with the name Noom Suik Harn (NSH, Young Warriors) and led by Saw Yanda (a.k.a. Chao Noi). The following year, a mixed force of NSH and police defectors attacked and captured Tangyan in northern Shan State.
The Shan insurgent movement grew slowly, and was much fractionalized. In addition to Shan-nationalism, some agitated that the sawbwa system should be reinstated, or at least that the territory should be given extended autonomy. Furthermore, groups with different aims sometimes merged or joined in alliance with each other, while the control of income from drug trade also created incentives to split or co-operate. Most of the KMT left the area in 1961 but those that remained continued to be active in the drug business while willing to co-operate with groups of almost any ideological leaning.
The NSH soon broke up into smaller groups including the SSIA (Shan State Independence Army), and the SNUF (Shan National United Front). On 22 April 1964, the three largest rebel Shan organizations; SSIA, SNUF and KRF (Kokang Resistance Force) merged as SSA (Shan State Army), from which eventually SURA (Shan United Revolutionary Army) splintered off.
To further complicate matters, the Burmese military coup in 1962 led to the collapse of the elected federal Shan administration. The joint Chinese-Burmese operations against KMT remnants also targeted anti-government opposition in the Shan states meaning that the government virtually imposed a military occupation of the territory. As part of this system, the government has sponsored paramilitary forces, and, since 1968, employed what it calls "the Four Cuts strategy" against opposition groups. This principle is an attempt to cut off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. The main method used by the government has been forcibly relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory. Human rights violations have been reported as a part of this process, and this has led to a continuous flow of refugees across the border into Thailand.
Communism in the golden triangle
On the morning of New Year’s Day 1968, the CPB (Communist Party of Burma) launched a large-scale Chinese-backed offensive from China into northern Burma. Among these forces were several ethnic minority leaders. The communist army did not lose any major engagements with the government until during the dry season 1971-72 and managed to gain control over almost all territory in the Shan states. This was partly because of the military support provided from China, but also through alliances with ethnic minority leaders that became parts of the CPB, or pro-communist ethnic armies. For example, the remnants of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) was renamed the Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (SSNLO) and expended their goal to concern the rights of all ethnic minorities within the Shan states. In 1974, the SSNLO received arms and training from the CPB and agreed to become an ally with the subsequent name-change of the group to Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SSNPLO).
The other source of arms was through alliances with KMT remnants that largely were interested in protecting their interests in the drug trade. This meant that the many Shan rebel movements primarily served as the private army of its’ leader, and that strategy and goals sometimes changed very suddenly. By the early 1980s, the main forces fighting for Shan independence were the "warlord-led" SUA (Shan United Army, led by Khun Sa) and the faction of SURA (Shan United Revolutionary Army) led by Moh Heng (a.k.a. Gon Jerng). Both of these warlords were also heavily involved in large-scale drug trafficking. In 1985, the two organisations merged to form the MTA (Mong Tai Army). They then swiftly expanded their territory along the Thai border by attacking weaker insurgent forces such as the SSPP (Shan State Progress Party) and the PNO (Pa-O National Organisation).
The decline of the CPB started in 1979, when Chinese support was withdrawn and tensions became visible within the CPB. Different ethnic factions emerged - some with strong interests in the drug trade - and the leadership allegedly spilt between the older and the younger generations. Hoping to capitalize on CPBs weakness, the Burmese government launched military offensives against CPB-held territories. In 1989, the organisation disintegrated into different ethnic factions such as the MNDAA, UWSA, and SSA-N. Quickly, the Myanmarese government contacted the leadership of the breakaway groups and offered ceasefires, which were accepted by many parties.
The surrender of Khun Sa
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, most of the Shan insurgent organisations either signed ceasefire agreements with the government or became affiliated (or incorporated) with the MTA. Many claimed that they were willing to ignore Khun Sas drug interests as he managed to build a strong Shan force. A provision of government offers of ceasefire was that groups should help fighting active rebels in the area. Following the 1989 dissolution of the CPB, the strongest successor organization was the UWSA (United Wa State Army) which agreed to support the government against the MTA. UWSA and MTA were at the time also each others’ main competitors in the drug trade.
Increasing military success by government and UWSA offensives pushed MTA's Khun Sa into negotiations in late 1995. He soon made a deal with the government where he "surrendered" and continued to pursue his remaining business interests until his death in 2007. Throughout 1995, and following the surrender by Khun Sa, the members of the MTA split into several different factions. Most of these also made ceasefire arrangements with the government but the armed opposition continued through the formation of the Shan State Army - South Command (SSA-S).
The Shan State Army - South command
SSA-S continued fighting the government, as well as fighting UWSA, who allegedly took control of most of the drug business left by MTA. Because the territory previously held by MTA was lost, the SSA-S initially almost exclusively relied on cross-border attacks from Thailand, where the group supposedly had bases. The Myanmar government has accused Thailand of supporting the SSA-S, but this has constantly been denied. By 2005-06, the SSA-S was operating over a larger territory of Shan state and this has since been expanded to a substantial area.
The government has refused to negotiate with the SSA-S as it claims that the group remains the same as the previous SURA, which had already surrendered. In 2005, the SSA-S strengthened through the incorporation of troops from another group that had formed following the Khun Sa surrender in 1996, the Shan State National Army (SSNA). The SSNA had a ceasefire agreement with the government which allowed them to keep their weapons. When the government requested that all ceasefire groups should disarm in early 2005, the SSNA announced it had lost confidence in the peace process and decided to join forces with the SSA-South.
At the same time, the fighting had slowly intensified between the government and SSA-S after a year of almost no conflict activity in 2003. Some small clashes were reported in 2004 as the government increased its military presence in Shan state. In 2005, the conflict resumed activity as the SSA-S established a presence in several areas of Shan state. Limited confrontations continued 2006-2010 as the SSA-S strengthened its control over its area while the government forces mainly were concentrated in towns and along the highways in Shan state.
Developments in 2011-15
As several of the ceasefire groups in Shan states were reluctant to join the government Border Guard Force Program, intense alliance-building followed. By late 2010, the RCSS (more commonly known under their military name, SSA-S) was discussing a mutual defence agreement with the SSPP (Shan State Progress Party) and possibly other groups such as the Karenni KNPP, the Wa UWSA, and the Kachin KIO.
UWSA continued to reject the government plan but negotiated an extension of their status as an autonomous special region, but fighting began in 2011 with the SSPP. Although clashes also took place involving SSA-S, the most intense fighting involved SSPP as the government sought to protect the construction of a gas pipeline to China that was planned to pass near SSPP-controlled territory.
As part of the civilian-led governments peace effort, there were also several rounds of talks between the government and the Shan rebels. RCSS agreed to a temporary ceasefire and continued negotiations in late 2011, eventually signing a ceasefire on 2 December 2011. SSPP followed suit, signing a ceasefire on 28 January 2012. Since the two agreements were largely respected, fighting in the Shan conflict did not cause 25 battle-related deaths in 2012.
Though the rebels and the government signed ceasefire agreements, the conflict over Shan State became active again in 2013. Fighting was heaviest in the first half of the year, and generated dozens of fatalities between government forces and the rebel groups. Despite the violence, the government met RCSS representatives on several occasions. 2014 saw a spell from intense fatal fighting and the conflict did not fulfill the criteria for active conflict in 2014. But in 2015 violence sparked again. Some clashes took place in February but the majority of violence took place in the fall starting in September. During the year, negotiations were ongoing concerning the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The clashes between the SSPP and the government escalated as the group in the beginning of October announced they would not be signing the agreement. This period of fighting took place in Loilen District in Shan state, where the base of the group lies. The SSPP claim that the government attacked them in reprisal for not signing, whereas the army stated that the SSPP had initiated the clashes. The RCSS, on the other hand, were one of the groups that did sign the NCA on 15 October.
Although some events were coded after 2015, the conflict was coded as terminated due to low activity in 2015.
