This dyad belongs to the conflict Iraq: Government
Summary of conflict Iraq: Government
In 2003, a multi-national coalition comprising USA, UK and Australia ousted the Saddam Hussein regime and a new government was installed. Shortly after, violence and criticism of the government and its foreign support escalated into a renewed armed conflict, in which a number of opposition groups became involved. In 2014, the Islamic State overran much of northern Iraq, fueling renewed foreign intervention and the mass mobilization of mainly Shiite paramilitaries, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Despite the Iraqi government's declaration of victory over the Islamic State (IS) in December 2017, the conflict has continued, particularly in areas between Iraq's central government and the autonomous Kurdistan Region. IS adapted its strategy from holding territory to guerrilla tactics, relocating from urban strongholds to rugged, sparsely policed terrain. Violence escalated notably in 2022 amid political instability following a disputed election. During this period, IS conducted numerous attacks targeting security forces, civilians, and infrastructure, prompting counter-terrorism operations and airstrikes by Iraqi forces and their allies.
Although the frequency of Islamic State attacks has decreased overall since 2021, the group has remained active, continuing to launch armed atttacks across Iraq. In 2025, the conflict intensity slightly decreased compared to the previous year. A large majority of the causalties reported in 2025 resulted from Iraqi airstrikes targeting IS hideouts in northern rural parts of the country.
Background and coup ending monarchy in Iraq 1958
The territory of present-day Iraq largely covers the three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire that became a British protectorate in 1920 following a decision by the League of Nations. Iraq was proclaimed independent in 1932 but became subjected to military occupation by the British in 1941-47 as it was deemed strategically important for the Second World War effort.
The political elite continued to be dominated by the educated Sunni Muslim minority which had previously worked for the Ottoman administration. As the state of Iraq had been constructed by different territories that originally had little in common, the British-installed king promoted Arab nationalism as a unifying aspect for the population.
The Iraqi military largely opposed the British-installed king, although itself being split in factions adhering to different ideologies and having different stands on pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism. In 1957, an officer named Abd al-Karim Qasim emerged as a leader of several leftist pan-Arab groupings. Qasim together with 13 other officers called themselves the Free Officers’ Movement and launched a coup in 1958. They succeeded in overthrowing the King. The coup enjoyed massive support among the Iraqi population. Qasim declared himself Prime Minister and announced that through the “revolution” the period of political repression, economic inequalities and economic stand-still had been ended. He ordered the execution of the king, the crown prince and several of the monarchy’s key persons.
1959 coup attempt by the forces of Colonel Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf
Shortly after the 1958 coup, which brought Abd al-Karim Qasim to power, the new leadership experienced internal rifts. Conservative Arab nationalists of the Free Officers Movement, who had together with Qasim toppled the Iraqi King, were opposed to the increasing influence of the Communists under Qasim’s government. The military officers had little to gain from Communism and were, moreover, disappointed with the positions they got under the new government. One of these officers was Colonel Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf, commander of the Mosul garrison and member of a prominent Iraqi family. In March 1959, al-Shawaf decided to launch a coup, when the Communist-led Peace Partisan Movement commemorated its founding in Mosul. Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf’s Military faction was supported by large landowners of the Shammar tribe surrounding Mosul, who feared agrarian reform. On 6 March 1959, al-Shawaf’s forces detained leading Communists in Mosul and proclaimed a revolt. Severe fighting broke out between Communists and al-Shawaf’s forces. However, the mutinying Military faction received little supported outside Mosul. Other former members of the Free Officers’ Movement, who had initially supported al-Shawaf, did not come to his aid. A few days later, on 9 March, Prime Minister Qasim ordered to bomb al-Shawaf’s headquarters and al-Shawaf was killed. After al-Shawaf’s death, his forces disintegrated. His leading supporters were killed or fled to Syria.
1963 new military coup against Qasim
Prime Minister Qasim’s government faced a number of difficult issues, such as the strained relationship with Great Britain that had sponsored the late king, demands for land reform, and Kurdish nationalism. Qasim’s government was not able to adequately deal with these problems, and in 1961, the Kurdish groups launched a rebellion (see Iraq (Kurdistan)). Qasim lost support among the population and the military. Large parts of the military wanted Iraq to join other Arab states in some kind of union and, thus, wanted Iraq’s foreign policy to have a more pan-Arabist emphasis. The two most important pan-Arabist groups were a clandestine formation, the so-called Baath or Resurrection party, and the Nasserites. During 1962, the Baath developed plans for a coup against Qasim. The plan was executed on 8 February 1963 when the Baath and their Arab nationalist allies formed NCRC (National Council of the Revolutionary Command). After two days of heavy fighting the rebels had gained control of the government and ordered the execution of Qasim.
Shortly after the coup, NCRC announced the structure of Iraq’s new government. Former Defense Minster Gen. Abd as-Salam ARIF was made president. He served, however, as a mere figurehead and real power initially lay in the Baath party. However, the Baath Party was soon weakened by a deep split in the party leadership. The Iraqi president took advantage of the internal power struggles within the Baath party. In a bloodless coup backed by factions of the military ARIF installed a new government in the autumn of 1963.
A series of military and civilian governments followed, until the Baath party under Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein seized power in 1968. Al-Bakr became president. However, his leadership was gradually outstripped by Saddam Hussein, who succeeded him in 1979.
1982 – 1996 Armed Conflict with the Shii opposition
SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) was the main Shii Opposition coalition in Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein, who had come to power in 1979. The followers of the leader and founder of SCIRI, Ayatollah Sayed Al-Hakim, made up one of the largest factions of the umbrella organisation. Other major members of the assembly included factions such as al-Dawa, the Movement of the Iraqi Mujahideen, the Islamic Movement in Iraq and the Islamic Action Organisation.
Following different forms of persecution of members of Islamic movements, Ayatollah Sayed Al-Hakim left Iraq in 1980. SCIRI was created by Iraqi exiles in Iran on 17 November 1982 and quickly attracted other exiles such as Islamists, defected Iraqi officers and soldiers. The goal of SCIRI was to fight the Iraqi President Saddam Husseins regime through armed force by establishing "secret resistance cells inside Iraq" and "to mobilize Iraqis outside Iraq and to train them on using arms." To conduct these missions Ayatollah Sayed Al-Hakim established the military wing of SCIRI, the Badr Brigades.
Much of the early activity by SCIRI was made up of attacks launched from the Iranian side of the border, and was difficult to dissimilate from the ongoing Iran-Iraq interstate conflict. Following the end of the Iraq-Kuwait interstate conflict in March 1991, parts of the Iraqi military openly showed their defiance of the regime which triggered widespread protests against the government in southern Iraq. SCIRI forces joined these protests and launched attacks on government installations in Basra, Nassariya and other southern Iraqi towns. The government responded with large scale offensives that included severe violence targeting the civilian population.
Since its formation 1982, SCIRI has received substantial support from Iran. The organisation remained based in Tehran until 2003, and also received weaponry, training, and financial support from the Iranian government.
In late 1990 and early 1991, an Iraqi deputy prime minister asked the Iranian president Rafsanjani to mediate an agreement with SCIRI and other Shi’i opposition groups. SCIRI was offered one-third of the parliament and cabinet seats if they joined Iraq and supported the military action in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, but the offer was rejected. Except for this mediation attempt there were no negotiations between the parties.
There was no definite end to the conflict in the 1990s as sporadic clashes between the government and SCIRI continued after 1996, which is the last year with over 25 battle-related deaths observed. Following the Iraq-Australia, USA, United Kingdom conflict in 2003, which deposed the government of Saddam Hussein, SCIRI returned from Iranian exile to contest the upcoming elections. The organisation claimed that its military wing, the Badr Brigades, was transformed into aid-workers, distributing food, setting up health care centres, and conducting other humanitarian services. In 2005, SCIRI participated as part of the winning United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) in elections to the transitional national assembly (in January) which was replaced by the Council of Representatives (in December). In the new government, SCIRI representatives became responsible for the Ministry of Interior, and most of the Badr Brigades joined the Iraqi security forces, particularly the troops under the control of this department. These former Badr elements have been criticised for violence against civilians and especially harassing Sunni Muslims in Iraq. In May 2007, SCIRI announced a name change to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, as it no longer is fighting to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein.
2004-2007 attacks by Ansar al-Islam
Following the victory by USA, UK and Australia against Iraq in the 2003 conflict, the Saddam Hussein administration was replaced by a new government. Forces from a coalition of countries remained in Iraq to support the new government in providing security, policing, and reconstruction in the years that followed. Even in the first months of the new administration, violence and criticism of the government and its foreign support increased.
During the interstate conflict, the coalition launched air-strikes in support of the forces of PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) in its non-state conflict with Ansar al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) in northern Iraq. Most of Ansar al-Islam's members fled into exile but returned a few months later and organized themselves under a new name, JAAS (Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna, Army of Ansar Al-Sunna). JAAS claimed responsibility for several attacks on government forces starting in October 2003. However, these claims were often discredited on the basis of obvious factual errors. In June 2004, the group orchestrated attacks by suicide bombers on five different police stations in the city of Mosul which killed 62 people. In early 2007, the JAAS leadership split creating a breakaway faction that joined RJF (al-Jihad and al-Islah Front; Reformation and Jihad Front), while the main faction reverting back to the name Ansar al-Islam on 28 November 2007.
2004-2008 the Shii Al-Mahdi Army
The ousting of the Saddam Hussein regime was originally supported by most of the countrys Shii population as it had been repressed by the previous administration. In early 2004, political discontent with the new government became increasingly vocal also in parts of the Shii population, especially regarding the continued foreign forces in the country. One of the more outspoken critics was Muqtada al-Sadr who formed a militia, the Al-Mahdi Army, as early as 2003, with the intent of protecting Shii holy places from destruction. In October 2003, al-Sadr announced a short-lived shadow government as he argued that the official interim administration lacked credibility. Al-Sadr and his followers became increasingly critical of the government and the US in his sermons. In April 2004, the government shut down a newspaper controlled by al-Sadr on the basis that it incited violence and arrested of one of his aides on murder charges. As a response, the al-Mahdi Army launched coordinated attacks on government positions in southern Iraq as well as in Baghdad on 4 April 2004.
The al-Mahdi Army fought the government intensively during April-May and August-September 2004. In late August, the prime Shiite clerk in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, intervened and negotiated a ceasefire between the two forces. Al-Sadr then focused on the creation of the political wing, JST (Jamaat al-Sadr al-Thani, The Association of the Second Sadr). The al-Mahdi Army remained occasionally active in 2005 and 2006 in clashes with government and foreign troops as well as other militias. The organisation was often accused of attacking civilians, especially Sunni Muslims or former members of Saddam Husseins Baath party. During this period, Al-Sadr repeatedly denied any involvement in such incidents, blaming "rogue elements" and repeating his commitment to the Iraqi parliamentary system. Following the 2005 elections, JST held 32 seats in the parliament as part of the United Iraqi Alliance and also performed well in local elections. Muqtada al-Sadr continued to criticize the government and especially the use of foreign forces. In late 2006, JST boycotted the Iraqi parliament for two months. In a speech on 9 April 2007, al-Sadr threatened attacks on Iraqi government forces if they continued to jointly work with foreigners. A week later the JST members of government resigned. Between mid-March and mid-May 2008, there were intense clashes between the government and al-Mahdi Army in Baghdad and in southern Iraq. Fighting eased following a ceasefire agreement with al-Sadr even though occasional incidents continued throughout the year. Muqtada al-Sadr officially dissolved the al-Mahdi Army in 2008.
2004-2009 the Al-Qaida ally ISI and its predecessors TQJBR and MSC
As violence increased in the early months of 2004, a Jordanian named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was accused of heading the insurgency. Al-Zarqawi had reportedly been involved with Ansar al-Islam in early 2003, but it was unclear whether these contacts remained. In contrast to dozens of others groups which repeatedly claimed incidents they obviously had not been involved in, there were no official statements from al-Zarqawi that could be confirmed. On 24 April 2004, the "Military Department" of the group Jamaat al-Tawhid waal-Jihad (The Monotheism and Holy War Group) stated its intention to overthrow the government, expel the US forces, and establish a Sunni Islamic state with Sharia law. The group started its activity in the months that followed and it became clear that al-Zarqawi was among its leadership. On 17 October 2004, al-Zarqawi announced a change of name of the group to TQJBR (Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Organization of Jihads Base in the Country of the Two Rivers) and pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. Statements from bin Laden acknowledged the group and encouraged foreigners to join the Iraqi resistance. However, it is clear that TQJBR was not concerned with the same objectives as al-Qaida (for information on al-Qaida, see USA).
The endorsement by bin Laden and the high profile of al-Zarqawi contributed to the development of TQJBR into an umbrella organisation, which was able to incorporate several other smaller organisations as well as some tribal forces. At the same time, the Iraqi government and its foreign supporters tended to primarily target TQJBR in its offensives. In January 2006, it was announced that TQJBR was the leading party in a joint political umbrella coalition MSC (Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen fi al-Iraq, Mujahideen Consultative Council in Iraq). On 15 October 2006, MSC declared the official formation of ISI (Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya, Islamic State in Iraq) comprising the provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Ninewa, Babil and al-Wassat. Al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006 and the leadership of ISI was formed by representatives from several different factions.
The government launched several offensives against ISI during 2008, in particular in areas north of Baghdad including provinces in northern Iraq and the city of Mosul. In 2009, Iraqi insurgents included primarily ISI and a multitude of smaller groups with unclear links to ISI and/or the Baath Party. As the insurgents seemed to have lost their footing in most urban areas, with the exception of the city of Mosul, the violence in the country continued to decrease even though criminality was common. However, at times large-scale spectacular attacks took place, usually involving several simultaneous bombers. During many of these, it seemed like Iraqi police had been infiltrated and helped the attackers.
2005-2007 IAI and RJF
Another group that proclaimed its opposition to the government and the foreign support in 2004 was IAI (Al-Jaysh al-Islami fi Iraq; Islamic Army of Iraq), but it was not until 2005 that incidents could be linked to the organization. IAI started to organise a separate umbrella for groups fighting for an (Sunni) Islamic state in Iraq, as criticism grew against TQJBR (Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Organization of Jihads Base in the Country of the Two Rivers) and its use of violence against civilians. TQJBR was the predecessor of ISI (Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya, Islamic State in Iraq). On 2 May 2007, IAI announced the formation of the RJF (al-Jihad and al-Islah Front; Reformation and Jihad Front) which included members of the 1920 Revolution Brigades and a breakaway faction of JAAS (Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna, Army of Ansar Al-Sunna). Other groups joined RJF later in the year, and the organisation became increasingly active against the government, but also in clashes against ISI. There were even some reports of RJF acting in co-operation with government troops in attacks on ISI, even if RJF declared its continuous opposition to the Iraqi government.
2004-2009 Foreign and domestic supporters to the Iraqi government
In 2004-2009, the Iraqi government was supported by troops from a multinational coalition headed by the USA. During these years, the foreign troops provided the majority of the military and security forces on the government side. In early 2007, the Iraqi government and the US supporting troops initiated an offensive against insurgents as well as other violent actors. This so-called "surge" led to an intensification of the conflict as insurgents were being pushed north from Baghdad. As a result, violence decreased in Baghdad even though occasional attacks continued to create uncertainty in the capital. Violence continued to decrease in 2008, as it seemed like many of the smaller groups ceased their activity or became converted into government militias. As the 2007 surge seemed to stabilize the situations somewhat, many countries withdrew their forces from Iraq during 2008 leaving foreign troops from just six countries in the coalition by early 2009 (USA, UK, Romania, Australia, El Salvador, and Estonia). On 30 June 2009, responsibility for security in Iraq was handed over to the government and the foreign troops ended its patrolling duties. By the end of July, only US forces remained and on 1 January 2010, the coalition was officially renamed the United States Force-Iraq.
The Iraqi security forces originally also cooperated with paramilitary forces of former rebel groups, such as the Kurdish KDP and PUK forces in the north, and the Badr Brigades in Baghdad and in southern Iraq. By 2007, these had largely been incorporated into the official Iraqi police and army. There was growing discontent among the traditional tribal leadership with the behaviour of several insurgent groups, in particular ISI (Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya, Islamic State in Iraq). This led to the formation of paramilitary tribal militias that started attacking insurgents locally, in particular in Anbar province. The government encouraged this development and promoted it in other parts of the country as well, and by 2008 these militias had become incorporated into the security structure, including receiving salaries from the government.
2009-2010 Continued armed conflict with ISI
One of the main problems for tracking the development of the conflict in Iraq is the difficulty to identify which group is responsible for each action. As in previous years, Shii religious holidays in 2009 and 2010 led to attacks on pilgrims despite heavy security presence, but this did not result in communally-based revenge attacks. There were no shii rebel movement active as Muqtada al-Sadr (who officially dissolved the al-Mahdi Army in 2008) was reported to have gone in exile in Iran in 2007, in order to pursue religious schooling to eventually qualify as an ayatollah.
On 7 March 2010, parliamentary elections were held, surrounded by several large-scale attacks with dozens killed (mostly coded as one-sided violence). No coalition won enough seats to form a government, creating a political vacuum, and the negotiations lasted throughout the year. It was not until December 2010 that a new government, including all major factions, was approved. President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki were re-elected. In the election, Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers gained considerable support and during the year he sought to gain a political role in forming the new government, mainly by trying to prevent al-Maliki from being re-elected. In the end, however, he gave his approval in exchange for eight cabinet posts. With the backing of his supporters, he returned to Iraq in early January 2011.
In 2009 and 2010, Iraqi insurgents consisted primarily of ISI (Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya, Islamic State in Iraq) and a multitude of smaller groups with unclear links to ISI and/or the Baath Party. As the insurgents seemed to have lost their footing in most urban areas, with the exception of the city of Mosul, the violence in the country decreased in 2009 compared to 2008, even though criminality was common. However, 2010 saw about the same level of violence as the previous year, with the continuing trend of large-scale spectacular attacks, usually involving several simultaneous bombers. During many of these, it seemed like Iraqi police had been infiltrated and helped the attackers.
In 2009, the process of incorporating the paramilitary Sahwa ("awakening councils") into the local police forces continued, even though there were skirmishes between local Sahwa leaders and government troops claiming to hunt for actors responsible for earlier sectarian killings. The government has planned to incorporate approximately 25% of the awakening councils into the police and provide demobilization assistance for the remaining. The process has, however, been criticized by Sahwa members, who argued that the government did not pay their salaries on time and failed to provide enough support and protection against ISI.
In January 2010, ISI announced a new military strategy. Contrary to previous years when US soldiers had been one of the main targets, ISI now declared that 90 % of their bullets should target the Sahwa and politicians, while only 10% should target the US forces. ISI’s new strategy seems to have been implemented in 2010 since there were relatively few attacks on US soldiers compared to the number of attacks (about 200 reported killed) on Sahwa members and their families.
ISI was dealt a severe blow when two top leaders of ISI was killed in April 2010 in a joint Iraqi and US operation near Tikrit. However, contrary to what many analysts expected, the group was not considerably weakened and eventually announced the appointment of new leaders. A few days after the leaders had been killed, Baghdad was rocketed by a series of explosions, which in total killed about 60 people.
On 30 June 2009, responsibility for security in Iraq was handed over to the government and the foreign troops ended its patrolling duties. By the end of July, only US forces remained and on 1 January 2010, the coalition was officially renamed the United States Force-Iraq. The next step towards a full withdrawal of US forces was taken on 31 August, 2010, when the “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was officially ended, and succeeded by “Operation New Dawn”. This marked an end to USA’s combat mission in Iraq. A transitional force of nearly 50 000 troops was to remain in the country until the end of 2011, when a full troop withdrawal would be completed. The remaining troops would “advise and assist” Iraqi troops and protect US interests. A month later, in October 2010, Wikileaks published nearly 400 000 secret US army documents on the war in Iraq, reportedly the largest classified military leak ever.
Continued armed conflict after USA’s troop withdrawal from Iraq
2011 was the first year that the conflict in Iraq did not pass the intensity threshold of war; 1000 battle-related deaths in one year, since the start of the intrastate conflict over government in 2004. However, despite being coded as a minor conflict since 2011, the violence in Iraq continued on a high level, with a large number of attacks where it was not possible to identify the perpetrator. The attacks against civilians, especially Shiite pilgrims, has also continued to a large extent (for more information see the One-sided violence category; ISI – civilians).
Despite several major setbacks for ISI (Islamic State in Iraq) over the last few years, it continued to mount large-scale attacks involving suicide bombers or car bombs. ISI continued to target Sahwa members (Awakening councils) to a large extent. Also, the number of targeted assassinations of politicians and high-ranking military officers increased drastically. ISI claimed some of these attacks, but was reportedly far from responsible for all of them. At the same time, it was reported in late 2011 that ISI’s troop size has decreased to between 800-1000. Furthermore, a decline in the number of foreign members of the group was also observed. However, one year later, in late 2012, it was reported that ISI had gained renewed strength and more than doubled its troops to about 2500.
While ISI has been the only group that has passed the threshold of inclusion (25 battle-related deaths) in the last few years, 2011 saw the return of Ansar al-Islam. Ansar al-Islam was active 2004-2007 and has since then continued to launch a few attacks but did not pass the threshold of inclusion again until 2011. The group claimed two attacks, one in February and one in October, which in all killed 27 people. Ansar al-Islam was not active in 2012.
On 18 December 2011, USA withdrew their last troops from Iraq and subsequently ended “Operation New Dawn”. US officials negotiated with the Iraqi government about keeping a small military presence in Iraq, but such an agreement was not reached due to legal issues, mainly because of the US demand for immunity for its troops. However, by the end of 2011, about 150 military personnel in charge of training at the US embassy and a small group of marines tasked with protecting diplomats remained in Iraq.
At the same time as the last US troops were leaving Iraq, a political crisis was sparked when an arrest warrant was issued for the Sunni vice-president Tariq al-Hashemi. The allegations concerned terrorist crimes. Al-Hashemi immediately flew to the Kurdish region in northern Iraq and then later on to Turkey. Sunni members of parliament responded by temporarily boycotting the parliament and the cabinet. Al-Hashemi was sentenced to death in absentia in September 2012, but has remained in Turkey.
As in most of the Arab countries in 2011, protests were held in several places in Iraq. However, these were relatively small-scale and mainly focused on corruption and the reoccurring lack of electricity. A number of people were killed as security forces clashed with protesters.
Escalation of violence and ISI changes name to ISIS
In April 2013, the head of ISI (Islamic State in Iraq), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced that the group had changed its name to ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, alternatively Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). The group is also frequently referred to as ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). In essence, these two names mean the same thing; the word al-Sham refers both to the country of Syria, as well as to the capital Damascus. However, it also refers to the larger Levant-region. This region is defined differently, but can be generally described as an area by the eastern Mediterranean. Common to all definitions is that Syria is a part of this region. For information on ISIS in Syria, see the territorial conflict to incorporate Syria in the Islamic State (Syria: Islamic State).
The conflict between the Government of Iraq and ISIS escalated in 2013 and the conflict once again passed the UCDP threshold of war (at least 1000 battle-related deaths in one year). ISIS increased its attacks against both military and civilian targets, especially during the second half of the year. The group continued to carry out large-scale, often coordinated, attacks involving suicide bombers or car bombs. ISIS also continued to target Sahwa members (Awakening councils) to a large extent.
In July, ISIS staged two major prison attacks, freeing several hundred purported members of the group. The Iraqi Security Forces eventually captured or killed some of the escapees, but the majority of escapees were not found.
IS proclaims establishment of a caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq
The conflict between the Government of Iraq and IS (Islamic State, previously known as Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)) escalated dramatically in 2014. Thousands of people were killed as IS carried out large-scale attacks and seized large areas in both Iraq and Syria, including Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. The UN and several human rights groups stated that the violence in Iraq has reached levels not seen since 2006-2007. (It should be noted that the figures recorded by the UCDP for those years are very conservative estimates. One reason for this was that a lot of the violence in those years could not be included in UCDP data since it was unclear who the perpetrator was.)
In early 2014, IS took control over several cities and areas in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province. Intense fighting between IS fighters and the Iraqi troops took place in, among other areas, Fallujah and Ramadi, taking a heavy toll on the civilian population.
As the group gained ground in Iraq, a dispute with the central al-Qaida organisation caused ISIS’ expulsion from the larger al-Qaida network. A few months later, in late June, the group changed its name to IS (Islamic State), and announced that they had established a caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq.
On 10 June, Mosul and its surroundings were captured by IS fighters coming from both Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi army and security forces stationed in the area fled as is fighters were approaching.
IS also advanced south following the capture of Mosul and its surrounding areas. Its forces reached as far as Tikrit and also east into the Diyala province. During its advances, the group looted banks, captured military equipment as well as the largest dam in Iraq; the Mosul Dam. Intense fighting also took place during the second half of 2014 around the country’s largest oil refinery close to Bayji town.
Following the capture of several cities, including Mosul and Sinjar in northern Iraq, hundreds of thousands of civilians fled the area. At the same time, a large number of people were captured. Many men and boys were killed while a lot of women and girls were later sold into slavery. Similar stories have been reported from other places captured by IS.
IS also continued to target Sahwa members (Awakening councils) to a large extent, as well as other groups and tribes that openly opposed them. In late October, the group killed more than 200 members of the Albu Nimr tribe in Anbar province. Most of the dead were either police officers or members of the Sahwa. Many civilian members of the tribe were also killed in the attack.
The conflict continued unabated in 2015. Thousands of people were killed as IS carried out large-scale attacks and clashed with security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Heavy clashes were fought over e.g. Ramadi in Anbar province. The city was captured in May and remained in full control until December when government forces retook part of the city.
US-led coalition air strikes against is in Iraq and Syria
As the IS gained more and more ground and reports of killings, abductions, torture etc. increased in number, a number of countries became involved as secondary warring parties on the side on the Iraqi government. During the second half of 2014, USA, Australia, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands carried out airstrikes against IS targets. The airstrikes continued throughout 2015. Most of these countries, as well as some others, also provided support in the form of advisers and training programs for the Iraqi army. Economic support and military equipment were also provided. Further, Iran supported the Iraqi government with military equipment, advisers, and carried out surveillance flights over Iraq. US officials have claimed that there have been indications that Iran has conducted airstrikes in Iraq, but this has been denied by Iran.
USA, together with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates, also carried out airstrikes against IS on Syrian territory. Since USA was seen a secondary warring party to Iraq, all attacks carried out by USA and its coalition partners against IS were coded as part of the Government of Iraq-IS dyad, regardless of geographical location.
Mosul offensive 2016-2017
The conflict between the Government of Iraq and IS continued unabated in 2016 and the US-led coalition continued to carry out airstrikes against IS targets in both Iraq and Syria. Thousands of people were killed in clashes between government forces, supported by a number of militias, and IS. During 2016, IS lost control of key cities and areas. In June, the Iraqi commander leading the fight to recapture Fallujah declared the battle to be over.
In October 2016, Iraqi forces initiated an offensive aimed at retaking Mosul, IS’s last major stronghold in the country. Thousands of people were killed in clashes between IS and government forces, supported by so called Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Peshmerga forces, and US-led coalition airstrikes. Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi finally declared Mosul to be under full government control on 10 July 2017.
Government of Iraq declares victory over IS in Iraq
Government forces continued to capture IS-controlled areas during the second half of 2017 and on 9 December, the Government of Iraq declared victory over IS in Iraq. Despite this, IS has continuously carried out a attacks in Iraq, albeit on a much smaller scale than previously.
In 2018 and 2019, the number of clashes between IS and government forces as well as the number of battle-related deaths decreased drastically. 2019 was the year with the lowest number of fatalities in state-based violence since the ouster of the Saddam Hussein government. However, despite the declaration of victory in 2017, the conflict remained highly active as IS shifted tactics from holding territories to carrying out attacks against military targets (for more information about IS attacks against civilians, see IS - Civilians).
In 2020, both the number of clashes and battle-related deaths between IS and government forces rose, largely due to a lack of coordination between the Iraqi armed forces and the Peshmerga of the Kurdistan Regional Government in disputed territories. This gap in cooperation reduced pressure on IS and enabled the group to stage a limited resurgence in these and surrounding areas. The trend persisted into 2021, which saw a slight uptick in fatalities resulting from clashes between the Government of Iraq and IS. In December 2021, the US-led international coalition that had supported Iraq against IS formally ended its combat mission in the country. Although hostilities between [Iraqi forces and IS](/#/actor/234 have become less frequent since 2021, 2024 saw a modest increase in battle-related fatalities compared to the previous year.
