This dyad belongs to the conflict Pakistan: Government
Summary of conflict Pakistan: Government
The overall conflict concerns Pakistani governmental power. However, different aspects have been the main focus at different stages of it, depending on which insurgent group has been active against the government. While the conflict initially focused on the rights of the Mohajir group within the Pakistani system, it later came to concern the country’s legal system. The article below reflects these different phases.
Since 2019, the conflict has followed the upwards trend in fatalities occurring in Pakistan, with a major escalation in 2024 and 2025. For a majority of this period, TTP was the sole actor fighting the Government of Pakistan. In 2023, the rebel groups TJP and HGB emerged as well. In April 2025, a new alliance IMP was announced, combining forces from Lashkar-e-Islam, HGB and Harakat-e-Inqila-e-Islami.
Background to the MQM-phase
Following the withdrawal of the British colonial power and the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, many Urdu-speaking refugees crossed the border from India and settled mainly around Karachi and other urban areas in the Sindh province. These refugees were generally referred to as Mohajir. During the 1980s, against a backdrop of increasing communal tension between the Mohajir and other ethnic groups, MQM (Mohajir Quami Movement, Mohajir Peoples Movement) started promoting an agenda of political reform. In the autumn of 1986, MQM held its first public meetings where its leader Altaf Hussain encouraged the Mohajir youth to collect their arms: "If our rights are not given to us, we will use every kind of force." MQM demanded the recognition of the Mohajir as a distinct ethnic group - as Pakistans fifth nationality - and increased political rights. This included proportional representation for the Mohajir in national and provincial assemblies, a diffusion of power, and a corresponding re-division of funds. The claims of MQM also included a territorial dimension, namely a division of the Sindh and the establishment of a Mohajir-dominated urban province around Karachi.
MQM activity in 1990
MQMs (Mohajir Quami Movement, Mohajir Peoples Movement) public agitation for rights and recognition was followed by street violence, but it was not until June 1990 that it was possible to confirm that 25 people had died in clashes between MQM and the government. By this time, the security situation in Karachi had deteriorated markedly through riots, communal clashes, fractious politics, large quantities of arms and institutional breakdown. The government chose to approach the situation as a problem of law and order and initiated a major security crackdown, designating urban parts in the province of Sindh as "disturbed areas". These areas were subsequently put under military control. The ruling Benazir Bhutto administration, however, failed to control the escalating violence and was ousted by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan later the same year. Following the coup, MQM participated in elections and briefly used the city government of Karachi as a platform for criticising the national government.
MQM activity in the mid-1990s
The period from 1991 to 1994 was marked by subsequent factionalisation of MQM (Mohajir Quami Movement, Mohajir Peoples Movement), internecine clashes within the Mohajir community and a series of harsh crackdowns initiated by the police and the army - i.e. communal and one-sided violence. An attempt to withdraw the army from Karachi in December 1994 and leave the responsibility for security in the hands of police and paramilitaries led to an escalation of violence. By July 1995, the government re-deployed the army and accused MQM of being terrorists trying to separate Karachi from Pakistan. The major military crackdown that followed left MQM severely weakened, with a large share of its cadres either imprisoned or killed.
In early 1996, MQM started to restrict its armed campaign and focused on demonstrating its commitment to a peaceful solution. The move was interpreted as a reaction both to a successful offensive by Pakistani security agencies and to increased scrutiny from the international community, as the conflict garnered increased attention.
Apart from a shift in strategy by MQM, two other factors coincided in 1996 to facilitate a peaceful solution: First, there was third party involvement in the form of diplomatic pressure from the US government to find a political solution; second, the incoming Pakistani government recognised MQMs accusations of extrajudicial killings and excessive violence by state forces, and promised an investigation of human right abuses. Such conciliatory moves paved the way for MQMs participation in the national elections in 1997, where it won a substantial share of the votes in the urban Sindh province. In February the same year MQM concluded an accord with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and joined the coalition government both at the federal level and in the Sindh province. The accord provided for examinations of alleged killings of MQM members in custody and compensation to the affected families.
U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan
2010 saw an unprecedented surge in US drone attacks against militants in Pakistan. In total, far over 100 strikes resulting in several hundred deaths were reported for last year, which marks a record high since the campaign started in 2004. The increase shows that the operation in Pakistan has become a crucial part of the “war on terror”. The attacks, operated by the CIA, almost exclusively targeted militants in North Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). While the campaign was thought to target high-level Al Qaida figures, the vast majority of the strikes in 2010 were directed against low-level militants and only few militant leaders were killed. Furthermore, US drones increasingly targeted militants of other terrorist networks than Al Qaida. In particular after the attempted car bomb attack on Times Square in New York, which TTP claimed responsibility for, the drone attacks increasingly also focused on Pakistan Taleban. Moreover, the Haqqani network has been targeted throughout the year.
Although the number of attacks increased, the strikes were carried out with high precision. The number of civilians killed in drone attacks is extremely low and continues to decline. The overwhelming majority of the persons who died in the attacks were classified as militants or suspected militants. Especially when compared to military offensives carried out by Pakistan’s security forces on the ground, the drone attacks have claimed fewer civilian lives.
Despite the accuracy of most strikes, several incidents that resulted in casualties among civilians and the growing frequency of strikes led to rising criticism and protests in Pakistan. The Pakistani government’s public stance towards the CIA-operated attacks is increasingly critical and opposes the strikes. Pakistan’s foreign minister publically stated that a continuation of the attacks might endanger the close ties between Pakistan and the US. The major concern of Pakistan’s government is that civilian casualties might inflame public anger and weaken support for Pakistan’s own counter-insurgency operations. In December, the leading political parties in Pakistan issued a declaration calling upon the government and the security forces to take action to stop the attacks, which are seen as a major violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that Pakistan is providing intelligence for at least some of the strikes and while the majority of the drones are launched from Afghanistan, reports also speak of secret bases within Pakistan.
A New Power is Rising - Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
When the conflict in Pakistan resumed in 2007, the main criticism of the government was related to the legal system in the country and the legitimacy of the government. The role of religion in Pakistan had been a contested issue ever since independence and it had been argued that governance should be more influenced by Islamic traditions. Groups pressing for such reforms had become increasingly prominent and militant particularly in the areas along the Afghani border such as the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. One such organisation was TNSM (Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws) which was formed in 1989 with the stated objective of promoting the imposition of Sharia-based laws in the Malakand region of the North-West Frontier Province.
Following an unsuccessful attempt to fight alongside the Taliban government in the Afghanistan conflict in 2001, the leader of TNSM was jailed and the organisation banned by the Pakistani government. The practical leadership of the organisation passed to Maulana Fazlullah who started making increasingly militant statements against the Pakistani political system and against the government. In 2007, at the same time as the government was involved in a standoff with radical clerics from an Islamabad mosque with a similar agenda as TNSM, Fazlullah encouraged his followers to start attacking government forces.
In subsequent months, TNSM expanded its control over areas in the Swat valley as police and government forces withdrew. TNSM removed Pakistani flags and established courts and a volunteer police-force to increase its control over the territory. Fighting escalated in late October as the government launched a large-scale offensive targeting the headquarters of TNSM. After a month and a half of intense fighting, the remaining TNSM forces retreated into nearby mountains while local tribal and religious leaders tried to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict. The government eventually released the imprisoned leader of TNSM, Maulana Sufi Mohammad, as other TNSM leaders renounced the use of armed force that had been promoted by Fazlullah. Eventually however, Fazlullah and his militant faction decided to join an alliance of commanders against the government, TTP (Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan, Movement of Students in Pakistan). This move signified the termination of TNSM activity in 2007, as other parts of the group, while still remaining committed to introducing Sharia-law in the country, renounced the use of force against the government.
Tribal leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan had been critical to government policy for several years. The primary point of concern had been the deployment of Pakistani security forces in the region which they argued violated the local autonomy of the tribes in the region. The government argued that the tribes had proven incapable of sufficient control of the border to Afghanistan or of the al Qaeda members hiding in the region. The tense situation led to occasional clashes and agreements of cooperation with local leaders about security arrangements in the region. At the outset, TTP was formed by commanders who were critical of the government’s policy concerning these areas, but eventually they also wanted to introduce a political change in Pakistan through the introduction of Sharia-legislation in the country. The promoted path is known as "defensive jihad" which can be seen as an approach of forcibly closing down government institutions and replacing them with Sharia-rules. If the government tries to protect or reinstate schools and judicial systems in these areas, the changes can be protected through the use of armed force.
Intense fighting between the government and TTP commanders took place throughout 2008, and continued during 2009. Following intense fighting in the beginning of 2009 in North-West Frontier Province’s Swat valley, the government offered the imposition of Sharia-law in the area, and asked Maulana Sufi Mohammad of TNSM (Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws) to convince the local TTP leader Maulana Fazlullah to accept a ceasefire. In late February, the ceasefire was agreed in the Swat valley and was followed a week later by a unilateral ceasefire imposed by the TTP commander in adjoining Bajaur agency, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad.
In response to this apparent de-escalation and reports of growing inter-factional clashes within the TTP umbrella, the commanders in North and South Waziristan Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Maulvi Nazir announced a new alliance called Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen (Union of Holy Warriors) committed to fight against the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. This moniker was not long-lived as the umbrella of TTP during the year even expanded to incorporate some local commanders that previously had been unwilling to fight the Pakistani government.
The ceasefires in Swat and Bajaur were not able to contain skirmishes between government forces and TTP, and large-scale fighting erupted in April in the adjoining Malakand division. In response, the government launched a total of five different offensives in different areas of the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas that continued throughout the year. These attacks led to high-intensity fighting but also dislodged TTP from controlling territory in most regions. TTP responded by increasing their bomb attacks in population centres in the south of the country, mostly targeting government or military installations but also at times civilians.
Throughout the year, US aerial attacks on al Qaeda (referred to as “foreign militants”) continued. (For more information, see Government of the United States of America – al Qaeda.) As the al Qaeda hideouts often coincided with camps of TTP commanders, these attacks also had an effect on the Pakistani conflict. In particular, an air strike in August killed TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud leading to the appointment of Hakeemullah Mehsud from the Orakzai tribal agency as the new leader of the organization. The TTP/al Qaeda/Afghan Taleban responded to the increasing air strikes by executing individuals – in particular Afghani nationals – while blaming them for being US spies used to identify the targets of the strikes.
Fighting between the Pakistani government and TTP continued throughout 2010 with high intensity, although the number of battle-related deaths decreased slightly. Fighting was particularly heavy in various agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in north-western Pakistan along the Afghan border. Fighting also continued in several agencies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the province formerly known as Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). But compared to previous years the number of fatalities dropped significantly in this part of the country.
Similar to previous years, Pakistani security forces launched several military offensives against TTP strongholds in various agencies in northwest Pakistan during 2010, resulting in the deaths of several thousand militants. In 2010, much of the fighting occurred in Orakzai Agency in FATA, a region where the security forces in the previous years had only sporadically attacked TTP and which served as the base for TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud. From mid-January onwards, forces from the Pakistan Army, the Frontier Corps and police contingents prepared the major offensive “Khwakh Ba De Sham” (“Spring Cleaning”) that was launched in Orakzai Agency and Tirah Valley of the Khyber Agency in mid-March. The security forces declared victory on 31 May. Clashes in Orakzai Agency, however, continued throughout the year and intensified again during summer. While the security forces were able to gain control over parts of lower Orakzai, upper Orakzai largely remained in the firm grip of the militants. In addition to Orakzai, the security forces also launched an operation against militant strongholds in Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies in early 2010. Although the TTP’s top leadership was able to escape, a number of local commanders were killed in the fighting and the militant outfits were forced to retreat further into the mountains.
In FATA and KP, TTP’s activities concentrated on attacks against convoys and checkpoints of the security forces and police stations. Also, members of pro-government peace committees and tribal elders were targeted by TTP. A major cause for concern and a clear sign of deepening radicalisation in Pakistan despite the overall decline in fatalities was the spread of terrorist attacks beyond FATA and KP that are attributed to TTP and affiliated groups during 2010. Attacks have increasingly been carried out in major cities and in Punjab. TTP militants even claimed responsibility for attacks in Karachi. There is considerable evidence suggesting that sectarian groups like the Punjabi Taleban that entered the scene in 2009 can now also be regarded as part of the TTP network. That sectarian violence plays an increasing role can also be seen from the escalating violence in Kurram Agency, which is the only Shi’a majority tribal agency.
In all, developments during 2010 underline the fact that TTP is far more than a local movement whose concern is limited to Pakistan. The attempted car bomb attack on Times Square in New York on 1 May revealed the movement’s far-reaching aspirations beyond the de-stabilisation of the Pakistani government. In Pakistan, TTP claimed responsibility for a number of attacks against NATO supply convoys. It also became public that TTP had sent a letter to the Afghan government in 2007, stating that the TTP was fighting for the separation of Bajaur Agency from Pakistan that should become a part of Afghanistan. Moreover, like in previous years, TTP has been cooperating closely with various Afghanistan- and Pakistan-based militant groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network. TTP militants are involved in operations in Afghanistan and uphold close ties with Afghan Taleban. A range of regional and international terrorist networks use TTP strongholds in FATA and KP as operational bases. TTP bases serve as hideouts and training camps for fighters from various terrorist movements from across Asia and other foreign militants. In addition to North Waziristan, where TTP bases mainly harbour militants affiliated to Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network, fighters from various other groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and Jaish-e-Islami (JeI) have bases e.g. in Bajaur Agency. It is unclear to what extent groups like Lashkar-e-Islami (LI) can be regarded as parts of the TTP network. However, these groups all share a common view of jihad that has been established by the Therik-e-Nifazi Shariat-e-Mohmmadi (TNSM), whose founder Maulvi Faqir Mohammad has also joined TTP.
The heavy floods that hit Pakistan in summer 2010 had major repercussions on the conflict between militants and the government. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was among the regions that were most severely affected by the floods, which significantly slowed down fighting in this area. Security forces were withdrawn from the fighting TTP and instead deployed to assist in relief efforts. For TTP, this offered an opportunity to regroup. Also, the militants engaged in relief efforts in areas controlled by TTP, thereby winning support in areas where the government was absent or failed to deliver aid and people felt that they were abandoned by the government. Some sources also claim that the floods offered an excuse for the Pakistani security forces not to launch a major offensive in North Waziristan that the US government had been pushing for. Throughout 2010, U.S. drone attacks against militants in North Waziristan reached an unprecedented level with far over 100 attacks. In addition to targeting Al Qaeda and other foreign militants, TTP leaders have also been targeted throughout the year. For example, an unsuccessful drone attack in January targeted TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud after TTP had claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against a CIA base in Afghanistan (For more information on the US campaign in Pakistan, see text on US drone attacks in Pakistan).
Although it recorded the least amount of battle-related deaths since the inception of Taleban insurgency, the fighting between the Pakistani government and TTP maintained its intensity throughout 2012. The total number of fatalities dropped for the fourth consecutive year, but for the first time there were more than three active dyads concerning Pakistani governmental power. The other two active groups in 2012 were TTP-TA (Tariq Afridi), an offshoot of mainstream TTP, and Lashkar-e-Islam (Army of Islam), which became active again after a one year break.
A vast majority of attacks against the government forces took place in the tribal belt between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Specifically, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces were hit hard by the Sunni extremist insurgency. The Pakistani military mostly relied on their air superiority against the militants, opting for air strikes instead of putting Pakistani soldiers at risk. As a result, the fatality statistics turned out to be quite asymmetrical, with militants suffering heavy casualties and not being able to retaliate. Insurgents, on the other hand, ambushed convoys in tribal areas and resorted to suicide bombings to inflict heavy damage to government forces. Similar to previous years, the Pakistani army was supported by the Frontier Corps, and in some cases, even by tribal lashkars (militias).
After splitting from the mainstream TTP, influential commander Tariq Afridis faction was specifically targeted in 2012. Two airstrike campaigns undertaken by the Pakistani military inflicted dozens of casualties to TTP-TA, making the dyad active for the first time. As TTP-TA had far less resources than the mainstream TTP, there was no recorded backlash against the government forces by TTP-TA.
New groups emerge
Since 2023, two groups have emerged alongside TTP in Pakistan. They are TJP and HGB. HGB (Forces of Hafiz Gul Bahadur) was originally established in 2005 before becoming part of TTP in 2007. It resurfaced as an independent organisation in 2023 and carried out both large scale and smaller attacks directed at government forces with the goal of enforcing Sharia law in Pakistan. TJP was formed in 2023 with the same goal. In April 2025, a new alliance IMP was announced, combining forces from Lashkar-e-Islam, HGB and Harakat-e-Inqila-e-Islami.
