SUMMARY
In the context of widespread popular protest, the Government of Venezuela has made use of one-sided violence against civilians.
The 1989 implementation of a strict economic austerity program imposed by Carlos Andrés Pérez’ newly instated government caused widespread discontent in Venezuela and made for a highly combustible setting with scattered demonstrations, led mainly by students, as a direct result. Isolated instances of demonstrations escalating and turning violent had already begun to take place, but the true spark for the crisis was provided following a substantial increase to the price of petrol. This caused a dramatic increase in the public transport fares. Protests began taking place at key points of the Caracas transportation system. The more spontaneous demonstrations eventually came to join forces with the better organised student manifestations, linking an immediate frustration with the dramatic increases to bus fares, in particular, with the broader dissatisfaction with the economic adjustment program of the Pérez administration, in general. The period of unrest that followed was to be referred to as the ‘Caracazo’, the most extensive and violent period of popular protest in Venezuela’s history.
The social protests soon turned into rioting and looting, before long engulfing Caracas’ poor townships and spreading to other parts of the country. A lack of timely authoritative intervention on behalf of the government is said to have allowed the protests of escalate and extend their reach. The Metropolitan Police quickly found they were overwhelmed and neither equipped nor prepared to respond effectively to the outburst of communal disorder. By some accounts, the police deployed were under order to not take any action at all. According to observers, the response bore the appearance of the Venezuelan government being both surprised by, and having seriously underestimated, the strength of protests. According to analysts, the civilian government was initially divided on how the outburst of protests and looting should be managed before opting for a more decisive approach, and government security forces were deployed to reinstate order. The government’s decision to suspend constitutional guarantees led way for heavy-handed tactics on behalf of the army and elements of the police force.
The response was to resort to massive violence that was disproportionate and, at times, indiscriminate. Tactics on behalf of the security forces and police elements included raids in homes and disappearances. There were widespread incidences of soldiers firing wantonly into residential buildings and crowds of people, killing unarmed civilians. The bulk of the casualties were residents of Caracas’ working class districts, shot to death as the security forces struggled to reassert control over the city. Students were among those who appear to have been particularly targeted for raids, and possibly killings. According to some observers, certain members of the police opportunistically rounded up and killed known criminals. Counterinsurgency measures on behalf of government intelligence forces included detaining and torturing members of political or student activist groups. While there were government statements issued on the nature of the rebellion and on figures of people deceased, they tended to insinuate that there had been improvements to the security situation following the prior imposition of the curfew. In fact, the situation was the opposite: with few exceptions the deaths occurred after the curfew was already in place, at the hands of the security forces and with the consent of the government. The level of experience and professionalism among the armed forces many of those airlifted into Caracas from the regions were very young has also been upheld as an explanation for the acts of one-sided violence against civilians.
The Pérez government denied having committed abuses during the crisis, instead blaming the events of the Caracazo on problems of insubordination within the Metropolitan Police. Further, Pérez rejected the notion that the announcement of his economic adjustment plan, or its early stages of implementation, was in any way connected with the instabilities. The Caracazo was dismissed as a completely spontaneous outburst. Government investigations into the deaths during the Caracazo, as well as in earlier cases on transgressions towards civilians on behalf of Venezuelan security forces, have not been prioritised.
The Government of Venezuela first became active as a one-sided actor in UCDP data in 1989, when the one-sided violence resulted in over 25 civilian deaths. The threshold was reached sometime between February and March of that year when more than 25 civilians were the target of shootings, indiscriminate use of force and extrajudicial executions by the government's security forces.
