SUMMARY
In December 2015, the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) was signed in Skhirat, Morocco. The main purpose of the agreement was to reconcile Libya’s National Salvation Government (NSG) and its rival, eastern-based government affiliated with the House of Representatives; armed conflict between the NSG-led Government of Libya and the House of Representatives had been ongoing since 2014. While the House of Representatives eventually reneged on the LPA, the agreement resulted in the NSG – which had been forcefully put in power by the Misrata- and Islamist-dominated Libya Dawn coalition in August 2014 – being replaced by a new “Government of National Accord” (GNA) in March 2016. The so-called Presidency Council (PC), chaired by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj, headed the new GNA. However, not long before the GNA was scheduled to arrive in the capital Tripoli, incumbent NSG Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghawill announced that he would not yield government power to al-Serraj and the GNA. Several powerful militias based in Tripoli, many of which had been part of Libya Dawn, also rejected the GNA; Salah Badi, an influential ex-Libya Dawn commander from Misrata, even expressed that he would use force to prevent the GNA from arriving in Tripoli. In the face of this hostility, al-Serraj and the GNA – which lacked any armed forces – engaged with several powerful Tripoli militias in order to ensure safe passage into the capital. By accruing the support of the Special Deterrence Force (SDF) – a militia led by Abdel Raouf Kara – and the Nawasi Battalion, al-Serraj and a small GNA delegation successfully arrived in Tripoli port by boat on 30 March. Rather unexpectedly, the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) – a large and powerful militia led by Haithem al-Tajouri, who just weeks before had demanded the restoration of the Libyan monarchy – also sided with the GNA. In the face of this, NSG Prime Minister al-Ghawill backed down, and allowed the GNA to assume government power; armed violence was also avoided, as authorities in Misrata convinced hardliner Salah Badi to stand down.
Even if the new GNA-led Government of Libya had secured its presence in Tripoli, it was still forced to engage with various local militias in order to compensate its lack of armed forces. Following the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Tripoli had been the scene of intense militia power struggles, as territorial control in the capital was closely linked to economic and political benefits. Up until the arrival of the GNA, militias from outside Tripoli – particularly from the town Misrata, but until mid-2014 also Zintan – had held dominant positions in the capital. The GNA tipped this balance in favor of Tripoli-based militias, as it forged ties to groups like the aforementioned SDF and Nawasi Battalion, but also TRB and a militia known as the Ghaniwa Brigade. In late 2016 and early 2017, Khalifa al-Ghawill attempted to retake government power with the help of various external militias – such as Jabhat al-Samud and Kaniyat – but was repelled by Tripoli militias loyal to the GNA. In the aftermath of the clashes against al-Ghawill’s forces, al-Serraj and the GNA allowed its affiliated militias to take control over Tripoli under the pretext of removing armed opposition against the government. In reality however, the government-affiliated militias used this mandate to eliminate its local competitors. Consequently, a powerful alliance of militias – which included SDF, TRB, Nawasi Battalion, and Ghaniwa Brigade – took almost complete control over central Tripoli from mid-2017. As these groups took control over vital economic and strategic infrastructure, and neighborhoods containing government institutions, they became informally known as the “Tripoli Militia Cartel”. While this cartel remained nominally loyal to the Government of Libya, it soon grew so powerful that it could act completely outside government control, instead focusing its own particularistic interests; the cartel militias even began extorting government institutions for various favors.
During the summer of 2018, tensions escalated in Tripoli as armed factions grew increasingly aggrieved by the power and favors enjoyed by the militia cartel. In late August, the Kaniyat militia from the town Tarhuna declared that it would “cleanse the country from the grip of armed gangs”, referring to the cartel militias. While Kaniyat had supported ex-Prime Minister al-Ghawill in 2017, it had since declared its loyalty to the GNA; however, this relationship had soured in early 2018, allegedly because of the government’s inability to control the militias in Tripoli. Kaniyat also had more direct grievances against the militia cartel, as TRB had forced it to abandon its strategically important positions near Tripoli International Airport in 2017. On 26 August, heavy fighting erupted in Tripoli’s southern suburbs, as Kaniyat advanced on positions held by TRB. The attacks were primarily directed towards Tripoli International Airport, as well as the highway linking the airport to downtown Tripoli. As the fighting escalated, TRB was joined by forces from the Ghaniwa Brigade from the Abu Salim neighborhood, and by Brigade 301, a less influential militia controlling areas around the airport. Both sides made use of heavy weapons, indiscriminately shelling densely populated areas, which killed, injured, and displaced a large number of civilians.
The fighting in Tripoli raged for several days, as Kaniyat attempted to enter the city; soon, the Nawasi Battalion was drawn into the fighting. The human toll was high, and the final death toll was over 70. As the fighting between the militias escalated, the GNA’s inability to control the Tripoli militias was laid bare; despite several attempts to stop the fighting, the militias ignored the government’s orders. It was not until 4 September that a fragile ceasefire was achieved with assistance from the United Nations; however, Kaniyat – which had taken control over Yarmouk military camp - did not withdraw from Tripoli’s southern neighborhoods, which meant that tensions remained high. In a bid to restore order in Tripoli, Prime Minister al-Serraj ordered the creation of new security arrangements, which included the transfer of formal security functions to non-Tripoli militias. Consequently, responsibility for maintaining order in Tripoli was given to the influential Zintani warlords Osama Juweil and Emad Trablesi, whose militias were stationed west of the capital. Furthermore, units from the powerful Misratan militia Al Bunyan Al Marsous Operations Room (ABAM) – most well-known for wresting Sirte from the Islamic State in 2016 – moved into Tripoli’s eastern suburbs on al-Serraj’s initiative. However, these forces were not allowed to enter the parts of Tripoli where the actual militia fighting had taken place; it was suggested that al-Serraj feared an armed confrontation between the Zintanis and Misratans, as fighting between these factions, had triggered the 2014-2015 conflict in Libya. In practice, this meant that most of Tripoli remained under the control of the Tripoli Militia Cartel.
In mid-September, fighting involving the cartel militias and Kaniyat – now reinforced by Salah Badi’s Jabhat al-Samud militia – erupted again; more information about this violent episode can be found here.
The non-state conflict between Brigade 301, Ghaniwa Brigade, Nawasi Battalion, TRB and Kaniyat is first included in UCDP data in 2018. In September of that year, clashes between the groups had resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.
