SUMMARY
Nawasi Battalion (alternatively “Eight Force”) was an armed group active in Libya. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s security and military institutions suffered an almost complete collapse. Consequently, Libya experienced a rapid proliferation of armed militias and “brigades” – many comprised of fighters who had participated in the 2011 uprising – that sought to establish themselves as local or regional powerbrokers; it was in this context that the Nawasi Battalion emerged. Abd al-Latif Qaddur created the Nawasi Battalion at some point after the defeat of Gaddafi in October 2011. The group was comprised of former revolutionary fighters – who had fought under the umbrella of the NTC rebel coalition – from Tripoli’s Suq al-Jum’a neighborhood. The group pursued its own particularistic agenda that was focused on maintaining control over strategically important territory and economic infrastructure in Tripoli; it was not clear whether the group had any political goals of its own, or if it had a particular ideological direction. However, the Nawasi Battalion was known for siding with various other political and military factions.
From late 2014 to March 2016, the Nawasi Battalion was part of the de facto armed forces – formally referred to as “Central Security Apparatus’ (CSA) North Tripoli Unit” – loyal to the “National Salvation Government” (NSG) that controlled the Government of Libya at the time. Nawasi Battalion leader Qaddur even briefly served as interior minister during Khalifa al-Ghawill’s tenure as prime minister. Following the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015, the NSG government was replaced by the Government of National Accord (GNA) in March 2016. While a majority of Tripoli’s militias were opposed to the GNA, the Nawasi Battalion decided to support the new government. When GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj arrived by boat in Tripoli, he disembarked at a naval base held by the Nawasi Battalion. As the GNA-led Government of Libya established itself in Tripoli, the Nawasi Battalion was one of the militias that came to function as the de facto armed forces of the Government of Libya.
As the GNA-led Government of Libya lacked any regular armed forces during the period 2016-2018, it was entirely reliant on the support of existing militias in order to exercise basic security functions. This eventually led to the emergence of the “Tripoli Militia Cartel”, an uneasy alliance comprised of a few major armed factions nominally aligned with the government. The Nawasi Battalion was part of this cartel, alongside the Special Deterrence Force (SDF, or “RADA”), Ghaniwa Brigade, and TRB. While the “cartel” cooperated in order to limit the influence of other militias, there were also tensions and clashes between the Nawasi Battalion and both TRB and the Ghaniwa Brigade. By mid-2017, the Tripoli militia cartel had purged most of its rivals from the city, nominally with the government’s mandate. The cartel militias took control over all relevant economic infrastructure, and carved up the city’s most important neighborhoods between themselves. For example, the Nawasi Battalion controlled the Port of Tripoli. By mid-2018, the Nawasi Battalion and its allies in the Tripoli Militia Cartel had grown so powerful that the Libyan government had no direct control over the groups; the cartel militias were even known for extorting various government institutions and of appropriating national resources. As such, the Nawasi Battalion emerged as an independent non-state actor in the UCDP data for the first time in 2018.
On 19 September 2018, the Nawasi Battalion alongside TRB, the Ghaniwa Brigade, Brigade 301, and Special Deterrence Force (SDF) created the Tripoli Protection Force (TPF); after this, the Nawasi Brigade ceased to exist as an independent actor in the UCDP data.
TRB (Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade) was an armed group active in Libya. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s security and military institutions suffered an almost complete collapse. Consequently, Libya experienced a rapid proliferation of armed militias and “brigades” – many comprised of fighters who had participated in the 2011 uprising – that sought to establish themselves as local or regional powerbrokers; it was in this context that TRB emerged. TRB pursued its own particularistic agenda that was focused on maintaining control over strategically important territory and economic infrastructure in Tripoli; the group did not have any overtly stated, coherent political goals.
TRB – which was led by Haithem al-Tajouri - emerged in Tripoli at some point in 2012. Al-Tajouri used TRB to further his own interests in Tripoli. For example, TRB did not participate in the 2014 Tripoli fighting, which was in part caused by the results of the 2014 parliamentary elections. After the “National Salvation Government” (NSG) took government power in Tripoli in August 2014, TRB became parts of the NSG-led Government of Libya’s armed forces under the formal name “Central Security Apparatus’ (CSA) First Security Units”. When the NSG was replaced by the new “Government of National Accord” (GNA) in March 2016, TRB capitalized on the changing power dynamics in Tripoli. Several Tripoli-based militias actively opposed the creation of the GNA as they firmly supported the NSG, but TRB advanced its own position by offering its support to the new GNA-led Government of Libya, which suffered from an acute lack of armed supporters. It should be noted that TRB’s decision to side with the GNA government was rather surprising, as al-Tajouri had called for the restoration of the Senussi monarchy – which had been ousted by Gaddafi in 1969 - just a few weeks earlier; this was another example of al-Tajouri’s unpredictable agenda. By siding with the new government, TRB rapidly expanded its own influence in Tripoli through 2016 and 2017 by driving out militias opposed to the GNA. When forces loyal to former Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghawil attacked Tripoli in 2017, TRB was one of the militias fighting for the Government of Libya.
As the GNA-led Government of Libya lacked any regular armed forces during the period 2016-2018, it was entirely reliant on the support of existing militias in order to exercise basic security functions. This eventually led to the emergence of the “Tripoli Militia Cartel”, an uneasy alliance comprised of a few major armed factions nominally aligned with the government. TRB was part of this cartel, alongside the Special Deterrence Force (SDF, or “RADA”), Ghaniwa Brigade, and the Nawasi Battalion. While the “cartel” cooperated in order to limit the influence of other militias, there were also tensions and clashes within the cartel itself. By mid-2017, the Tripoli militia cartel purged most of its rivals from the city, nominally with the government’s mandate. The cartel militias took control over all relevant economic infrastructure, and carved up the city’s most important neighborhoods between themselves. For example, TRB controlled the neighborhood housing the foreign ministry. By mid-2018, TRB and its allies in the Tripoli Militia Cartel had grown so powerful that the Libyan government had no direct control over the groups; the cartel militias were even known for extorting various government institutions and of appropriating national resources. As such, TRB emerged as an independent non-state actor in the UCDP data for the first time in 2018.
On 19 September 2018, TRB alongside the Ghaniwa Brigade, Nawasi Battalion, Brigade 301, and Special Deterrence Force (SDF) created the Tripoli Protection Force (TPF); after this, TRB ceased to exist as an independent actor in the UCDP data.
Ghaniwa Brigade (alternatively the Abu Saleem Brigade) was an armed group active in Libya. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s security and military institutions suffered an almost complete collapse. Consequently, Libya experienced a rapid proliferation of armed militias and “brigades” – many comprised of fighters who had participated in the 2011 uprising – that sought to establish themselves as local or regional powerbrokers; it was in this context that the Ghaniwa Brigade emerged. The group pursued its own particularistic agenda that was focused on maintaining control over strategically important territory and economic infrastructure in Tripoli; the group did not have any overtly stated political goals of its own.
Former revolutionary fighters from Tripoli’s Abu Salim neighborhood – who had fought under the umbrella of the NTC rebel coalition – created the Ghaniwa Brigade at some point after the defeat of Gaddafi in October 2011. While the exact origins of the group were unclear, it was led by Abd al-Ghani al-Kikli, who was also known as “Ghaniwa”. In 2014, the Ghaniwa Brigade was part of the Libya Dawn coalition, which following fighting in Tripoli facilitated the ascension of the “National Salvation Government” (NSG) to government power on 24 August that year. During the rule of the NSG-led Government of Libya from late 2014 to March 2016, the Ghaniwa Brigade served as a de facto government armed force under the name “Central Security Apparatus’ (CSA) Abu Saleem Unit”.
When the new Government of National Accord (GNA) came to government power in March 2016, Ghaniwa Brigade was one of the Tripoli militias that decided to support it. This decision was motivated by al-Kiklis desire to obtain support from the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) – which had decided to side with the GNA – against rival militias from Misrata; consequently, the Ghaniwa Brigade aligned itself with the new government as well. The Ghaniwa Brigade thus became one of the militias that comprised the de facto armed forces of the GNA-led Government of Libya; by then, the group was sometimes referred to as “Abu Saleem Central Support Forces”. During the fighting against forces loyal to former Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghawill in 2017, the Ghaniwa Brigade played an important role among the forces fighting for the Government of Libya.
As the GNA-led Government of Libya lacked any regular armed forces during the period 2016-2018, it was entirely reliant on the support of existing militias in order to exercise basic security functions. This eventually led to the emergence of the “Tripoli Militia Cartel”, an uneasy alliance comprised of a few major armed factions nominally aligned with the government. The Ghaniwa Brigade was part of this cartel, alongside TRB, the Special Deterrence Force (SDF, or “RADA”), and the Nawasi Battalion. While the “cartel” cooperated in order to limit the influence of other militias, there were also tensions and clashes within the cartel itself. By mid-2017, the Tripoli militia cartel purged most of its rivals from the city, nominally with the government’s mandate. The cartel militias took control over all relevant economic infrastructure, and carved up the city’s most important neighborhoods between themselves. For example, the Ghaniwa Brigade controlled the Abu Salim neighborhood, and parts of the highway linking downtown Tripoli to the International Airport. By mid-2018, Ghaniwa Brigade and its allies in the Tripoli Militia Cartel had grown so powerful that the Libyan government had no direct control over the groups; the cartel militias were even known for extorting various government institutions and of appropriating national resources. As such, the Ghaniwa Brigade emerged as an independent non-state actor in the UCDP data for the first time in 2018.
On 19 September 2018, the Ghaniwa Brigade alongside TRB, the Nawasi Battalion, Brigade 301, and Special Deterrence Force (SDF) created the Tripoli Protection Force (TPF); after this, the Ghaniwa Brigade ceased to exist as an independent actor in the UCDP data.
Brigade 301 was an armed group active in Libya. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s security and military institutions suffered an almost complete collapse. Consequently, Libya experienced a rapid proliferation of armed militias and “brigades” – many comprised of fighters who had participated in the 2011 uprising – that sought to establish themselves as local or regional powerbrokers; it was in this context that Brigade 301 emerged. The exact origins of Brigade 301 was unclear, but the group was described as an “offshoot” of the Halbous Brigade, a powerful militia from the coastal town Misrata that had been part of the NTC rebel coalition during the uprising against Gaddafi; later, the Halbous Brigade had also been part of the Libya Dawn coalition.
Brigade 301 established itself as an independent actor in Tripoli and its environs at some point after 2016; the Halbous Brigade had been one of the most powerful military actors in the capital since 2014. The leaders of Brigade 301 were primarily ex-Halbous Brigade members from Misrata, but the group’s cadres were drawn from other parts of the country as well. The group became involved in the intense struggle for influence between the large number of militias present in Tripoli, and eventually took control over areas close to Tripoli International Airport, as well as the highway linking the airport to downtown Tripoli. The group also allied itself to the powerful Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB), one of the largest militias in the capital. Brigade 301 was also one of the militias that supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) that came to government power in March 2016. However, the link between Brigade 301 and the government appeared to have been severed at some point in early 2018.
As indicated above, Brigade 301 had close ties to other Tripoli-based militias. In 2017 and the first half of 2018, four powerful Tripoli militias nominally aligned with the Government of Libya – TRB, Ghaniwa Brigade, Nawasi Battalion, and the Special deterrence Force (SDF) – took control over most of the capital; these militias became known as the “Tripoli Militia Cartel”. Brigade 301 allied itself to the militia cartel, but did itself not control any highly valuable infrastructure in Tripoli. While the cartel and its allies – including Brigade 301 – were considered as “pro-government” actors, it became increasingly clear during 2018 that the Libyan government had no direct control over most Tripoli militias. The cartel militias were for example known for extorting government institutions for various favors, and in May 2018, Brigade 301 and TRB even evicted the Presidential Guard – a force tasked with protecting the government – from its positions in several parts of Tripoli. As such, the UCDP considered Brigade 301 as a separate non-state actor.
On 19 September 2018, Brigade 301 alongside TRB, Ghaniwa Brigade, the Nawasi Battalion, and Special Deterrence Force (SDF) created the Tripoli Protection Force (TPF); after this, Brigade 301 ceased to exist as an independent actor in the UCDP data.
