SUMMARY
The interstate conflict concerned what Somalia referred to as “Western Somalia”; the Ogaden region and adjacent areas in south-eastern Ethiopia, which was claimed by Somalia on ethnic and cultural grounds. Aiming to establish a Greater Somalia, which would also include Djibouti and parts of Kenya, Somalia attempted to invade the region in 1964, and then again in 1977-78. In 1980, the last Somali troops were pushed out of Ethiopia and while relations remained strained during the following years, the conflict did not become active again. An agreement was reached in 1988, but the basic conflict issue was not solved.
IN DEPTH
Background to the conflict
During colonial times, the Somali people were divided among no less than five states: Italian Somalia, French Djibouti, British Somaliland, British Kenya and Ethiopia. The independent Somali Republic was created in 1960 by the merger of only two of these entities (British Somaliland and Italian Somalia); something that did not satisfy the aspirations of Somali nationalism. Subsequently, in August 1960 the government of the newly independent state published a manifesto that called for the formation of a Greater Somalia, which would include Djibouti, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and above all the Ogaden desert and adjacent areas in south-eastern Ethiopia. This put Somalia on a collision course with a majority of all African states, which supported the idea of the inviolability of all frontiers inherited from the colonial era.
In particular, the expansionist claims made relations between Somalia and its neighbours strained and hostile. On the part of Ethiopia, Mogadishu’s claims were unfeasible and threatening. Giving up the territory that Somalia called “western Somalia” would mean the loss of almost a third of the country’s territory. Furthermore, while the Ogaden mostly consists of desert, the adjacent areas that were also claimed by Somalia were some of Ethiopia’s richest agricultural regions and they also had a strategic value. Further aggravating the situation was the fact that Ethiopia consisted of a multitude of ethnic groups and there were fears that Somali irredentism in the Ogaden would lead to other ethnic groups starting to press for a change in the status qou.
Addis Ababa had never fully brought the disputed region under effective control but maintained a low, non-confrontational presence. However, when Somalia’s independence neared and it became evident that the new state would attempt to stir up irredentist feelings in the Ogaden the Ethiopian state moved to increase its presence in the region. Taxes were imposed and military bases were established and from this widespread insurgency followed. Subsequently, through the first half of the 1960s there were frequent clashes between more or less organised Somali tribesmen and the Ethiopian army. On several occasions Ethiopian troops also entered Somali territory in hot pursuit of Somali rebels. While these were generously supported by Mogadishu, the Somali regular army does not appear to have been involved at this time. Relations between the two states deteriorated and they both set about to increase their military forces. Supported by a superpower each – the Soviet Union aiding Somalia and the United States giving military aid to Ethiopia – the two neighbours started an arms race that by the mid-1960s had made Ethiopia the largest military force in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1964 tensions came to a head and the Ethiopian and Somali regular armies turned their weapons directly on each other for the first time.
The 1964 fighting
1964 was the first year when the Somali army was directly involved in clashes in the disputed region. Fighting had erupted already in late 1963, but until February 1964 it appears as if the clashes were mainly taking place between the Ethiopian army and insurrectionist Somalis under the leadership of Mukhtal Taher. On 7 February, however, the Somali regular army launched an attack on the Ethiopian frontier post of Tog Wajaleh. The following days saw heavy fighting in the border region and the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie declared a state of emergency in the affected area.
The fighting was accompanied by accusations, protests and condemnations on the political front. The conflict was discussed at the meeting of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) Foreign Ministers in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and a resolution was approved, calling on Ethiopia and Somalia to proclaim an immediate ceasefire, to abstain from all hostile propaganda against each other, and to settle their dispute by peaceful means.
On 16 February, a ceasefire became effective when the Sudanese President announced that the Somali government had accepted the Dar-es-Salaam proposals. The ceasefire was however breached by both parties on numerous occasions though the remains of February and March. On 25 March, the Sudanese government convened a conference, aiming to solve the conflict. A complete agreement was subsequently reached on 30 March and an official announcement was made, stating that Ethiopia and Somalia had agreed to solve their dispute peacefully, to maintain a ceasefire, and to complete the withdrawal of military forces from the border. Furthermore, the parties had undertaken to appoint a joint commission to supervise the withdrawal and agreed to resume talks on the dispute shortly. On 30 May the joint commission announced that the evacuation of troops from the demilitarised border area had been concluded by both sides. During the latter half of the 1960s relations between Ethiopia and Somalia improved and a series of agreements were reached. The territorial question was not solved, however, and Somalia continued to actively press its demands, arguing that the normalisation agreements had been concluded so as to construct mechanisms for negotiating over the core issues. By the early 1970s, border skirmishes started to recur and relations deteriorated once again.
The Ogaden War (1977–1978)
In 1972 oil and gas was found in the disputed Ogaden region and tensions, which had erupted into clashes in 1964 began to increase yet again. Ethiopia started to build up its military presence along the border; something that was quickly countered by Somalia and in 1973 the two countries were on the brink of open conflict. However, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia seemed eager to initiate fighting and tensions eventually decreased.
In the mid-1970s, events in Ethiopia led the government in Mogadishu to believe that it had a good chance of achieving its goal of incorporating the Ethiopian Ogaden region into Somalia. The Ethiopian Imperial regime under Emperor Haile Selassie had been ousted in 1974 and the country subsequently experienced increasing internal problems. Apart from a bloody power rivalry within the ruling military council (the so-called Derg), the conflict in the then-Ethiopian region of Eritrea had escalated and a number of rebellions had broken out in other regions of the country. At the same time the army was weakened and by 1976 the country’s main military backer, the United States, withdrew its support due to the Derg’s clear turn to the left. Somalia, in contrast, had received large-scale military support from the Soviet Union and actively built up its forces.
The Somali regime initially tried to accomplish its goal by giving large-scale support to the WSLF (Western Somalia Liberation Front), a rebel group which Mogadishu had helped to set up. Apart from training and weapons, the Somali president, Siad Barre, also assigned some 3000 Somali troops to join the rebels in the Ogaden. The soldiers took off their uniforms, left their heavy weapons behind and joined the WSLF rebels in carrying out guerrilla-style attacks within Ethiopia (for more information about this and the intrastate conflict in general, see the section on the Ogaden conflict). When this did not produce the expected results, the decision was made to commit the Somali army to the Ogaden and on 13 July (some set the date to 23 July) 1977, thousands of Somali troops launched an invasion.
Within days the invading force had managed to push the Ethiopian troops out of most of the Ogaden, the latter only having artillery and antitank guns for protection. By early August only the towns of Dire Dawa, Harar and Jijiga stood in Somalia’s way of achieving its goal. In mid-August the Somali forces launched an attack on Dire Dawa and initially it looked like the city would fall, but when the Ethiopian air force arrived it was able to turn the tide and the attackers subsequently withdrew. Despite some further attacks in late August the Somali forces were never able to capture Dire Dawa. In September they instead turned their attention to Jijiga. During the first half of the month the city saw some of most bloody battles of the conflict, and it changed hands twice, only to fall to the Somali forces on 12 September 1977.
Even though the fall of Jijiga was a hard blow to Ethiopia, the tide had begun to turn by late September, with the Somali advance coming to a virtual standstill. This was mainly due to overextended fronts, bad weather and the harsh climate in the region. The rest of the year was characterized by a military stalemate, which neither side was able to break. During this time, the balance of forces shifted in favor of Ethiopia, which began to receive important outside backing. The Soviet Union, which the Derg regime had established good relations with early in the year, and which had been against the Somali invasion, eventually severed its ties to Mogadishu and began a massive airlift of weapons to Ethiopia. The superpower also deployed military advisors in the country, which helped the Ethiopian military plan the campaign in the Ogaden. Along with the Soviets came regular Cuban troops; starting with a few hundred in December and increasing to 18 000 by February 1978. Furthermore, two armed battalions from South Yemen had arrived in September, considerably boosting the army’s fire power. At the same time, Somalia failed to receive the hoped-for aid from the West.
In late January 1978, Ethiopia launched its counter-offensive, planned together with Russian and Cuban officers. The Ethiopian army quickly pushed the Somali troops eastwards and on 5 March Jijiga was re-captured. After this the Somali defeat was imminent. Somali President Siad Barre on 8 March announced the unilateral withdrawal of the Somali troops and on 23 March Addis Ababa declared that the last frontier post had been regained and that the war was officially over. This was not completely accurate, though, as Somali troops remained in control of Geladin, Shibalo, Mustahil, Ferfer and several other towns in an area that amounted to nearly a third of what it had seized in July-August 1977. Ethiopia did not press this issue in 1978, however.
The fighting re-erupts
After a majority of the Somali army had been pushed out of the Ogaden in early 1978, relations between the two neighboring states remained tense and hostile. Many of the events unfolding during the following year and a half were however more connected to the intrastate conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Somalia-backed rebel group WSLF (Western Somalia Liberation Front) that continued in the region, than to the interstate conflict over the status of the Ogaden. For example, in mid-1978 Addis Ababa threatened to invade Somalia unless Mogadishu stopped supporting WSLF. During the following year the two governments made claims and counter-claims of cross-border activity, invasions plans and bombing campaigns, most of which were impossible to substantiate.
In 1980, relations deteriorated even further and between May and July fighting between the two countries’ regular forces was again reported, when Somali troops were claimed to have made incursions across the border. This time, the reports were more credible than earlier announcements. For one, the Ethiopians displayed pictures of allegedly captured Somali armour and guns and read out the serial numbers of the captured armour and the names of the units of some of the killed Somali soldiers. Secondly, western diplomats claimed that the invading Somali force was around 8000 strong, and not 14 000, like Ethiopia had declared, thus inadvertently confirming that the Somali regular army was indeed taking part in the fighting. It appeared as if the Ethiopian army had by mid-July been able to fight off the Somali attack and the following two months saw Mogadishu claiming continued Ethiopian air attacks and an invasion attempt, neither of which could be corroborated.
On 28 August 1980, the Ethiopian army launched Operation Lash in eastern Ethiopia. The operation had two intertwined goals: to defeat the insurgents operating in this part of the country (see the section on the intrastate conflict in Ogaden) and to expel the last Somali troops from the territory. The latter were still controlling Geladin, Shibalo, Mustahil, Ferfer and several other towns in an area that amounted to nearly a third what it had seized in the July-August 1977 invasion. After having succeeded with the first aim – if not completely eliminating the rebels, at least significantly weakening them – the Ethiopian army turned to the second matter at hand and on 22 November opened a three-pronged attack against the Somali troops. The latter only offered weak resistance and by 3 December the operation was successfully terminated and Ethiopia had restored national sovereignty over the whole of the Ogaden.
The 1980s: Proxy warfare, negotiations and agreement
With the end of the 1980 clashes, no more fighting is included in UCDP data for the Ethiopia–Somalia territorial conflict. This is not to say that the Ogaden and the border region was peaceful during the 1980s; it was the scene of sporadic outbreaks of hostility between the two countries, the intrastate conflict between the government and the Somali-backed rebel group WSLF and the emergence of two anti-Mogadishu rebellions, supported by Addis Ababa.
In this context of continued suspicion, hostility and proxy warfare, peace initiatives and negotiations were difficult to initiate. However, in January 1986 the Somali President Siad Barre and his Ethiopian counterpart, Mengistu Haile Mariam, met in Djibouti and agreed to set up a committee that would be charged with improving relations between the countries. The envisioned committee was subsequently created and held two meetings during 1986, none of which led to any discernable progress. By the end of the second meeting Somalia continued to claim jurisdiction over ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden region, while Ethiopia maintained that existing territorial boundaries should be respected.
In 1988, events in Ethiopia served to move the negotiation process forward. In March the army had been defeated by the Eritrean rebels in a major battle at Afabet, losing thousands of men (see the section on the intrastate conflict in Eritrea), and President Mengistu badly needed to transfer troops based in the Ogaden to the Eritrean and Tigrayan fronts in the north. After talks involving both the two countries’ Presidents and Foreign Ministers an agreement was eventually reached on 3 April. The accord provided for the demilitarisation of the common border, the restoration of diplomatic relations and the exchange of prisoners of war. Furthermore, it stipulated that the two states would end assistance to insurgent groups operating out of each others’ territory and that they would refrain from the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other. The implementation of the agreement commenced immediately, and by August both the troop withdrawal and the prisoner exchange were completed.
It should be noted that the April 1988 agreement is not coded as a peace agreement in UCDP data, since it does not deal with the root issue – or incompatibility – of the conflict: the status of the Ogaden. Over the years Ethiopian President Mengistu had staunchly refused to discuss what he called secondary questions unless Somalia abandoned its claim to the Ogaden. However, the military pressure put on the army in northern Ethiopia in 1988 forced him to retreat on this, and he agreed to sign an accord that did not solve the basic problem. Mengistu subsequently expressed the hope that “the border issue, which is the main cause of contradiction and conflict between the two countries will be settled legally so as to create, once and for all, a situation in which it will be possible to create all-round cooperation.”
